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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

EDUCATIONAL HISTORY AS A FIELD OF STUDY

by



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A DISSERTATION

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance a thesis entitled "Educational History as a Field of Study" submitted by Henry William Hodysh in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

ABSTRACT

The objective of this thesis was to examine the development of the history of education as a study, to explicate and to assess the nature of history and its relation to the history of education, and to suggest a new approach to the writing of educational history.

The study was divided into three main sections.

Section One assessed trends in educational historiography and educational history as a field of study. It was found that educators often viewed educational history with a professional bias that resulted in an inadequate interpretation of the events. Recent inquiries indicated a need for the review and revision of philosophical and methodological perspectives in order to align the discipline with accepted canons of historiography.

Section Two clarified and advanced a historical perspective which stressed the need for an interdisciplinary view that allowed for the correction of many of the shortcomings of history and educational history indicated in Section One. The relationship of the critical philosophy of history to historical method and historiography was explored. The value of the philosophy and methodology of such writers as W. Dray and C. Hempel was discussed as it might be of use for the educational

historian. Emphasis was placed on bringing together different perspectives in order to clarify man's understanding of his past.

Section Three presented an original investigation into the development of education in the North Eastern United States from 1820 to 1850, using some of the ideas outlined in Section Two. Education was treated as more than formal schooling and was viewed in its interaction with the culture. An intellectual history perspective was used that stressed the interplay of ideas on ideas and ideas on the practice of education. The educative influence of such agencies as the press, church, family and working men's associations was assessed within the context of the pluralistic Jacksonian Era.

The study concluded with an analysis of the educational history, evaluating the use of some of the philosophical and methodological positions presented earlier.

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PART ONE

The Nature of the Study

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The nature of the history of education has frequently been an issue for debate, but only recently has the subject been examined with more serious consideration being given to its assumptions, its relationship to historical inquiry in general, and its ties with the forces shaping the cultural matrix of society. A report of the Committee on the Historical Foundations of the National Society of College Teachers of Education summarized its findings on the importance of the history of education to tertiary study.¹ B. Bailyn's Education in the Forming of American Society,² a publication of the Institute of Early American History and Culture, questioned the "traditional approach" to the history of education and suggested the necessity for a re-examination and re-interpretation of the history of education in view of its cultural milieu.

¹Committee on the Historical Foundations of the National Society of College Teachers of Education, History of Education Journal, 7 (1955-1956), 1-132.

²B. Bailyn, Education in the Forming of American Society: Needs and Opportunities for Study (New York: Vintage Books, 1960).

Two recent inquiries are Education and American History,³ a brief by the Committee on the Role of Education in American History, and an essay on the historiography of American Education by L. Cremin, The Wonderful World of Ellwood Patterson Cubberley.⁴

The preceding studies have not only queried the doctrines of many educators, but have directed the historian to problems concerned with the nature of history and of history of education. Some of the problems that would warrant investigation would include an exploration of the nature of history of education, of the forces that shaped its development, of its connection with "history," and of the value of such disciplines as sociology, psychology and the natural sciences to historical methodology. These and related problems have been suggested by the new interest in the history of education.

II. STATEMENT OF SPECIFIC PROBLEMS

The thesis concentrates on investigating and assessing both the nature and the status of history and of

³Committee on the Role of Education in American History, Education and American History (New York: The Fund for the Advancement of Education, 1965).

⁴L. Cremin, The Wonderful World of Ellwood Patterson Cubberley (New York: Teacher's College, 1965).

educational history. By way of example, a brief study in the light of some of B. Bailyn's guidelines completes the second stage of the investigation. The concluding phase assesses the idea of educational history as presented in stage one and its application as exemplified in the historical survey. The inquiry will be concerned with the following:

1. Examining the growth of American educational historiography.
2. Analyzing developments in the history of education as a field of study.
3. Investigating the nature of history and the role of the philosophy of history, historiography and historical method in historical study.
4. Assessing the relationship of other disciplines to history.
5. Examining the concept of educational history and assessing its relationship to educational history.
6. Presenting a brief study illustrating the writer's conception of historical inquiry in

education.

7. Discussing the idea of educational history and its application as exemplified in the historical survey.

III. DESIGN OF THE STUDY

The thesis is organized into three general areas. The first section assesses trends in educational historiography and educational history as a field of study. The second section explicates a historical perspective that recognizes the need for interdisciplinary studies. The third section provides an example of the use of intellectual history in treating educational developments, and an analysis of the example which is intended to demonstrate that the method of writing educational history which the thesis recommends has been employed.

The second chapter, through an investigation of the types of textbooks that were written in the history of education, indicates the forces that shaped its development. Through an examination of the influence of H. Barnard,⁵

⁵J. Brubacher (ed.), Henry Barnard on Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1931).

E. Cubberley⁶ and others, the writer maps the growth of the discipline. The fact that history of education in the beginning was written by educators, rather than historians, accounts in part for the continuing emphasis on the professional bias inherent in some history of education texts up to the present day. It was also of value to review the attitude of historians towards the history of education which indicated how their understanding of the subject affected its growth.

Chapter Three continues the discussion by examining the general development of the history of education as a field of study. The fortunes of the subject are viewed in relation to its use as a course of study in teacher training institutions. Its growth is charted from the turn of the twentieth century through the "twenties" and "thirties" and up to the present. The nature of educational history directs the discussion to various studies that report on the nature of, and expectations for the subject as a field of study. Educators and historians tended to view the subject from either a liberal arts or a professional preparation perspective which are the focal points for a concluding discussion that explores the dichotomy with a

⁶Cremin, loc. cit.

view to delineating educational history and its place in teacher training programs.

Chapter Four, "The Nature of History," indicates the role of a critical philosophy of history, historical method and historiography in the writing of historical events. It attempts to place these issues within the context of such problems, for example, as the autonomy, uniqueness and value nature of the discipline. Recent studies by H. Tennessen,⁷ C. Hempel,⁸ Q. Gibson,⁹ and W. Dray¹⁰ are compared to earlier studies, particularly those of H. Barnes¹¹ and J. Robinson.¹² It is through the

⁷H. Tennessen, "Science of History and Notions of Personality: Some Preliminary Remarks," Paper read before the International Colloquium on Logic-Physical Reality-History at Denver, Colorado, May16-20, 1956.

⁸C. Hempel, "Reasons and Covering Laws in Historical Explanation," Philosophy and History: A Symposium (ed.) S. Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1963), pp. 143-166.

⁹Q. Gibson, The Logic of Social Enquiry (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960).

¹⁰W. Dray, Philosophy of History (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964).

¹¹H. E Barnes, The New History and the Social Studies (New York: The Century Co., 1925).

¹²J. Robinson, The New History (originally published by Macmillan in 1912; Springfield, Massachusetts: Walden Press, 1958).

exploration of these and other viewpoints that the writer prepares to discuss the significance of the natural, social and behavioural sciences for history.

In the beginning of Chapter Five theory development and its possible use in history is investigated. By drawing parallels and showing similarities as well as differences between theories in the natural and historical sciences, a role for theory development in history is presented.

The possibility of adapting positivistic and idealistic interpretations of history to historiography is made. The works, for example, of F. Northrop,¹³ C. Hempel,¹⁴ and W. Dray¹⁵ are evaluated for the use of the practicing historian. This is supplemented by considering the importance of structural-functionalism for historical writing as found in the works of R. Merton,¹⁶ G. Homans¹⁷ and others. The preceding perspectives, in some cases,

¹³F. Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and Humanities (New York: Macmillan, 1947).

¹⁴Hempel, loc. cit.

¹⁵Dray, loc. cit.

¹⁶R. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1949).

¹⁷G. Homans, Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms (New York: Harcourt Brace and World Inc., 1961).

are adaptable to the historian's task and they are discussed with consideration to possible pitfalls and shortcomings.

Chapter Six explores the use of intellectual history for the study of educational developments. The weaknesses of the traditional history of education are the point of departure for considering education as more than formal schooling by accounting for the many cultural forces active upon the educational scene. The cultural approach, however, is in part opposed by some historians as well as some educators. F. Tolles,¹⁸ who favours the traditional history of education, advances arguments against the "Baillyn idea."¹⁹ It is these arguments that the writer questions, and then proceeds to a discussion of an intellectual history. The emphasis is placed not only on writing a history of ideas, but a history of ideas that accounts for the interaction of ideas and educational practice.

The history presented in Chapter Seven places education within the cultural context and then continues to an examination of the chief intellectual ideas of the

¹⁸F. Tolles, "Book Reviews," The Historian, XXIII (May, 1961), 364-365.

¹⁹Baillyn, loc. cit.

Jacksonian Period. The impact of these ideas on various educative agencies is explored through a variety of primary and secondary sources.

Chapter Eight, which analyzes the historical exemplar, indicates the implicit and explicit use of some of the philosophical and methodological perspectives developed earlier in the inquiry. The analysis is also delimited to a select number of examples.

CHAPTER II

AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL HISTORIOGRAPHY

The foundations of educational historiography in America were laid by men concerned with gathering useful information to serve and promote the interests of early colonizers.¹ The Works of J. Smith, for example, record his impressions of the colonies from 1608-1630 and deal primarily with geographical and administrative questions, only occasionally examining situations of a cultural nature. These men were not trained historians and their writings, though directed to financiers, political administrators and colonial governors, more often by accident than by design, considered many educational matters. Van Tassel writes:

Briefly, then, the first impetus to historical writing in colonial America came of the desire to promote settlement and investment in particular colonies, to defend or explain colonial administration, and to answer the demand for information about a new world. These traits were in no way representative of contemporary European historical writing, and therein lies a part of the significance of American historical studies. Because the authors of most of these early works offered knowledge of a strange land and of means by which settlers could survive and prosper in a wilderness, they dealt with many subjects which the historians of Europe did not consider to be fit material for a scholarly history.

¹J. Smith, Works 1608-1631, ed. E. Arber (Westminster: Archibald Constable and Co., 1895).

Bacon and Camden and Selden wrote of kings and parliaments and such matters of importance as changing political and military policies; tracts from the New World described small companies of men and how they raised corn, caught fish, governed themselves, and made war or peace with the Indians.²

American historians had at their disposal an abundance of source material that dealt with social and environmental conditions, the raw materials of a cultural perspective on history.³

The promotional tracts of the colonizers were supplemented by the writings of Puritan theologians who, by the eighteenth century had produced a substantial literature. In C. Mather's Magnalia Christi Americana: Or the Ecclesiastical History of New England from Its First Planting in the Year 1620, Unto the Year of Our Lord,

²D. Van Tassel, Recording America's Past (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 9.

³R. B. Morris, Government and Labor in Early America (New York: Octagon Books Inc., 1965), pp. 380-383. Morris indicates that the promise of formal schooling was a means of enticing the European settlers to America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and hence formed an indirect part of educational historiography.

"In making provisions for rudimentary education for apprentices the colonial indentures generally went considerably beyond the normal educational obligations of English apprenticeship articles. . . colonial articles of apprenticeship normally bound the master to have the apprentice instructed in ciphering at least. . . . Schooling was not infrequently provided for in the articles." p. 380.

1698,⁴ first published in 1702 and republished in 1820 in two volumes, we have one of the first studies in the treatment of the formal institutions of education. Mather wrote in many forms; history, biography, essays, sermons, fables, books of practical piety and theological treatises are to be found among his works. His Magnalia Christi is written in seven books; the first on the settlement of New England, the second on the lives of the governors, the third concerned with biographies of ministers, the fourth describing the story of Harvard College, the fifth on the Congregational Church in the colonies, the sixth on the "remarkable providences," and the last on various disturbances in the Churches.

Mather's chapter on the founding of Harvard College is part of the Puritan's concern to preserve and secure the interests of their religion and institutions. The Book tells of the laws, benefactors and vicissitudes of Harvard in addition to relating the lives of some of its prominent students. His work might be considered to be an ecclesiastical history, for Mather maintains that "the history, which we are now writing, does professedly

⁴C. Mather, Magnalia Christi Americana (2 vols.; Hartford: Silas Andrus, 1820).

intend nothing so much as the service of religion."⁵ This reveals his historical point of view which exalts the cause of godliness and celebrates the triumphs of the Puritans in the New World.

Until the time of the American Revolution, historical studies in America reflected the concerns of the colonists and the relationship of the Crown to the settlers.⁶ After the Revolution, historians were concerned with defending revolutionary ideals and they attempted to make them a symbol of national unity in order to demonstrate "that the Constitution was the most natural and perfect embodiment of the fruits of war," and that "rights of life, liberty, and property [were] carried on not by mobs, but an 'enlightened, virtuous, substantial body of uncorrupted citizens.'"⁷

Revolutionary ideals and the attempt to build a new nation had major effects on the course of American

⁵Mather, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 91. Italics in original.

⁶R. Schlatter, "The Puritan Strain," pp. 25-45, and W. Craven, "The Revolutionary Era," pp. 46-63, in J. Higham (ed.) The Reconstruction of American History (New York: Harper and Bros., 1962).

⁷Van Tassel, op. cit., p. 44, citing N. Webster, An American Selection of Lessons in Reading and Speaking (3rd. edition, greatly enlarged; Philadelphia: 1787, pp. 22-223).

educational historiography of the early nineteenth century.⁸ There is strong evidence to suggest that the emphasis on the development of a formal public school system, and the subsequent concern of those writing educational history at the time to interest themselves in such an endeavour reflected the intellectual trends of the time.

Prominent educational reformer, H. Barnard, introduced his American Journal of Education as an encyclopedia of American educational history and thought, a work originally planned for thirty-one volumes.⁹ Barnard's Journal is devoted to a descriptive study of local educational conditions as noted through travel, observation and questionnaires. It is devoid of personal remarks and criticism. The last volume was issued in 1881.

In his works, Barnard succeeded in clarifying and expressing his educational perspective in addition to editing, reprinting and translating numerous biographies

⁸This aspect is fully developed in the illustrative intellectual history of education from 1820 to 1850 in Chapter VII of the thesis.

⁹J. Brubacher (ed.), Henry Barnard on Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1931), p. 19.

and general historical studies. A major force upon Barnard's thinking was that of the European culture, and the ideals of an infinite capacity for human improvement. In his Eighth Annual Report, Barnard makes the following remark:

Whatever may be thought of the practical value of the experience of European States in the organization and administration of the System of Public Instruction, . . . no one who had reflected at all on this subject can doubt the applicability, with some modification, of many of the institutions and agencies which are employed there, especially in Germany, Holland and Switzerland Under the influence of these institutions and agencies, the public schools of certain districts of Europe have attained . . . a degree of excellence which has attracted the attention of statesmen, and commanded the admiration of intelligent educators in every part of Christendom.¹⁰

The public schools for Barnard appear to be great equalizing forces within society, functioning as perveyors of inspirational and reformatory values. Through the subject matter of history, for example, and the formal development of colleges, professional schools, and adult education, Barnard hoped to continue the democratization process.¹¹

The ideals of free, universal and compulsory

¹⁰H. Barnard, "Eighth Annual Report as Superintendent of Common Schools in Connecticut, 1853," pp. 180-182, cited in J. Brubacher, op. cit., p. 73.

¹¹H. Barnard, "Report on the Condition and Improvement of the Public Schools of Rhode Island, 1845," pp. 77-79, cited in Brubacher, op. cit., pp. 56-57.

common school education were further enforced by Barnard's proposal of 1868 calling for a central agency for the advancement of education in the United States, for the dissemination of knowledge on the subject of education, and "especially of the condition and means of improving society."¹² His proposal was not immediately adopted, but his efforts to advance the cause of public schools inspired a desire to write a single comprehensive history of schools in the United States for the centennial celebration of 1876. The history was never written but was planned to include three sections: a discussion of the forerunners of the public school, an examination of the genesis of the public school, and an examination of the development of the public school.¹³

Another crusader for a state-wide school system as the foundation of democratic society was J. Wickersham. By 1890, the majority of those concerned with education associated its growth with the genesis of the public school.

Further evidence of this attitude is found in the writings of A. Mayo who, upon the insistence of

¹²H. Barnard, "Report of the Commissioner of Education (United States) 1868," p. 11, cited in Brubacher, op. cit., pp. 200-201.

¹³L. Cremin, The Wonderful World of Ellwood Patterson Cubberley (New York: Teachers College, 1965), p. 12.

Commissioner Harris in 1893, commenced writing a history of the common school.¹⁴ Although the work was never published in a finalized form, the Bureau of Education managed to present various parts of it, each of which stressed the relationship of the ideal of the common school with the growth of American Democracy.¹⁵

P. Monroe, a compiler of vast amounts of material related to the growth of education and the history of education,¹⁶ presented the following point of view in his Founding of the American Public School System:

To give a clear view of all the forces shaping the attitudes and activities of any generation, a complete survey of the entire institutional structure of the society of that period would be required; for all institutions and social activities conduce to shape the ideals and ideas of the youth of the times. The present volume has no such ambitious aim. It explains the more commonplace idea of education as a school process, and aims to give an idea of the general laws and regulations creating social institutions¹⁷

Monroe is aware of the "other forces" that function within the area of education,¹⁸ but he delimits himself to the

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 16-17.

¹⁵E. Wesley, NEA: The First Hundred Years (New York: Harper and Bros., 1957), p. 117.

¹⁶P. Monroe (ed.), Cyclopedia of Education (New York: Macmillan Co., 1911-13).

¹⁷P. Monroe, Founding of the American Public School System (Vol. I; New York: Macmillan Co., 1940), p.vii.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 34 ff.

public school system. A number of factors might have led to his concentration upon public schools, including his interest in the schools per se, the lack of primary sources for a non-institutional study, or the need for time and resources to carry out a wider investigation. A certain factor, however, appears to have been the influence of such writers as Mayo and Wickersham, who by Monroe's time had agreed to "the more commonplace idea of education as a school process."¹⁹

Near the turn of the century E. Brown's, The Making of Our Middle Schools²⁰ and T. Davidson's, A History of Education²¹ appeared in the field of educational history. Brown's work, dealing with an institutional history of American education omits any discussion of the cultural forces acting upon the formal system. In his "Preface," Brown claims that he is preparing a book for two classes of readers:

First, for such as are making or are disposed to make a serious study of American education in its process of development; and secondly, for such "general

¹⁹Ibid., p. vii.

²⁰E. Brown, The Making of Our Middle Schools (3rd edition; London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907).

²¹T. Davidson, A History of Education (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1900).

readers" as may seek an acquaintance with our educational annals, for any of the thousand reasons which guide general readers in their choice of books.²²

Brown's concern with schooling and his disregard for the social forces that determined the formal education is complete. He is unwilling to acknowledge the significance of culture and assumes that his history of schools provides the much needed "comprehensive view" of American education.

Davidson's text, however, treats education as a consciously developed evolutionary process that had seemingly resulted in the inevitable improvement of man.

Seeing that immanent purpose of evolution is the realization of free individuals, that is, moral personalities, I have endeavored to mark the steps by which this has been gradually attained, and to indicate those that have yet to be taken.²³

In the light of usually accepted methodological canons of historiography,²⁴ it would appear that Davidson's work is not history but historicism--an historicism that appears to be grounded in the inevitable progress of man. He believes that by placing "education in relation to the

²²Brown, op. cit., p. vii.

²³Davidson, op. cit., p. v.

²⁴E. Carr, What is History? (Victoria: Penguin Books, 1961); L. Gottschalk, Understanding History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963); or J. Barzun and H. Graff, The Modern Researcher (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1957).

whole process of evolution, as its highest form," it will attain "a dignity which it could hardly otherwise receive or claim."²⁵ The history of education is recognized as a messianic tool of reform.

The trend of educational history to approximately 1900 revealed a number of characteristics: First, education was primarily considered to be schooling and its history was a history of schools; second, democratic ideals and the growth and reform of schools and society were considered to work "hand-in-hand" and were the main concern of the history of education in America.

Notice, however, must be taken of Adams,²⁶ Dexter²⁷ and Eggleston,²⁸ who attempted to view education as more than formal schooling. Adam's nine-volume History of the United States of America During the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison, published in 1891, concentrates

²⁵Davidson, op. cit., pp. v-vi.

²⁶H. Adams, The Formative Years: A History of the United States of America During the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison, ed. by H. Agar (Vol. I; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1947).

²⁷E. Dexter, A History of Education in the United States (New York: Macmillan Co., 1914).

²⁸E. Eggleston, The Transit of Civilization (first published in 1900 by Appleton and Co.; Boston: Beacon Press, 1959).

on a political history of the United States. In his first volume, however, Adams investigates the vast range of influences, formal and informal institutions and traditions, that shaped the mind and character of early America.

Education is a part of the culture and hence is concerned with social, economic, religious and political forces.²⁹

Another attempt at a cultural approach to education is that of E. Dexter's A History of Education in the United States, a compendium of facts concerned with informal and formal educational processes. The work is divided into three main parts: "The Growth of the People's Schools," "Higher and Special Education," and "Educational Extension." Dexter states his purpose:

I have been governed by the belief that the most crying need of the student of our educational history is a considerable mass of definite fact upon which to base his own generalizations, or with which to interpret those of others, rather than extended philosophical discussions of historical trend. Current educational literature is rich in the latter, though comparatively barren of the former, and when it does appear, is of necessity disconnected. That the work is then, essentially institutional--perhaps more appropriately termed a Chronicle than a History--is a part of the plan, and if a defect, is one fully reckoned with, for of two evils the lesser has seemed to me to be the omission of the philosophy rather than the fact.³⁰

²⁹Adams, op. cit., pp. 3-97.

³⁰Dexter, op. cit., p. vii.

Dexter does not emphasize the relationship of culture to education. He does, however, examine education in its broader perspective as involving the communication of ideas. For example, he investigates the contribution of newspapers, magazines, libraries, learned societies and lyceums as a part of "Educational Extension," and provides the student with a wealth of facts and figures that could be adapted to a study of education in culture.

In 1900, E. Eggleston published The Transit of Civilization from England to America in the Seventeenth Century, and as Schlesinger suggests, produced a "notable milestone in the history of American historiography."³¹ The work is concerned with cultural rather than a narrow political or military history of the times. However, Hutton and Kalisch suggest that his work was not well received by scholars of his day.³² This reaction might be expected, for Eggleston, a pioneer as a social historian of America, maintained that the subject matter of many historians did not interest him. He attributed part of the

³¹Eggleston, op. cit., commentary by A. Schlesinger in an introductory statement, p. xix.

³²H. Hutton and P. Kalisch, "Davidson's Influence on Educational Historiography," History of Education Quarterly, VI (Winter, 1966), 79-87. See Chapter III of this thesis in the use of Davidson's text from 1900-1907.

difficulty to the attitude of college professors of history who gave "those of us who are not of that clan the cold shoulder."³³

Although the fifth and longest chapter of Eggleston's study examines the formal role of education in society, the remainder of the work establishes the cultural base affecting school development, treating of law and custom, religious and moral outlooks, and literature.

Though scholars since his time have piled up detailed studies of many of the same themes, Eggleston's pioneering effort still shines through with a special glow of its own. From this longer perspective for example, the late Carl Van Doren, American historian and man of letters, termed the work "erudite, humane, and graceful," Ferris Greenslet, the biographer, has called it the best of all of Eggleston's many writings, "a learned, vividly written, yeasty book"; and Michael Kraus, weighing the two Eggleston volumes in his History of American History, has declared, more restrainedly, that they are still informative, better written than most historical treatises and "not as well known as they should be."³⁴

Eggleston's investigation of cultural factors had little effect upon the educational historiography of the times, and studies concentrating upon the public school ideal continued to be written.

Considered as a landmark in the history of

³³Van Tassel, op. cit., p. 176.

³⁴Eggleston, op. cit., commentary by A. Schlesinger in an introductory statement, p. xviii.

education was Cubberley's Public Education in the United States,³⁵ first published in 1919 and revised and enlarged in 1947. The study recognizes three phases in the development of American education: the founding of the universal public schools, the public school as a modifying influence upon character, and the effect of industrialization and urbanization upon current educational practice. These developments are treated apart from the cultural foundations of education and exhibit a concern with the legal and organizational structure of the public schools. Bailyn, in his Education in the Forming of American Society,³⁶ attacks Cubberley for anachronism in that he looked for the seeds of the public school in the colonial period, and for parochialism by confusing education with schooling. He writes:

Imbalance, quaintness, and jagged discontinuities mark these brief treatments of the colonial period. Mountains were made of religion in the Puritan laws of the 1640's, of the Symes and Eaton bequests, of hornbooks, dame schools

.

The story lurched and bumped along without apparent

³⁵E. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States (Revised and enlarged edition, first published in 1919; Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1947).

³⁶B. Bailyn, Education in the Forming of American Society (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1960).

purpose or direction. Organization, so clear a reflection of understanding, was primitive when it existed at all. Three "type attitudes" framed Cubberley's colonial material: "compulsory maintenance attitude" (Massachusetts), "parochial-school attitude" (Pennsylvania), and "the pauper school non-state-interference attitude" (Virginia).³⁷

Bailyn, questioning the Mayo, Wickersham, Monroe and Davidson idea of education, rests the blame for the continuation of this trend partially on the shoulders of Cubberley. Indeed, Cubberley continues the trend and incorporates the ideals of the messianic tradition of educational history as part of the program for the professional preparation for teachers. History is being written to espouse a cause and is extracted from the cultural context of which it is a vital part. Three factors, however, should be considered. First, Cubberley names his study Public Education in the United States, and in this respect forewarns the reader that his study is concerned with the "common school" idea. Second, Cubberley's overemphasis on religion in the colonial schools might have resulted from a paucity of other materials. Apart from the shortcomings that Bailyn and others³⁸ have pointed out, Cubberley's work is a mine of information on the public schools that could be employed

³⁷Ibid., p. 13.

³⁸Cremin, loc. cit.

in studies more fully cognizant of cultural forces. Although Cubberley has failed to provide an educational history which is satisfactory to all, much of the ground work which he has completed is of potential value to historians who could adapt much of his research to a wider context of social-cultural history.

There have been many attempts to write the history of education from a cultural perspective. In his History of Education, for example, Mulhern states that his study

. . . does not view education as embracing only pedagogical theories and practices, isolated from their social setting. It views it, rather, as an aspect of the total cultural scene in the societies and historical periods with which it deals.³⁹

He attempts to embrace the economic, political, social, and intellectual factors that affect formal educational developments. Mulhern moves from preliterate societies right on through to twentieth century education in 720 pages. His intentions are admirable, but the task he has set himself is unmanageable.

Reference can also be made to E. Knight's

³⁹J. Mulhern, A History of Education (New York: Ronald Press, 1959), p. iii.

Twenty Centuries of Education.⁴⁰ His text is divided according to general themes such as the rise of scientific inquiry, growth of the public school idea, and the problem of meeting democratic needs. On page ix of the preface he separates theory from practice, and states that the "material has been presented as concretely as possible. Emphasis has been on conscious movements and leaders, and more upon practices than upon theories."

On page x he suggests that his work has been written "to assist prospective teachers and functioning administrators." Knight's labors are largely a directive for the professionalization and reform of education in order to meet the needs of a democratic society.

Two other works worthy of closer study are one by F. Butts and L. Cremin,⁴¹ the other by R. Welter.⁴² In their History of Education in American Culture, Butts and Cremin suggest that the history of education involves an assessment of our cultural and educational traditions. "It

⁴⁰E. Knight, Twenty Centuries of Education (New York: Ronald Press, 1959), p. iii.

⁴¹F. Butts and L. Cremin, A History of Education in American Culture (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1953).

⁴²R. Welter, Popular Education and Democratic Thought in America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962).

should help educators make judgements concerning what of our past culture is good for the future and thus needs to be strengthened."⁴³ The authors imply that educational history should preserve and encourage the development of certain ideological ideals, and that this task is part of the responsibility of the educator. The study by Butts and Cremin is culturally oriented, and although their work is directed to professional educators, it appears to be one of the better investigations of American education.

Welter's Popular Education and Democratic Thought in America is a delimited study of the relationship between popular education and democracy. Major portions of the study are concerned with politics, but Welter tends to relate these efforts to the general culture through the exploration of a wide selection of source materials including newspapers and periodicals.

The preceding discussion indicates that in the majority of instances the growth and development of historical writing in education has been identified with the functional objectives of the professional educator and the cause of the common school ideal. As a result, educational history has concentrated on the history of educational

⁴³Butts and Cremin, op. cit., p. vii.

institutions, and has largely ignored the cultural and other educative forces.

General historians frequently view the history of education from one of three positions. One of these is exemplified by M. Curti in The Growth of American Thought,⁴⁴ where he treats educational developments within the broader context of social history and employs biographies, autobiographies, and periodicals in his study. A similar approach is used by R. Riegel,⁴⁵ but he examines education from an institutional perspective, excluding an extended consideration of social forces. Another position is seen in the complete reliance on the institutional aspects of education as found in Fish's, Rise of the Common Man, where in his "social approach" he advocates the writings of Cubberley, Dexter, Wickersham, Knight, Parker and Monroe.⁴⁶ On the other hand, F. Turner, who writes on American history from 1830 to 1850, makes only passing reference to educational history, and concerns himself with political,

⁴⁴M. Curti, The Growth of American Thought (second edition; New York: Harper and Bros., 1951).

⁴⁵R. Riegel, Young America 1830-1840 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1949).

⁴⁶C. Fish, The Rise of the Common Man (Vol. VI of A History of American Life. Eds. A. Schlesinger and D. Fox; New York: Macmillan Co., 1929), pp. 363-364.

military and economic affairs.⁴⁷

Bailyn insists that "the main weakness of the history written by the educational missionaries of the turn of the century derived directly from their professional interests," and hence they have written apart from the mainstream of American historiography.⁴⁸ The latter part of this statement is open to further investigation. First, a study of history texts pertaining to the cultural growth of the United States reveals that general historians are often interested in political and economic developments. Education is frequently given cursory treatment, and in many instances not treated at all. Second, Bailyn's interest in education appears to fall into the area of social history, a field which for many years has been the concern of American historians.⁴⁹ Little, however, has been completed in the way of research into any specialization from an educational point of view. Third, if professional interests have dominated educational history,

⁴⁷F. Turner, The United States, 1830-1850 (New York: Henry Holt, 1935), pp. 81, 131.

⁴⁸Bailyn, op. cit., p. 9.

⁴⁹G. Bancroft, History of the United States of America, From the Discovery of America (Author's last revision, New York: Appleton and Co., 1912); and E. Channing, A History of the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1927).

the general historians have been partly to blame, for they have generally not concerned themselves with education, and hence, by default have left the field to educators. This, of course, does not free educators from the responsibility for writing a socially based history. It only suggests that not until the 1930's, and especially the post World War II period, had general historians, let alone educational historians, given serious attention to the interaction of cultural forces upon historical events.⁵⁰

Although the writer is aware of the dangers of generalization, certain features of the studies in educational history seem worthy of comment.

1. Although all historians have particular interests such as politics, agriculture, economics, or education, it was found, for example, that an article on "The Northern-born community of New Orleans in the 1850's" in the Journal of American History⁵¹ presented a social history dealing with

⁵⁰H. Wish, The American Historian (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 293-295.

⁵¹W. Chenault and R. Reinders, "The Northern-born Community of New Orleans in the 1850's," Journal of American History 51 (1964-65), 232-247.

education as a factor in the historical perspective. The significance of institutions in education was not emphasized.

2. Both general and educational historians write monographs on institutions and personalities prominent in education. A need for these in-depth studies exists in order to contribute to the body of accurate historical knowledge, to correct historical misconceptions in the light of additional evidence, and to provide a firmer basis for historical trends and generalizations.
3. Historians of education follow numerous patterns in their presentation of objectives and content, and the relationship of stated objectives to content. A sampling of the types of history of education texts is considered below.
 - a. Text and articles of a biographical nature are common: F. Thursfield, "Ellwood Patterson Cubberley," Harvard Educational Review, IX (1939), pages 43-62 is an example. Such presentations not only examine the life history of the

educator but often present and then comment upon his theory and ideals.

- b. Texts and articles that present the history of education as institutional history: E. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States (revised, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1947) is an example.
- c. Texts and articles dealing with history according to periods: F. Eby and C. Arrowood, History and Philosophy of Education, Ancient and Medieval (New York: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1940) is an example.
- d. Texts and articles that present a thematic or problematic approach: E. Wilds and F. Lottich, Foundations of Modern Education (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961) and E. Meyers, Education in the Perspective of History (New York: Harper and Bros., 1960) are examples.
- e. Texts and articles on the theory of education: J. Rousseau, Emile (London: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1911) is an example.

f. Texts and articles written in monograph form: P. Abelson, The Seven Liberal Arts (New York: Columbia Teachers College, 1906) is an example.

Though the above division is arbitrary and tentative, it is indicative of the variety of materials open to scrutiny.

CHAPTER III

AN ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION AS A FIELD OF STUDY: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

Educational history as a field of study has been influenced by a number of factors both from within and without the discipline itself.

F. Lilge in "The Functionalist Fallacy and the History of Education" reviews an educational sociologist's attitude towards history of education:

His [the educational sociologist] criticisms of the manner in which it has usually been written and taught are largely justified, and I suspect that much of his opposition is derived from his own unpleasant memories of the courses and texts to which he was once subjected. There is, for example, Cubberley's text written in the fact-collecting tradition of scholarship. While the author did not wholly lack a philosophy of history, his philosophy sustains the work insufficiently The great currents of educational thought are dissipated into little pools and rivulets, and the great issues get buried inaccessibly under piles of information

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Monroe, on the other hand, avoided the dangers of zealous factualism only to commit the opposite error of excessive generalization. Some sections of his text . . . deteriorate into a veritable carnival of classification in which such ghostly characters as "humanistic realists," "social realists," "disciplinary-arians," and naturalistic, scientific, psychological

and sociological "tendencies" try in vain to leave an impression on the student's mind.¹

He concludes with the belief that historical studies are of "irreplaceable educational value when they allow the student to observe and examine repeatedly major social phenomena and problems under sets of variable conditions."² His criticism is not constructive and offers little in the way of suggested reforms.

Although the subject of educational history has been used in those institutions concerned with the training of teachers, its popularity as a field of study has fluctuated. For example, it was considered a valuable study in the Province of Manitoba in 1902.³ A review of the required examinations in their program indicates that the growth and development of schools formed a major part of the subject, and it was noted that T. Davidson's evolutionary approach was standard until 1907.⁴

¹F. Lilge, "The Functionalist Fallacy and the History of Education," School and Society, 65 (April 5, 1947), 242.

²Ibid., p. 243.

³Report of the Manitoba Department of Education Ending December 31, 1902 (Winnipeg, Manitoba: Government Printer), pp. 1, 4.

⁴Report of the Manitoba Department of Education Ending December 31, 1907 (Winnipeg, Manitoba: Government Printer), p. 80.

The Province of Alberta in its First Annual Report of the Department of Education, also listed the history of education as a required course of study for teacher certification.⁵ G. J. Bryan, principal of the normal school, outlined its role in the following manner:

Our work has its theoretical and its practical phase. The first and second months of the session are devoted to the discussion of the Philosophy of Education, the History of Education, Psychology, Teaching and Class Management While it is impossible to deal with these subjects at great length, still we endeavour to create a certain attitude towards method and subject-matter,--the critical attitude which does not accept as Gospel the dicta of educational writers or rest content with common practice, but which puts all things to the test and desires to hold fast that which is good.⁶

The examination in the history of education was concerned with two fundamental learnings. The student was required to discuss questions pertaining to the history of formal schooling and the theories of educators, and second, to relate the theories and values of educational thinkers to possible practices in the classroom situation.⁷ It would

⁵See T. Davidson's, History of Education (New York: C. Scribners' Sons, 1900), which was popular in both Manitoba and Alberta during the early 1900's. Also see examination questions in Second Annual Report of the Alberta Department of Education, 1907 (Edmonton, Alberta: Government Printer), p. 104.

⁶First Annual Report of the Alberta Department of Education, 1906 (Edmonton, Alberta: Government Printer), p. 37.

⁷Ibid., pp. 206, 210.

appear that educational history was presented as the study of formal schooling insofar as it would guide prospective teachers in pupil-teacher relationships.

A number of factors adversely affected the growth of the history of education as an academic discipline. For example, people trained primarily in curriculum, administration, or psychology were frequently assigned a major role in teacher education.⁸ This partly reflected the status accorded the pragmatic and empirical subjects in the teaching profession, made fashionable by such men as E. Thorndike and L. Terman.⁹ Ideals of scientific research, based on experimental techniques, were considered to be relevant to the field of education.

Not only did the new science of education claim to show the teacher how to teach, and how to measure what he taught, but it also claimed the power to decide what to teach. Not only the means but the ends of education were to be arrived at scientifically. Through the scientific techniques of "job analysis" and "activity analysis" Charters and Bobbitt believed

⁸O. J. Williamson, Provisions for General Theory Courses in the Professional Education of Teachers (New York: Teachers College, 1936), p. 67.

⁹E. Thorndike, An Introduction to the Theory of Mental and Social Measurements (New York: Teachers College, 1913); L. Terman, The Intelligence of School Children (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1919).

the purposes of education and the content of the curriculum could be determined and made practical.¹⁰

Theory courses, such as philosophy and history, in the training of teachers assumed a secondary role.

A series of studies investigating the importance and worth of the history of education reflected both favorably and unfavorably upon the field. In 1907 the National Education Association recommended that the history of education, among other subjects, be made common professional background for all teachers.¹¹ A follow-up study by L. Koos and C. Woody in 1917 investigated the extent to which the recommendations were accepted in the State of Washington. The participants in the study included 496 teachers and thirty-nine high school principals and superintendents.¹² Of 451 teachers reporting, 315 indicated that the history of education was part of their professional training. By way of comparison, 330 teachers indicated preparation in the area of psychology, the most

¹⁰Williamson, op. cit. Italics in original.

¹¹E. Wesley, NEA: The First Hundred Years (New York: Harper and Bros., 1957), pp. 297, 347.

¹²L. Koos and C. Woody, "The Training of Teachers in the Accredited High Schools in the State of Washington," The Eighteenth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education (Bloomington, Illinois: Public School Publishing Co., 1919), pp. 246-257.

popular field. Only 12.7 per cent of the teachers considered the history of education to be their "most helpful" course, ranking it one step above elementary school curriculum, the subject considered to be of least value by the teachers. The practical worth of professional courses for classroom conditions appeared to be the criterion for "most helpful." The superintendents ranked educational history as fifth in importance as compared to the teachers' ranking of fourteenth.¹³ In the light of their study the authors could

. . . not refrain from noting that the course in the history of education, one of the oldest courses in the field and, therefore, one that has had ample time to have been made useful . . . should have proved so sterile in utility in teaching as to have been checked as most useful by hardly more than one-eighth of those who reported that it had been a part of their professional training. The percentage is so small as to leave grave doubt in the mind as to whether this course should be regarded as sufficiently useful to be continued . . .¹⁴

It appears that Koos and Woody were themselves advocates of a particular kind of utility that reflected the influence of the pragmatic, functional value of teacher training courses.

H. Rainey published "A Study of the Curricula of State Teachers Colleges" in 1925, which indicated that

¹³Ibid., p. 251.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 252.

history of education courses in seventy-one teachers' colleges ranked fifth on an eight point scale in the total number of course offerings for professional subjects, and that it was on the decline as a field of study in teacher preparation.¹⁵ Rainey's study lends support to O. J. Williamson's statement that there was a tendency to curtail theoretical courses in education in the teacher training curricula in the period intervening between 1922 and 1932.¹⁶

S. Rich, writing at the same time as Rainey, also attacked the history of education on grounds that it did not relate to the social conditions of the period under study, and devoted insufficient attention to the practical problems of teaching.¹⁷ He writes:

The history of education is not taught to future administrators alone, nor to future theorists in education: since it is taught to practitioners, it should be the history and social setting of educational practice. By this is meant the practice of teaching, not the practice of organization or of curriculum-making. It may be here added that the

¹⁵H. Rainey, "A Study of the Curricula of State Teachers Colleges," Educational Administration and Supervision, 11 (Oct., 1925), 468.

¹⁶Williamson, op. cit., p. 99.

¹⁷S. Rich, "Wanted: A Better History of Education," Educational Administration and Supervision, 11 (April, 1925), 239.

writer's opinion is that the ineffectiveness of the history of education as a subject of professional instruction is due primarily to its dealing with matters that affect the classroom teachers only indirectly.¹⁸

He proposed that less time be devoted to history prior to the Reformation and that the emphasis be placed on practical problems of teaching. A history, however, that attempts to concentrate exclusively upon practice at the expense of its theoretical basis should not rightfully be considered to be a history at all, let alone a cultural history which by its very terms implies the study of the theoretical groundwork of society's ideals as well as practices.

Additional documentation of the decline of history as a field of study is made by O. Williamson's report of 1933 which maintained that in 1922,

. . . 29 per cent of the institutions offering two years of normal work required history of education, in 1932 only 6 per cent; in 1902 history of education was a required subject in 89 per cent of the institutions.¹⁹

The history of education up to the 1930's, however, was offered and considered valuable in many colleges. In 1924, while the stress on a practical, functional curriculum still dominated educational thought, W. C. Reavis'

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Williamson, op. cit., p. 99.

review of E. Hardy's unpublished master's thesis on the professional offerings of thirty training institutions during the years 1921-1922, indicated that history of modern education was presented in twenty-five of those institutions, the history of education in the United States in twenty, general surveys of educational history in twelve, history of comparative education in ten and history of education in earlier periods in nine.²⁰ Reavis' own belief was that a "science of teaching" was foundational to all teacher preparation.²¹

The influence of science had so permeated the teacher training program by 1925 that A. Jones attempted to separate the growing bond between the functional value and the scientific orientation. He notes the following:

There is . . . a very real danger that we shall become so absorbed in making a science out of our subject that we shall neglect to develop the skills that we all know are so necessary. Another danger already pointed out is that in the process of developing a science much material will be included which is necessary to the development of the science but which cannot be made to function in the experience of the

²⁰W. C. Reavis, "The Determination of Professional Curriculums for the Training of Teachers for Secondary Schools," School Review, 32 (Jan., 1924), 30, citing E. Hardy, "Professional and Non-Professional Curricula in Schools of Education and Colleges," Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Department of Education, University of Chicago, 1922.

²¹Ibid., p. 33.

teacher. This is notably true in the history of education and is becoming apparent in some of the new "sciences"

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I have been led to stress principles or ideals, rather than applications²²

He continues, somewhat in contradiction of his own statement, by suggesting that he is in favor of both skills and principles as being part of the teacher training program, and history in particular. His conclusion, however, is weak and it leaves the reader with the confused impression that skills, ideals, principles, applications and "science" are in some manner related, but exactly how is uncertain.²³

A significant change in the outlook taken towards the history of education is that of E. B. Wesley, who in 1933 advanced reasons for the unpopularity of the study. He maintained that the "most fundamental" explanation for the slight esteem with which teachers regard the discipline is that the majority of subjects in professional study are of "direct and immediate value."²⁴ Wesley believed that

²²A. Jones, "The Professional Curriculum of the College of Education in the Light of Job Analysis of Teaching," Journal of Educational Research, X (October, 1924), 248.

²³Ibid., p. 248.

²⁴E. Wesley, "Lo, The Poor History of Education," School and Society, 37 (Jan. - June, 1933), 620.

a prime purpose of educational history was the transmission of values, which in itself might be slow but, nevertheless in the "long-run," most rewarding. This, he hoped could be accomplished by extending the training period for teachers, although he realized that those concerned with teacher preparation were often unable or unwilling to permit an extension of time to allow for such study.

Wesley's criticism also extended to the historians who, he claims, had neglected the history of education, and had abandoned the field to educators who were untrained and hence unprepared to write a history which was not narrowly professional or frequently "unscientific."²⁵

Reasons for the historians having avoided educational history were many, not the least of which Wesley suggested was that the professionally trained historian had no financial or professional incentive to enter a field which was associated with teacher training colleges, and was dominated by a group "which he regards as utterly incompetent to work it."²⁶

In addition to these factors, Wesley considered the field to be poorly defined.

²⁵Ibid., p. 621.

²⁶Ibid.

Now it is a history of civilization, now the path of world evolution, now the record of organized administrative practice, now the summary of educational theory, now the account of educational method, now a digest of cultural development, now a history of the curriculum²⁷

His appeal for a clarification of the problems facing the history of education foreshadowed, by a quarter of a century, many of the shortcomings noted by B. Bailyn.²⁸

The American economic collapse of the "thirties" signalled a flood of questions pertaining to education. Some of these were: "What should be taught to future teachers?", "Should professional preparation primarily be apprenticeship?" and "Should theoretical education be stressed more or less?". There were varied answers given by educators. For example, T. Woody envisioned a new purpose for teacher education and educational history.

First, there must be a definite order of studies, beginning with the general and theoretical and concluding with the practical; second, an adequate limit to time must be allowed to do a scholarly job . . . third, the easy assumption that anybody who has studied some education, and has had a little experience, can teach history of education, philosophy of education, and educational sociology, must be set aside,²⁹

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ B. Bailyn, Education in the Forming of American Society (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1960), passim.

²⁹ T. Woody, "Clio and the Teacher; Or the Place of History of Education in the Education of Teachers," School and Society, 39 (March, 1934), 325.

He then states five principal functions of educational history for professional preparation.

1. To cultivate a healthy scientific skepticism in the teacher;
2. To provide guidance and orientation through knowledge of the past;
3. To outline the evolution of educational practices in their cultural framework;
4. To examine the interrelationship between the culture and educational practices, philosophies and institutions; and
5. To inspire good teaching.³⁰

The function of the history of education, by affecting the knowledge and values of the teacher, is to assist in the reconstruction of society. During the "thirties" the question of educational purpose came to the fore in academic thought. Educational sociology, comparative education, and educational philosophy and history joined with the educational testing and measurement movement in

³⁰Ibid., pp. 326-330.

the hope of a socio-economic renaissance.

The writings of George Counts, Harold Rugg, and others³¹ accompanied the work of Woody in suggesting the direction the educational task should move in the process of reconstruction.

Many of the above educators have stressed two dominant themes for the study of the history of education. First, educational history must be made practical and functional; and second, particularly with the re-examination of societal values during the depression of the thirties, educational history must be related to the cultural background of society.

It is relevant that the terms "functional" and "practical" are often associated by educators in their attempt to defend the value of the history of education, a problem that the general historian seldom encounters.

Towards the middle of the 1930's, the use of "function" became more and more frequent in educational literature. C. C. Crawford, in 1938, outlined a "practical, present-day" approach to the study of educational history.

³¹G. Counts, The American Road to Culture (New York: John Day, 1930); and Dare the School Build a New Social Order (New York: John Day, 1932); H. Rugg, The Great Technology (New York: John Day, 1933); W. Kilpatrick et al, The Educational Frontier (New York: Appleton-Century, 1933).

He questioned whether history should "be taught for storage of information or for guidance in solving the problems of American life today?"³² Crawford favored the latter purpose, and suggested that "adequate solutions for present day problems" would be the benefit of such a functional approach.³³ History, therefore, becomes problem-centered and dependent, in the main, on educational issues of the present. Many historians now felt justified in presenting a history which was related to the profession and frequently apart from the culture.

By the 1940's, World War II had stimulated educators to review their outlook of the educational canvass. A re-examination of cultural values and educational purposes was the outcome.³⁴ Long-term educational goals were examined, and the possibility of employing history as a guide to a "better world" was explored. R. Schneideman in Democratic Education in Practice argued that the school must

. . . introduce a new kind of education into the lives of all Americans of all ages, to prepare them to think

³²C. C. Crawford, "Can History Be Taught Functionally?," School and Society, 48 (Dec., 1938), 856-857.

³³Ibid., 856-857.

³⁴R. Ulich, Fundamentals of Democratic Education (New York: American Book Co., 1940).

for themselves, and to give them a desire to work for the improvement of society and the brotherhood of man.³⁵

Educators supported the idea of democracy, and the use of education for the promotion of that idea became the basis for the writings of Fine, Hutchins and others.³⁶

By 1948 the plea for the history of education as a part of cultural study was in evidence in A. Moehlman's "Toward a New History of Education."

The new history of education should employ the improved techniques of historical and geographical research together with allied social sciences to lay clear the historical perspective of education within its matrix of over-all living.³⁷

Here Moehlman calls for educational history in terms of interdisciplinary study that would assist one to obtain a better understanding of history as a vital part of the culture. His thinking was similar to that of Wesley's,³⁸ and anticipated by fifteen years much of the thinking of B. Bailyn. Although the need for a cultural approach to

³⁵R. Schneideman, Democratic Education in Practice (New York: Harper and Bros., 1945), p. 5.

³⁶B. Fine, Democratic Education (New York: J. Y. Crowell Co., 1945); R. Hutchins, Education for Freedom (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1947); T. M. Greene, et al., Liberal Education Re-examined, Its Role in a Democracy (New York: Harper and Bros., 1943).

³⁷A. Moehlman, "Toward a New History of Education," School and Society, 63 (Jan. 1946), 58.

³⁸Wesley, loc. cit.

the history of education was recognized during the 1930's, investigation indicates that no substantial works from a cultural perspective were attempted until the middle 1940's.³⁹

A study by G. Kyte published in 1939, dealing with the requirements of teacher certification for secondary schools, indicated that of thirty-eight institutions in the United States, fifteen presented a general history of education, four offered a history of American education, and one offered a history of modern education. The number of credits in semester hours in educational history ranked favorably with those of educational psychology and secondary education.⁴⁰

The problems of the nature and purpose of the history of education were considered at length in the History of Education Journal between Fall 1955 and Spring

³⁹R. Butts, A Cultural History of Western Education (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946); R. Butts and L. Cremin, A History of Education in American Culture (New York: Holt, 1953).

⁴⁰G. C. Kyte, "Tendencies in the Educational Requirements for Teaching Certificates in Universities," Educational Administration and Supervision, 25 (Nov., 1939), 610.

1956.⁴¹ The report, in three parts, traced recent developments of educational history to the 1950's, outlined viewpoints on its nature, and attempted to justify a functionalist approach to the field. Two major positions were noted. One was that of Noble⁴² who opposed a functional view, while the other was that of Brubacher who argued the following:

. . . we justify history of education . . . on professional grounds. On those grounds we must be more pragmatic. The history of education must illuminate specified professional problems of education.⁴³

Brubacher's position raises two questions. First, his insistence that the problems of the present be the point from which we direct our investigation of the past is held by many general historians. If one believes that history

⁴¹The Journal was founded in 1948 and reflected the increased interest in educational history. The report was divided into the following parts: Part I by L. Cremin, "The Recent Development of the History of Education as a Field of Study in the United States," History of Education Journal, VII (Fall, 1955), 1-35; Part II by A. Anderson, "Bases of Proposals Concerning the History of Education," History of Education Journal, VII (Winter, 1956), 37-98; Part III by M. Chiapetta, "Recommendations of the Committee," History of Education Journal, VII (Spring, 1956), 99-132.

⁴²Ibid., pp. 59-60.

⁴³Ibid., p. 60.

should help us to understand the present, and most all historians would agree to this, then Brubacher has much support, for even our attitude towards historical events, in part, is shaped by our present environment and culture. However, if one looks to the past mainly with professional interests in mind, and this Brubacher seems to imply, then one's interest in history will probably tend to concentrate on those issues of a professional nature. The professional problems of the educator suggest, for example, such topics as administration, curriculum, and educational objectives and theories, and may omit the cultural forces and non-formal educative agencies that are a vital part of the educational picture.

Second, Brubacher seems to believe that the term "pragmatic" somehow entails the term "professional," and that a "pragmatic" history of education, whatever that would mean, is suited to the teaching profession. According to his writing, it appears that that which is not pragmatic is unprofessional. What Brubacher is trying to say is not clear, but he has influenced the study of educational history.

The report concludes with the belief that it is desirable to reconcile the liberal and functional perspectives towards educational history. However, the means of achieving reconciliation is not discussed without

inconsistencies.⁴⁴ In the last section of the study, the authors recommend that at the undergraduate level history should be presented as a functional study, whereas at the graduate level the subject should follow the accepted principles of historiography.⁴⁵ The report, though informative, appears to be indecisive and does not extricate the history of education from its dilemmas.

A study of education subject offerings in Canadian institutions by W. Brehaut and K. Francoeur reported that of nineteen degree granting institutions, all offered at least one course in the history of education.⁴⁶ The majority of the history courses treated education in a chronological rather than in a problematic manner.

J. Conant⁴⁷ and J. Koerner,⁴⁸ investigating teacher education, reviewed the history of education as a

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 79-81.

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 125-129.

⁴⁶W. Brehaut and K. Francoeur, Report of a Survey of Programmes and Courses in Education in Canadian Degree-Granting Institutions Pt. I, English Language Institutions, Pt. II, French Language Institutions, (Toronto: Ontario College of Education, Laval: École de Pédagogie et D'Orientation, June, 1956), pp. 56-59.

⁴⁷J. Conant, The Education of American Teachers (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963).

⁴⁸J. Koerner, The Miseducation of American Teachers (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1963).

field of study in American institutions. Conant attacks the traditional approach to educational history and the foundational fields, but does not suggest that they be completely eliminated from teacher education. His views on history of education are the same as his views on philosophy of education. He writes that "graduate schools of education should cease trying to train professors of philosophy of education without the active and responsible participation of the departments of philosophy."⁴⁹

Conant's suggestion that arts and education faculties cooperate in the foundation fields is in evidence at the University of Alberta where students enrolled in educational history, philosophy, or sociology take course offerings from both faculties.⁵⁰ Conant's main criticism of educational history's content appears to be that the study must be viewed in light of its culture, as opposed to the often incomplete and narrow professional view frequently maintained by the functionalists.

Koerner's attack, similar in many ways to Conant's, emphasizes the need for liaison between the arts

⁴⁹Conant, op. cit., p. 131.

⁵⁰Calendar Faculty of Education, 1966-1967
University of Alberta, Edmonton.

and education interests in the foundational fields.⁵¹ His criticism generally assumes the following tones:

Textbooks in the history and philosophy of education, the second major division of the professional curriculum, come in all sizes and shapes, but mostly large and lengthy. A few of them are very decent workmanlike jobs.

And he goes on to say that:

Others, unfortunately those that are most highly regarded by educationists and used most often, are quite pedestrian and derivative compilations, thoroughly dull,⁵²

Where he obtains reliable data to make such sweeping accusations is not clear. Koerner's polemic tends to oversimplify many of the problems of history of education by his failure to fully assess either the development of the field or the implications of his suggested revisions. As a result, the credibility of his argument has been weakened.

Criticisms of educational history have generally centered on the traditional belief that the subject mainly serves professional interests, and on the preparation of educational historians who have often been trained through programs that have offered no study of history at graduate levels.

⁵¹Koerner, op. cit., pp. 274-276,

⁵²Ibid., p. 76.

B. Bailyn in his Education in the Forming of American Society is critical of the professional educational bias of historians of education, and their narrow view of history which is primarily institutional.⁵³

Bailyn proposes that education must not be conceived as "formal pedagogy," but "as the entire process by which a culture transmits itself across the generations,"⁵⁴ an interpretation that appears to be synonymous with M. Herskovits' "enculturation."⁵⁵ W. Brookover develops a similar interpretation of education which includes "both the formal education occurring in social groups such as the school and the multitude of informal communicative processes which serve educational functions."⁵⁶ In a sketchy but perceptive fashion, Bailyn examines some of the basic social institutions of early America--the family, the community, the church--and illustrates how these major factors in conjunction with the school affected the development of values. Education in this sense, implies

⁵³B. Bailyn, Education in the Forming of American Society (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1961).

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 14.

⁵⁵M. Herskovits, Cultural Anthropology (New York: A. Knopf, 1955), pp. 328-329.

⁵⁶W. Brookover and D. Gottlieb, A Sociology of Education (New York: American Book Co., 1964), p. 11.

not only the "deliberate, self-conscious pursuit of certain . . . ideals," but also "non-deliberate influences" which "are often, if not always, more powerful and pervasive."⁵⁷

The Bailyn thesis, however, has not remained unchallenged. Both general and educational historians have attacked his position. W. Brickman's "Revisionism and the Study of the History of Education" is critical of Bailyn's own research techniques which he claims are not adequate.⁵⁸

As has been indicated, a fundamental characteristic of the historiography of American education is its concern with the formal institutions of learning. Its history has reflected the professional interests of educators. A number of factors have contributed to this development.

1. The American ideals of equality and the continuation of the democratic tradition through an enlightened citizenry affected the growth of and demand for public education. Equal educational opportunity, the

⁵⁷L. Cremin, The Wonderful World of Ellwood Patterson Cubberley (New York: Teachers College, 1965), p. 75.

⁵⁸W. Brickman, "Revisionism and the Study of the History of Education," History of Education Quarterly, 4 (1964), 221-223. Also see CHAPTER VI, INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AND HISTORY OF EDUCATION.

equalizer of social inequality, was considered to be the birth right of every American. Formal schooling was the means by which this goal could be achieved. Informal education was often an indicator of social class difference. These principles and the prominence they received through the efforts of the influential Manns and Barnards reinforced the formal rather than the informal concept of education.

2. The writing of educational history in America became the concern of educators rather than historians. One probable reason for this development was that European historians were mainly concerned with politics, economics and war,⁵⁹ and they, in part, affected the historiography of those interested in America's cultural past. Hence, the history of education, which was not directly connected with the political bias of history, remained outside of the concern of historians, leaving

⁵⁹D. Van Tassel, Recording America's Past (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 9.

the crusaders for equalitarian institutionalized education to treat of its development.

3. The neglect of educational history by historians and its acceptance by educators as their history and referent for past developments, left the field in the hands of professional interests who found the subject adaptable to teacher training institutions which were the embodiment of professional purpose.
4. The resulting emphasis upon formal schooling and the neglect of informal education agencies as a concern of educational historians did not provide for the study of the cultural dimension of educational history.
5. The adaptation of testing to psychology in education, and its association with pragmatic influences provided new direction and impetus to teacher training programs. Techniques and skills, which in some ways are measureable, frequently became the ends as well as the means of learning. It was expected that studies should render an

immediate "cash value." The importance of these courses were frequently rated in terms of their functional value for the prospective teacher. Historians of education, in their attempt to justify an immediate functional value for their subject, produced histories with professional interests foremost in mind.

The continuing emphasis upon a functional history is noted as recently as 1964 at the Western Canadian Conference on the Foundations of Education where Professor G. J. Langley presented a paper on "The Function of History of Education."⁶⁰ In his statement, Langley deals with six functions of educational history that would supposedly assist the professional teacher in performing his task. In passing, he mentions the possibility of considering the history of education as a liberal arts study.

The adoption of functionalism to the history of education poses two problems. First, it implies that a series of identical recurring problems can be isolated from the field of history. Although this may be an impossibility, it might be found that different historical periods have

⁶⁰G. J. Langley, "The Functions of History of Education," The Foundations of Education. A collection of papers delivered at the Western Canadian Conference on the Foundations of Education at Banff, ed. R. Anderson, 1964, pp. 47-56.

similar historical problems. However, a functional approach requires that the historian must be familiar with past events during different historical periods, that he must be capable of indicating their significance to similar, but not necessarily identical current problems in education, and further, that he must determine, at least approximately, which problems will be relevant a number of years hence, in order to provide the teacher with learnings which will have practical consequences in the classroom situation. This rests on the assumption that conditions remain sufficiently uniform to give precedents a perpetual value. Conditions, however, at least in our own time are so rapidly changing, that for the most part it would be questionable to assume the application of past solutions to the definitive or tentative solution of current problems. Moreover, we rarely have sufficient accurate data of an historical event to enable us to fully apply it to present conditions. This does not deny that history can provide guidelines for study; it does deny the expectation that educational issues can be isolated from the culture in one period and applied to the solution of educational problems in a society whose cultural conditions

we are unable to accurately envision.⁶¹ If such a task were even possible, the functional historian would probably select issues that were concerned with institutional education, disregarding the many other cultural forces that are a part of the educational scene.

Second, the nature of his task would require the functional historian to anticipate to some degree future societal conditions. Thus he would become a soothsayer, and in this capacity would probably make value judgements and decisions on what is best for society. Professor J. Rayback maintains that once the historian moves beyond the investigation of the past, to proposing changes and directions for society, he ceases to be an historian.⁶² The historian devotes his talent to the study of man's past in order to understand the present. This does not deny his right to formulate goals and purposes for society, but it clearly indicates that in doing this he has stepped out of his role as historian.

One might ask, for example, what harm is there

⁶¹K. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (New York: Harper and Row, 1947), passim.

⁶²Dr. J. Rayback, Professor of American History, University of Alberta, and former editor of The Historian, Statement made in relation to an interview of January 25, 1967.

in ascribing the functional form "To achieve an understanding of present conditions" to the history of education, since this particular function does not oblige the historian to assume the prediction of the goals or the nature of the society. In this case, the function is amenable to the definition of history as being "the study of man's past in order to understand the present," a definition which is acceptable to many historians. However, the historian, who views history as a subject with a liberalizing influence, has no need to apply the term function to his subject.

The word function, as used by professional educators, implies direction and purpose to a particular set of circumstances. If the word is employed in historical study in this sense, then the study can no longer be thought of as history. It becomes a related discipline that is partially derived from historical learnings.

As indicated above, it is not impossible to find purposes that do not contravene the accepted canons of historical writing. However, these functions are a part of the liberal arts⁶³ conception of history's value and are not functional in the sense of the educator who attaches

⁶³P. Dressel, L. Mayhew and E. McGrath, The Liberal Arts as Viewed by Faculty Members in Professional Schools (New York: Teachers College, 1959). "When any course emphasizes specifics, techniques, and skills rather than understandings, attitudes and values, it tends to lose its liberal possibilities." p. 4.

an additional predictive "skill-like" meaning to their use. Thus, the traditional educational historian has made use of function in two ways: first, in the liberal arts sense of the word, and second, in a typical non-historical, directive sense of the word. In the former case, one is associating the "value" (rather than "function") of history with the liberal arts, while in the latter instance, one is associating the "purpose" (rather than "function") of history with an ahistorical or non-historical view. P. Geyl, who represents the thinking of many historians, delineates a threefold understanding of history.

1. The study of history assists in the enrichment of civilization by reanimating old modes of existence and thought.
2. History contributes to the cultivation of the historical attitudes of mind.
3. History elucidates the present and its problems by showing them in perspective.⁶⁴

A study by Dressel, Mayhew and McGrath, in general agreement with Geyl's view, reports on the necessity of

⁶⁴P. Geyl, Use and Abuse of History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 83.

the liberal arts in professional education, and indicates that

. . . all students should have such contact, that this contact should extend through all four years of the students' college careers, that broadly conceived courses are good, and that . . . faculty members are conscientiously trying to provide technical students with an adequate liberal arts experience.

They go on to say:

. . . as noted earlier, the liberal arts curriculum of the present day presents an expansive and confusing array of subjects, some highly specialized. How does one choose meaningfully from all these remotely related options? One obvious principle is to choose in relation to the technical needs. The general conclusion seems justified that there is a real interest in liberal education among these professions.⁶⁵

It would seem, therefore, that a history of education, properly conceived, would be a liberal arts study.

However, the possibility of employing historical learnings from educational history in order to alert prospective teachers to possible problems and solutions in teaching, and to encourage creative thought for educational improvement must be recognized. Although such subjects would be associated with the history of education, they would not be history in the practicing historian's understanding of the word. They might, for example, be conducted under such studies as "Educational Developments, Prospects and Their Historical Antecedents," "Critical Educational

⁶⁵Dressel, et al, op. cit., p. 39.

the liberal arts is professional education, and industries

that

... all students would give their contact, that this contact should extend through all four years of the students' college careers, that broadly conceived courses are good, and that ... faculty members are consistently trying to provide technical students with an adequate liberal arts education.

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... as noted earlier, the liberal arts curriculum of the present day presents an expansive and confusing array of subjects, some highly specialized. How does one choose meaningfully from all these remedies? The related options? One obvious principle is to choose in relation to the technical needs. The general conclusion seems justified that there is a real interest in liberal education among these professions.⁶²

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standing of the word. They might, for example, be conducted

under such studies as "Educational Developments, Prospects

and Their Historical Antecedents," "Critical Educational

Issues and Their Historical Relevance," "Prospect and Retrospect in Educational Movements" or "Introduction to Education." Courses structured along these lines would serve as auxilliary to the history of education, drawing upon its knowledge and in some instances its techniques. The historical knowledge would be supplemented by principles and perspectives that would be fundamentally non or ahistorical, but which would assist in the attainment of the program's unique objectives.⁶⁶ In this sense, the subject would be able to fulfill many of the "functions" that are central to the teaching profession.

As indicated above, the problems facing functionalism and educational history have been largely due to a misconception in the nature and purpose of history. Again, the term "function" has been conceived in a number of senses, none of which has been clearly defined. In one instance, for example, "function" becomes a term encompassing all the purposes, whatever they might be. In another, "function" becomes a term which is highly specific, relating in a pragmatic sense to that which is workable,

⁶⁶ It is not the writer's concern at this time to develop what might be the specific content and nature of a subject which could employ historical learnings for teacher training purposes. Nevertheless, the desirability and need for such courses is realized.

that which has a practical use.

Through the use of function American educators promoted their own professional concerns by presenting a viewpoint that justified their own existence, a justification that rested on no criteria other than that it advanced the growth of professional interests.⁶⁷ Such an approach was neither in the best interest of history nor of functional history.

⁶⁷Bailyn, op. cit., passim.

PART TWO

The Nature of History and Its Related Disciplines

CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE OF HISTORY

This chapter examines the nature of reported history and its connection with historiography, historical method and philosophy of history.¹ The assumptions underlying this study are in essential agreement with the following thoughts:

Human beings . . . are only on the threshold of the most preliminary steps to the mysteries of Man and the Cosmos. There is not a single sentence among what we today should look upon as adequate transmitters of our most important, surest and most indisputably significant assertions, which may not at another stage of our insight become an object for ridicule and painful shame. Thrown into an eternally changing universe, human beings cannot be tied by a set of rigid rules for language, thought or action. Assuming that we, and most of our fellow beings, choose to exist, and to increase our insight, perfect our knowledge about ourselves, our fate and our cosmic situation, we should never express any judgement of value or truth without carefully considering the status of present relevant research. It seems that the only incorrigible knowledge we have ascertained so far is the fact that there is no incorrigible knowledge.²

¹Throughout the study the writer has attempted to use the word "history" as recorded history, history which is recorded through artifacts or writings. In certain instances, "history" is used to refer to events that may have happened. A record of the events may or may not exist. The writer has attempted to indicate when history is employed in the latter sense. However, it is often difficult to separate the two meanings of the word. See notes 6 and 8.

²H. Tennessen, "The Serio-Comic Encounter of Clinical Psychology and Existential Philosophy," (abbreviated version of a paper read before the International Psychology Congress at Banff, April, 1965), pp. 40-41.

The English word "history" is derived from the Greek noun meaning "inquiry."³ The so-called "father of history," Herodotus, was one of the first figures concerned with historical inquiry, insisting upon the conversion of legend-writing to a "science" of history. His history of man is written in an easy, spontaneous, and highly convincing style.⁴

In comparison to Herodotus, Thucydides, his follower, attempts a scientific formulation of historical writing founded on evidence that is supported by laws--laws which are associated with the eternal and unchanging forms that are typical of a main trend in Greek thought.⁵ This approach is also akin to the Aristotelian conception of history which envisages a systematic account of a set of natural phenomena, and this usage, though rare, still prevails in the phrase "natural history."⁶ In the course

³P. Gove (ed.), Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Springfield, Massachusetts: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1961), p. 1073.

⁴R. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), pp. 19ff.

⁵F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy: Greece and Rome (Vol. I; Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1946), pp. 229-250.

⁶L. Gottschalk, Understanding History (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1950), p. 41, who indicates that the often used German terminology for history--"Geschichte, . . . is derived from geschehen, meaning to happen. Geschichte is that which has happened." Italics in original.

of time, the equivalent Latin word scientia designated non-chronological systematic accounts of natural phenomena; and the term "history" was usually reserved for chronological accounts of phenomena, particularly human affairs.⁷

A frequent formulation of the word "history" is "the past of mankind," a definition advanced by R. Aron. This definition is made on the basis of the following observation which maintains that

. . . in the wider sense, [history] studies the development of the earth, of the heavens and of the species, as well as of civilization. On the other hand, in the concrete sense, the term "history" designates a certain reality; in the formal sense, the knowledge of that reality.⁸

Within this context man becomes the central figure of historical events. R. G. Collingwood places man in a similar position.⁹

⁷Ibid.

⁸R. Aron, Introduction to the Philosophy of History trans. G. Iriven (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), p. 15. Cf. Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964), p. 1, who remarks in similar terms that

"On the one hand, we use it to refer to the course of events; a certain stratum of reality, which historians make it their professional business to study. On the other, we use it to denote the historian's study itself: we mean by it a certain kind of inquiry into a certain kind of subject matter."

⁹Collingwood, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

A study on the nature of history, Theory and Practice in Historical Study: A Report of the Committee on Historiography, delimits five overlapping senses of the word:

(1) the systematic study of, or a treatise dealing with natural phenomena--as in "natural history" or "life history"; (2) the past of mankind (or any part thereof)--as in "history as actuality" or "the totality of history"; (3) the survivals and records (whether primary or secondary) of the past of mankind (or any part thereof)--as in "recorded history", "a history book", or "a case history"; and (4) the study, representation and explanation of the past of mankind (or any part thereof) from the survivals and records--as in "written or spoken history"; and (5) the branch of knowledge that records, studies, represents, and explains the past of mankind (or any parts thereof)--¹⁰ as in "department of history" or "school of history".

Senses (2), (3), (4) and (5) are central to this study,¹¹ each recognizing in some way the position of mankind in the historical vista, and excluding a purely systematic study of natural phenomena as a meaning of history.

The preceding discussion indicates that history has been interpreted as a study of the past. The subject to be studied and the techniques employed to investigate

¹⁰ Social Science Research Council, Theory and Practice in Historical Study: A Report of the Committee on Historiography, Bulletin 54 (New York: 1946), 133, Hereafter cited as "Bulletin 54."

¹¹ Differing viewpoints and various examples of concepts and terms are employed throughout the thesis. These serve as referent points from which the writer's own concepts and terms are explicated.

the subject, however, have been open to different points of view. Herodotus and Thucydides both differed in their approach to history, the former stressing that it be concerned with the deeds of men and in this sense having a humanistic basis, while the latter emphasizing that it be concerned with laws and in this sense scientific.¹²

Aristotle, however, argued that history includes the systematic study of natural phenomena. It is evident that the field of history still lacks precision, that it lacks a common definition as to what events are worthy of study, and as to what methodology is of the greatest value in interpreting these events. Historians themselves are in disagreement as to the answer for many of these problems. In excluding the study of natural phenomena as worthy of historical study, insofar as it has no noticeable bearing upon the actions and thoughts of men, the writer is exercising a value judgement which may or may not be agreed to by others.

These and similar questions may be viewed in relation to three concepts often confused with the idea

¹²The humanities and the sciences need not necessarily be in opposition to each other. Such opposition highlights two traditional positions. It should be noted, however, that the "boundaries" between the sciences and humanities are disappearing.

of history: historiography, historical method, and philosophy of history. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines historiography as "the writing of history."¹³ It is necessary, however, to consider the word in three related senses: as a synthesis in historical work; as secondary historical literature; and as the history and the critique or recorded history.¹⁴ In the first instance, historiography as a synthesis in historical work, historiography is an intellectual process, both critical and constructive by which historical events are recorded. It relates to all phases of the description and interpretation of events taking into account the awareness of the existence and nature of the problems that may be treated historically, and the recognition of the functions and the limitations of the historical in the examination of past problems.¹⁵ Not to be excluded from this term are the readiness to collect and to submit to careful selection the available evidence necessary to support the

¹³C. T. Onions, (ed.), The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd edition; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 906.

¹⁴Bulletin 54, op. cit., p. 134.

¹⁵M. Mandelbaum, "Objectivism in History," Philosophy and History: A Symposium, hereafter cited as Symposium (ed.) S. Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1963), pp. 53-54.

statements made in any piece of written history, the proper weighting of various pieces of evidence thus selected, and the acknowledgement of one's own value judgements and biases.¹⁶ In the second instance, historiography as the secondary historical literature involves the results of those processes, regardless of the medium through which the historical events are presented. Historiography in the third instance, as a critique and history of recorded historical events includes the study and criticism of the sources and development of history.

Historiography thus accounts for a historical method which is the process by which the historian approaches his material. Three essentials of this process might include:

1. A gathering of the artifacts and the relevant printed, written, and oral materials;
2. An exclusion of unauthenticated materials;¹⁷

¹⁶E. Van Den Haag, "History as Factualized Fiction," Symposium, pp. 219-223.

¹⁷Gottschalk, op. cit., p. 28.

3. The organization of reliable testimony into a meaningful study.¹⁸

These guidelines of method are in turn fixed to the philosophy of history which supports the historian's point of view. Practicing historians are frequently unaware of and unconcerned with the philosophy underlying their researches. This neglect has harmed the historians by leaving the questions of the philosophy of history to philosophers, who in turn are often concerned with the

¹⁸J. Barzun and H. Graff, The Modern Researcher (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1957), p. 134, make the following observation:

"No matter how it is described, no piece of evidence can be used for historiography in the state in which it is found. It is invariably and necessarily subjected to the action of the researcher's mind, and when that action is methodical and just, what is being applied is known as the critical method. Faced with a piece of evidence, the critical mind of the researcher for truth asks the fundamental questions: Is this object or piece of writing genuine? Is its message trustworthy? How do I know? This leads to an unfolding series of subordinate questions:

1. Who is its author or maker?
2. What does it state?
3. What is the relation in time and space between the author and the statement, overt or implied, which is conveyed by the object?
4. How does the statement compare with other statements on the same point?
5. What do we know independently about the author and his credibility?"

Italics in original.

logic of the historian's assumptions to the exclusion of the historian's method and the soundness of the evidence he employs. There is no suggestion here that the philosopher of history should surrender his task to the practicing historian. The suggestion is rather that the philosopher of history must concern himself with the historiography, and that the practicing historian must concern himself with the philosophy of history. The use of the interdisciplinary approach would assist the historian in writing good history¹⁹ by making him more aware of the assumptions he consciously or unconsciously employs and the methodology which he advocates.

As indicated above, basic to any history is the question of a philosophy of history. The idea of a philosophy of history is often unclear because of its relation to historiography and historical method. What "philosophies of history" frequently have in common "is the aim of giving a comprehensive account of the historical process in such a way that it can be seen to 'make sense'!"²⁰

¹⁹H. Tennessen, "Science of History and Notions of Personality: Some Preliminary Remarks," Paper read before the International Colloquium on Logic-Physical Reality --History at Denver, Colorado, May 16th-20th, 1966, p. 5.

²⁰P. Gardiner (ed.), Theories of History (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), p. 7. Hereafter cited as Theories.

Various interpretations of this statement can be made. First, it is possible to distinguish between the idea that history has "a meaning in the sense that all that has happened or is going to happen has been . . . pre-ordained by some 'hidden hand'";²¹ and to suggest that history's course to date has a general tendency to follow a certain pattern, the basis of which can be employed as a "hunch" in order to decipher the direction it might possibly take in the future. This might be compared with the view that causal laws are inherent in historical events and function as predictors as to the precise course of future development--a view which is amenable to both Comtean and Hempelian positivism.²²

Isaiah Berlin's Historical Inevitability, a document which supports the unpredictability and uniqueness of all past events, proposes a dual classification of historical theorizing: deterministic and non-deterministic. The deterministic theories are grouped according to the

²¹Ibid. Italics in original.

²²A. Comte, "The Positive Philosophy and the Study of Society," Theories, pp. 75-82; and C. Hempel, "Reasons and Covering Laws in Historical Explanation," Symposium, pp. 143-166. Whereas both Hempel and Comte desire the use of "scientific" means to substantiate their claims, Comte's historical laws are part of a wider scheme more in keeping with the idea of a "speculative," philosophy, whereas Hempel's view is in the tradition of a "critical" philosophy.

inevitability of an outcome and the teleology of the event, whether that theory be positivistic, metaphysical, or theological. These schemes are distinguished from those that deny any causality or purposiveness in the historical process.²³

M. Mandelbaum²⁴ brings forward a different distinction on the basis of Broad's separation between a speculative philosophy of history, which seeks to unravel the meaning inherent in the course of events, and the critical philosophy of history,²⁵ which discusses "the ways in which practicing historians in fact interpret their subject matter, attempting to reveal the presuppositions that underlie any piece of historical thinking."²⁶

Although a speculative philosophy of history might have a particular type of creativity, it is a concern

²³Isaiah Berlin, Historical Inevitability (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), passim.

²⁴M. Mandelbaum, "Societal Facts," Theories, pp. 476-488. In lieu of "speculative" and "critical," Mandelbaum applies the "formal" and "material" distinction. Also see his "Some Neglected Philosophical Problems Regarding History," Journal of Philosophy, XLIX (May 8, 1952), 317.

²⁵The application of a "critical" philosophy to other fields, such as education, is not uncommon. See G. R. Eastwood, "An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis for Students of Education," (unpublished paper University of Alberta), 1964.

²⁶Gardiner, op. cit., p. 8.

with critical philosophy and its relationship to the methodology of history that serves as the basis for this discussion.

The need for interdisciplinary study in history is crucial to the advancement of man's understanding of the past. The social, behavioral and physical sciences, and the humanities are undergoing new and ever increasingly rapid change, the pool of man's knowledge is becoming wider and deeper, the differences between the various disciplines are less pronounced, the concern of different disciplines in similar topics has effected the overlapping of research techniques and the arrival at related conclusions. These changes are forcing the historian and others to recognize the similarities as well as the differences between their studies, and to employ whatever is of value in areas of philosophy and methodology. Such changes do not deny the need for continued in-depth research and specialization, for all of man's advances are vital to a more meaningful understanding of his existence.

The application of a variety of techniques to the exploration of human history is not new, though it has often been neglected. Taking a position similar to the one maintained in the preceding section, James Robinson argued in 1912 that history should avail itself of

. . . all those discoveries that are being made about mankind by anthropologists, economists, psychologists and sociologists--discoveries which during the past fifty years have served to revolutionize our ideas of the origin, progress, and prospects of our race. There is no branch of organic or inorganic science which has not undergone the most remarkable changes during the last half century, and many new branches of social science, even the names of which would have been unknown to historians in the middle of the nineteenth century, have been added to the long list.²⁷

Robinson's observation is not new, for the development of knowledge from the days of early Greek culture to that of the present reveals a gradual increase in its depth and breadth. Similarly, the historian's task of understanding the past has been both complicated as well as simplified by the availability of new methodological techniques and the advancement of information. It has been complicated insofar as the historian must avail himself of the new philosophical and methodological tools at his disposal and must consider the discoveries made in the process of unearthing past events. On the other hand, the same factors that have complicated the historian's role have also simplified it by providing fresh perspectives and insights upon events which in the past were considered to be

²⁷J. Robinson, The New History (originally published by Macmillan in 1912; Springfield, Massachusetts: Walden Press, 1958), p. 24.

inexplicable.²⁸

The New History and the Social Studies, written by H. E. Barnes, also makes a plea for a renewed perspective upon historical study, and in a similar vein to his predecessor Robinson, suggests that history should make use of other areas of concentration.²⁹

The newer history would solve the problem of the scope of history by maintaining that history must take into account the sum total of human achievement. The historian of the new type does not try to substitute any magic basis of unity, organization or exclusion for the older political fetish, but confines his efforts to constructing as intelligible and complete a picture of the entire past as his sources of information will allow and to emphasizing the dominant features of every epoch.

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It is not contended that a mediocre representative of the new school of history can duplicate Macaulay's famous description of England in the seventeenth century; but it is maintained that any careful and conscientious writer who brings together all that is known of the manners, customs, institutions and ideals of any age will give the reader a more accurate, comprehensive and intelligible picture of the past than is furnished by the works of the most consummate genius of political and episodical historiography. Owing to the broader scope proposed, it may be

²⁸The recent furor, for example, over the discovery of Viking artifacts and their inexplicability in terms of their being found on North American shores has been partly clarified by the efforts of archeologists and historians who have in part revised ideas associated with the first colonization of America. See F. Mowat, West Viking (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965).

²⁹H. E. Barnes, The New History and the Social Studies (New York: The Century Co., 1925).

expected that the synthetic history of the future will become increasingly of the cooperative type.³⁰

Barnes' insight and understanding of the historian's task has also assisted the growth of social and cultural history, a type of history that lends itself to discovering and explaining the interrelatedness of past events by removing them from isolation and placing them in the context of economic, religious, educational, political, and social forces.

With the recent and continuing emphasis upon analysis as a way of doing philosophy, some clarification of the philosophical and methodological basis of history has resulted. Associated with advances in such fields as empirical semantics,³¹ "ordinary language"³² and the philosophy of science,³³ the study of history has joined once again other fields of interest in pushing ahead, as well as back, the frontiers of man's knowledge.

A major problem within the critical philosophy of history has been the attempt, for example, of those in

³⁰Ibid., p. 17.

³¹Tennessen, loc. cit.

³²G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson of London, 1949).

³³C. G. Hempel and P. Oppenheim, "The Logic of Explanation," reprinted in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck, Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), pp. 319-352.

both the positivist and idealist³⁴ camps to perpetuate a separation, rather than to encourage a rapproachment in establishing a reasonable philosophical and methodological ground, a ground which would assist the historian in getting on with his job, or as P. Bridgeman has suggested of the scientist "doing his damndest."³⁵ Whereas the differences between the Hempelians and Collingwoodians have been emphasized,³⁶ little has been done to seek a common basis.

The dispute not only continues among philosophers of history, but among historians, and between philosophers and historians. All sides in the debate have often dogmatically refused to see any value in one another's positions, and have been guilty of fragmenting and dispersing, rather than unifying and directing their efforts in the study of the past of man. Although history can be, and is approached from as many perspectives as there are

³⁴ "Idealists" and "neo-idealists" are those such as B. Croce and W. Dray who look favorably upon the ideas of Collingwood, whereas the positivists are often referred to as those such as Hempel and Gardiner who look favorably upon the application of laws to history.

³⁵ Cited in A. Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler Pub. Co., 1964), p. 27.

³⁶ Collingwoodians here refers to those philosophers of history concerned with the "inner" or "thought side" of historical events.

historians and philosophers of history, it is suggested that a dialogue that recognizes the worth of different methodologies and philosophies among the divergent groups and individuals continue in an effort to advance the cause of man's knowledge of his past. It is desirable that the testing of one another's philosophical and methodological assumptions and conclusions continue, but it is equally desirable that this be a cooperative venture to find suitable grounds for improving the basis of history and historiography. It is hoped that philosophers of history hold, as one of their objectives, the desire to assist the historian in writing good history by making him aware of his underlying assumptions and methodological limitations.

With these and similar issues in mind, let us move to a consideration of some specific problem areas of the nature of history.

A frequently mentioned issue is the problem of the autonomy of history. One might consider the remark of Professor H. Tennessen in this issue who suggests that "there should be no reason for more dreary repetitiousness of this topic."³⁷ However, a further comment in regard to the philosophical approaches of both Covering

³⁷Tennessen, op. cit., p. 7.

Law³⁸ and idealist theorists must be made. In Experience and Its Modes Professor Oakeshott maintains that "if the historical past be knowable, it must belong to the present world of experience; if it be unknowable, history is worse than futile, it is impossible."³⁹ Hence, by definition, past events of history cannot be known as present ones and are ipso facto inexplicable. It appears that what P. Gardiner considers to be "knowledge by acquaintance"⁴⁰ has precluded any valid historical knowledge. This raises the question as to how one could establish that something is inexplicable. Although past events cannot be "known" as happenings in the present, it must be admitted that the historical past is built from archaeological and documentary evidence available to our senses and, in this limited way at least, known. No particular branch of knowledge ever deals with anything but past events, and in this sense, the differences, for example, between astronomy and history, in regard to events, are mainly differences of degree.

³⁸ Covering Law theorists are those philosophers who propose to apply laws to historical events in order to achieve explanation of those events.

³⁹ M. Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), p. 36.

⁴⁰ P. Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 36.

Whether or not one wishes to consider history to be an autonomous discipline or not is a matter of perspective. If one devises criteria which in some fashion exclude other studies from history, one might defend the autonomy of history. Basic to this question is the problem of clarifying the words "autonomous" and "discipline." In one instance, "autonomous" is defined as "existing independently . . . of the whole,"⁴¹ while "discipline" is defined as "a branch of knowledge involving research."⁴² The recent explosion of knowledge, in depth and in breadth, has tended to destroy the idea of a branch of knowledge that exists independently of the whole. The degree to which a subject might be considered to be independent of any other appears to be in part due to the primitive state of the condition of knowledge in that subject, and to a narrowness of perspective adopted by students towards the complexity of knowledge.

A second issue is that "historical events are unique and hence unclassifiable--a view attributed to Croce."⁴³ The historian concentrates upon the unique

⁴¹Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (Toronto: Thomas Allen Ltd., 1961), p. 60.

⁴²Ibid., p. 236.

⁴³W. Dray, Laws and Explanation in History (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 14.

individuality of each event, regarding it "as something which is to be viewed for and in itself."⁴⁴ In making this claim, however, Croce has made one classification already by claiming that historical events must be classified as unclassifiable. Nevertheless, W. H. Walsh, in the Philosophy of History, persists in the Crocean tradition when he suggests that history is a science, that it is not abstract but concrete, and that "it terminates not in general knowledge but in knowledge of individual truth."⁴⁵ This problem is clarified to some degree by referring to Q. Gibson, who believes that the difficulty rests in

. . . a simple verbal confusion which can be cleared up without much difficulty. What, after all, is meant by those who insist on the uniqueness of an event? They are hardly likely to mean merely that such an event is a particular event, numerically distinct from others. For in this sense every event is unique, the swing of the pendulum as well as the French Revolution. And, anyway, the particularity of events of whatever kind is not something which we could be said to miss when we describe them. In giving a description we do not merely name features, what we do is to attribute those features to the particular event in question. Abstraction of features and reference to particulars may clearly go along together.⁴⁶

⁴⁴Gardiner, op. cit., p. 40.

⁴⁵W. Walsh, Philosophy of History (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 43.

⁴⁶Q. Gibson, The Logic of Social Enquiry (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960), p. 9. *Italics in original.*

Referring to the same issue Dray writes:

That the French Revolution is complex does not prevent its being explained as typical; it does not prevent its being regarded as an 'instance' of a law of revolutions. What prevents this is what Oakeshott calls a presupposition of historical inquiry. As Oakeshott puts it, to treat the French Revolution as an instance of anything is to abandon historical inquiry for scientific. "The moment historical facts are regarded as instances of general laws," he maintains, "history is dismissed." Properly understood, this dictum appears to me to be both true and important; for what it brings to our attention is the characteristic approach of historians to their subject-matter.⁴⁷

The issue as presented here hinges in part on the different understandings of the term "event" in history, as proposed, for example, by the positivists and idealists. It would seem that the extent to which we regard something as either an instant of a type, or as unique, is a function of our point of view or interest. As indicated in the first part of the chapter, history, as written by historians, has no exclusively characteristic approach. There are as many histories as there are historians. If the history assists us to understand the past regardless of the orthodoxy or unorthodoxy of approach, and if it is in keeping with the basic principles of historical method, then that history is of value. Thus the need for the historian to provide reasonable explanations of events requires that he

⁴⁷ Dray, op. cit., pp. 49-50. Italics in original.

be aware of the use of both particularity and generality.

A third issue centers on the problem that "historical events are, or involve, thoughts, and thoughts cannot be brought under law."⁴⁸ The classical statement of this argument is found in Collingwood's The Idea of History, where in contrasting the natural sciences and history he maintains that

. . . the processes of nature can . . . be properly described as sequences of mere events, but those of history cannot. They are processes of actions, which have an inner side, consisting of processes of thought; and what the historian is looking for is these processes of thought. All history is the history of thought.⁴⁹

This raises the question of Ryle's attack on the "ghost in the machine," and the idea that the emphasis on mind-body dualism has created numerous unnecessary philosophical and methodological difficulties.⁵⁰ Ryle's approach appears to be oriented towards behavioristic principles of psychology. Gardiner suggests that

. . . we view human behavior not only in its reactive aspects, but also under the aspects of being purposive, calculated, planned. And we must argue that the distinction formulated in the above terms holds

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 14.

⁴⁹ Collingwood, op. cit., p. 215.

⁵⁰ Ryle, op. cit., p. 15. This problem is in part treated in greater detail in the section on "Historical Interpretation."

good insofar as we do not explain the movement of a 'piece of matter' by referring to its intention, whereas we may explain a human action by making such a reference.⁵¹

Again the historian must be aware of these differences and he must view his evidence in relation to the theories which provide a reasonable explanation, an explanation which does not contradict the fundamental principles of historiography that function as criteria for accurate research.

A fourth issue crucial to the idea of history is that of value and value judgements. There appears to be fundamental agreement on the attitude that values arise out of the social-cultural matrix of society.⁵² In history, this poses two problems:

1. Whether or not the values of society and the individual affect the development of historical happenings.⁵³
2. Whether or not the historian's values affect the writing of history.

⁵¹Gardiner, op. cit., p. 51.

⁵²R. Mukurjee, "Values in Social Science," A New Survey of the Social Sciences (ed.) B. Varma (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), p. 222.

⁵³For a discussion of the interdependence of values and culture, see B. Malinowski, The Dynamics of Culture Change: An Inquiry Into Race Relations in Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945).

The second of the preceding issues might be viewed in the light of a two-fold classification:

1. Whether social scientists and historians can attain objectively valid conclusions about what is good, in the same way that they can ascertain judgements about what is fact.
2. Whether it is their business to make this part of their research,⁵⁴ if this goal is attainable.

These questions as applied to history are not new and have been discussed in detail by many, including H. Rickert, who, in his Science and History: A Critique of Positivist Epistemology, distinguishes between the natural and the value oriented cultural or historical sciences.⁵⁵ Much of the current thinking in this field is summarized by Gibson, who argues that values are reflected in recommendations.

When we express attitudes or make recommendations, we are not making statements about anything--we are using

⁵⁴M. Natanson (ed.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A Reader (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 352.

⁵⁵H. Rickert, Science and History: A Critique of Positivist Epistemology (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc., 1962), pp. 18-19.

words for quite a different purpose. Others may disagree with us, but this does not mean that they think what we say is false--it means that they regard it as wrong--that is, they are expressing an opposed attitude.⁵⁶

Gibson's view, however, is clouded with subjectivity. Its nature is one that realizes the influence of words such as "good," which can assume factual status when interpreted, for example, as a standard and idea for a popular revolution.⁵⁷ He continues:

Here then is a point in which it is as well for social enquirers to keep an open mind. It may be that in certain circumstances it will be impossible for them to achieve a full understanding of social events without entering into the non-factual consideration of the values which different sorts of states of affairs possess.⁵⁸

Nevertheless, in keeping with the "scientific attitude," it would seem reasonable to adopt the following principles when dealing with issues of value:

1. The selection of problems both in the natural as well as the social sciences and history are based on the interests of the

⁵⁶Gibson, op. cit., p. 61. Also see C. Stevenson, "The Nature of Ethical Disagreement," Philosophy of Education (eds.) H. Burns and C. Brauner (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1962), pp. 219-224. Here, Stevenson distinguishes between value and knowledge of facts on the basis between belief and attitude.

⁵⁷Gibson, op. cit., p. 64.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 65.

investigator.⁵⁹

2. Values held by researchers could be stated to indicate bias at the start of any investigation.⁶⁰
3. In principle, the separation of fact from value in questions involving such words as "good," in the context of the above example cited by Gibson, is admittedly difficult but not necessarily impossible.⁶¹

A. Kaplan insists that allowing a role to values is not what makes for bias, "what makes for bias rather, is allowing them only a role that insulates them from the test of experience: they are prejudicial when they are prejudged."⁶²

Value judgements seem to be unavoidable and are

⁵⁹E. Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), p. 486.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 488. It should be admitted, that although stating one's prejudices and values at the beginning of the investigation alerts the reader to the "point of view," it does not eliminate their effect upon the study, and hence does not absolutely solve difficulties resulting from their presence.

⁶¹Ibid., pp. 491-495.

⁶²Kaplan, op. cit., p. 396.

apparent at the foundation of all knowledge, particularly in its interpretive aspects. The best that can be done would appear to be to recognize these biases in the hope that a degree of objectivity will be attained, mindful nevertheless of the interdependence of values and the interpretation of the elusive "facts."

In closing, one might examine four propositions about historiography which run as follows:⁶³

1. Historiography is selective and is unable to deal with the totality of past happenings. It deals with some limited portion of these.

The ideal of writing a universal history that meets accepted standards of historiography remains an ideal. The explosion of knowledge in depth and in breadth provides an ever increasing pool of information with which the historian must cope. The selection of what evidence is worth using is partly dependent upon the interest and perspective of the historian. The historian's objective is also important. A

⁶³A. O. Lovejoy, "Present Standpoints and Past History," The Philosophy of History in Our Time, (ed.) H. Meyerhoff (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co. Inc., 1959), pp. 174-175.

history may deal with either a single incident covering a short span of time, or a series of interrelated events covering a long span of time. In short, the history will depend upon the interest of the historian, the selection and delimitation of topic, the availability of reliable evidence, the purpose of the history, and the total perspective taken upon the happenings involved by the historian, providing these factors are attuned to the canons of historiography.

2. The selection of an event to research involves both a subtraction from the facts and an addition to them.

In selecting a particular event or series of events, the historian must extricate the happenings from the context of world or universal history. In this sense, the historian's consideration of what is or is not worth recording affects the overall presentation of his facts, and subsequently his interpretation.

3. Historiography, if it is to be anything more than bare chronicle, is not only selective but

interpretive.

History is essentially an interpretation of a series of facts.⁶⁴ The facts must be related or joined in some fashion. This joining, in most instances, requires a perspective or interpretation.

4. Historical inquiry is controlled by the problems and the conception of the culture of the period in which it was written.

It is suggested that historical inquiries are not necessarily motivated by present non-historical problems. This is particularly true, for example, of intellectual history for Lovejoy, when he remarks that

If there are problems which were of concern . . . to men in the past, though they do not seem so to me or most of my contemporaries, this is a fact of prime historical . . . interest.

⁶⁴E. H. Carr, What is History? (Victoria: Penguin Books, 1964), p. 23. Carr notes that

"The facts are really not at all like fish on a fishmonger's slab. They are like fish swimming about in a vast and sometimes inaccessible ocean; and what the historian catches will depend, partly on chance, but mainly on what part of the ocean he chooses to use--these two factors being, of course, determined by the kind of fish he wants to catch. By and large, the historian will get the kind of facts he wants."

He continues:

. . . for he [the historian] may not assume a priori that the major problems of the past, or that the controlling categories and presuppositions of thinkers of all former ages were those now commonly accepted; he may . . . need to exercise his mind in thinking in concepts that--though not intrinsically alien to the potentialities of the human mind--are alien to his and his contemporaries, ⁶⁵ habitual modes and moods of thinking.

It is suggested that although history may cast light on the problems of the present and should assist us in understanding it, historiography, for its own sake, may validly be concerned with events that do not directly satisfy this objective. The historian's own interests may prompt such a study.

⁶⁵Lovejoy, op. cit., p. 179. Italics not in original.

CHAPTER V

HISTORY AND THE NATURAL, SOCIAL AND BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCES

The principles and techniques of the natural and social sciences¹ are in many ways fundamental to the study of history. Depending upon one's point of view, the question as to the precise nature of the social sciences has been either muddled, or clarified by the drawing of analogies between the social and natural sciences.

M. Natanson in his Philosophy of the Social Sciences has considered social-scientific inquiry in light of subjectivism and naturalism, opposites of a continuum.² The frame of reference or model(s) which one accepts is crucial to the interpretation of these sciences and their application to history. One basic question must be

¹The "natural sciences" are "the branches of knowledge collectively which deal directly with natural objects" Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (Toronto: Thomas Allen Ltd., 1961), p. 560.

The "social sciences" are those sciences that deal with "human society or its elements, as family, state or race and with the relations and institutions involved in man's existence and well-being as a member of an organized community." Ibid., p. 803.

²M. Natanson (ed.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A Reader (New York: Random House, 1963).

considered: What relevance have the natural, social and behavioural sciences for the study of history? A partial answer to this and more specific questions, it is hoped, could be obtained by investigating: (1) the importance of theory development to the field of history, and (2) the significance of differing procedures of interpretation applied to historical events.

For reasons previously considered, it appears advisable that history employ the results of all of man's inquiry to reach an understanding and explanation of the past. Much of the difficulty often lies in unwittingly emphasizing the differences, rather than the similarities, in interpreting man's past. Attempts to seek some agreement, however, have been made. F. Kaufmann, for example, has directed his attention to "re-think" social science investigation along lines of the natural sciences, maintaining that the lack of law-like relationships and clarity of expression in the social sciences is essentially due to the failure of quantification, and subsequently, the shortage of inter-subjectively controllable data.³ The search for laws and explanation for prediction in the social sciences and history has produced an abundance of

³F. Kaufmann, Methodology of the Social Sciences (London: O.U.P., 1963), pp. 133, 142.

literature. E. Nagel has attempted to pinpoint much of the difficulty.

Historians . . . aim to assert warranted singular statements about the occurrence and interrelations of specific actions; and though this task can be achieved only by assuming and using general laws, historians do not regard it as part of their task to establish such laws. The distinction between history and theoretical science is thus somewhat analogous to the difference between medical diagnosis and physiology; or between geology and physics. A geologist seeks to ascertain, for example, the sequential order of geologic formations, and he is able to do so by applying various physical laws to the materials he encounters; it is not the geologist's task qua geologist, to establish the laws of mechanics or of radio-active disintegration that he may employ.⁴

The preceding reference suggests at least two major issues that by analogy have implications for history. First, Nagel roughly categorizes both history and geology, the "soft sciences," as dependent upon other fields of endeavour; and second, that both the historian and geologist, in using laws from the "hard sciences," explain or interpret the information before them. This frequently leads to a discussion on the form of historical explanations and interpretations.

The historian, in his research, employs all techniques that assist him in historical interpretation.

⁴E. Nagel, "Some Issues in the Logic of Historical Analysis," Theories of History, (ed.) P. Gardiner, (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), p. 375. *Italics in original.*

This makes history more than a positivist science, permitting the application of such tools as Verstehen or psychoanalysis, while recognizing that these tools usually function as generators of hypotheses which one must attempt to verify by historical evidence. Hence, any statement pertaining to history presupposes a point of view, perspective or model.

As an introduction to a discussion of the value of the natural, social and behavioural sciences to history, the writer examines the role of theory as the basis of man's various attempts to understand the world.

I. THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HISTORY

The word "theory" is open to innumerable interpretations. The natural sciences employ the term in at least two senses:

1. As an hypothesis that has been verified by observation.
2. As a logically interconnected set of confirmed hypotheses.⁵

⁵D. O'Connor, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 76.

In a similar sense, the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Historiography believes it helpful

. . . to think of theories not as a means of summing up a mass of data already obtained but as a means of guiding the search for data and of assisting the process of analysis and interpretation. Theories in this sense are explanatory devices. They are constructed experimentally and they are evaluated in terms of how well they enable us to discover, analyze and explain the evidence.⁶

It seems reasonable to expect theories in history to adopt a similar role. Indeed, explanation and understanding involve principles and assumptions of a type, regardless of whether or not the assumptions are part of a highly sophisticated and logically sound theory. The validity of the theory lies in how well it explains the happenings, and hence how well it assists us to understand the historical event or events.

Hypotheses, which frequently exhibit the following features, are basic to any theory:

1. Hypotheses, propositions that assert the existence of relationships among phenomena

⁶ A Report of the Committee on Historiography, The Social Sciences in Historical Study Bulletin 64, (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1954), 91.

and thus differ from concepts,⁷ are not unmotivated, undirected or random guesses.⁸

They are designed to lead to the solution of a particular problem. The hypothesis may be stated in a declarative or an interrogative manner. An example of the former might be: "Highly motivated educational reform groups are extremely vocal." Such an hypothesis might be derived from general group theory. If the theory is valid, the hypothesis would be confirmed by the evidence. A test of the hypothesis is therefore a partial test of

⁷Ibid., pp. 91-92.

"A concept is a mental construction, an abstract idea that refers either to a class of phenomena or to certain aspects or characteristics that a range of phenomena have in common. Thus, a concept is an analytical and theoretical approach, a way of looking at the data."

He continues:

"Concepts by definition are abstractions from reality, designating types of movements, persons, behavior, or other classes of phenomena. Concepts are used for organizing and analyzing; but they are also generalizing devices, containing implicit theoretical assumptions, and must be linked with explicit hypotheses if they are offered as historical explanations of particular situations."

"Concepts, and therefore theories, can be developed at several different levels of abstraction."

⁸O'Connor, op. cit., pp. 77-78.

the theory. The preceding illustration does not imply that historians, when studying a particular event or series of events, state their hypotheses in a rigorous fashion and proceed to investigate on the strictest of scientific principles. It merely suggests that the historian's inquiry is amenable to certain procedures, which may be explicitly stated, whether or not the historian is aware of his procedures.

2. The hypothesis, if true, will have observable consequences. In history the word "observable" must be open to a wide-range of interpretation. Possibly "verifiable" is better able to account for historical evidence which "exists," but "exists" in a particular way.
3. An hypothesis is valid only insofar as the anticipated consequences must actually occur. Although the consequences deduced from the hypothesis are actually verified, this does not conclusively establish that the

hypothesis is correct.⁹

It is often misleading to apply the principles employed in one field of endeavour to another without thorough exploration. However, certain ideals are common to all fields. To suggest that all disciplines must approximate the physical sciences is also misleading, but the historian would do well to be cognizant of various, possibly applicable ideals. In this context one should not overlook the possibilities of employing some principles of the natural, social and behavioural sciences.

F. Northrop in The Logic of the Social Sciences and Humanities asserts that

. . . any empirical science in its normal healthy development begins with a more purely inductive emphasis, in which the empirical data of its subject matter are systematically gathered, and then comes to maturity with deductively formulated theory in which formal logic and mathematics play a most significant part.¹⁰

It is not necessary to assume that historical study does or must adopt the preceding principles in totality. It is evident, however, that historiography does employ description as a basis and proceeds from that to explanation. Pure theory might eventually result from such

⁹See forthcoming section on behavioural sciences and history.

¹⁰F. Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and Humanities (New York: Macmillan, 1947), p. 134.

efforts. One might organize the following levels of growth:

1. Categorization and description.
2. Explanation and testing.
3. Pure theory.

Stages 1 and 2 are familiar to historians*, and in a sense many of them have attempted to arrive at the third stage.¹¹

Historians frequently shy away from philosophers for no reason other than there is a lack of communication between them. Much of what the philosopher suggests, has long been practiced by the historian. Needless to say, the opposite is also true. As a result, these groups are often closer together in thought than they realize.

P. Alexander, for example, suggests that the goal of science is the description of observable phenomena,¹² and he is


¹¹L. Benson, "A Tentative Classification for American Voting Behavior," Sociology and History (eds.) W. Cahnman and A. Boskoff (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 415-421.

¹²P. Alexander, Sensationalism and Scientific Explanation (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 51; and R. Harre, An Introduction to the Logic of the Sciences (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1960) who elaborates on the relationship of description to explanation.

supported by E. Nagel who maintains that the "sciences . . . achieve what are at best only comprehensive and accurate systems of description, not of explanation."¹³

The student may thus approach the problem under study in either one of the two followings ways.¹⁴

1. He may set out with the explicit purpose of testing a conventional interpretation or theory, moving from one step to the next.




2. In historical theories, evidence is not always available because of the application of incompletely defined concepts. Thus the

¹³E. Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt and Brace and Co., 1961), p. 26. *Italics in original.* Also see B. Ellis, "On the Relation of Explanation to Description," Mind, LXV (January, 1956), 506, who draws the conclusion that "I have shown that in . . . the whole class of scientific explanations the theory that a scientific explanation must be a higher order redescription of the phenomena to be explained But I have not shown . . . that the making of progressively higher order redescriptions of phenomena is the main business of science."

¹⁴Bulletin 64, op. cit., p. 30.

practicing historian frequently employs the ensuing procedure:



Apart from the often "value loaded" nature of the "factual" historical event itself,¹⁵ (the Jacksonian Period in America, for example, is associated with such ill-defined concepts as "equality" and "liberty"), a further difficulty is that the body of empirical (historical) evidence has itself been selected from a wealth of material.

It might be necessary for the historian to attempt to reconcile two or more differing theories which, though explaining the same set of facts, rest on different assumptions. The historian should be willing to use all theories if they are equally sound, until one has been proven conclusively correct.

The variations in the understanding of the term

¹⁵Rickert, op. cit., p. 86.

"theory," a function of the conceptual model the researcher wishes to employ, indicates at one end of the continuum a rough or loosely constructed set of precepts, and on the other a tightly knit framework encompassing laws. Theories, as interpretive systems, appear valuable to the extent that they assist in explaining and understanding the historical event.

This suggests the nature of historical interpretation and leads to a brief study of the value of theories in the natural, social and behavioural sciences.

II. HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION

The natural, social and behavioural studies all have value for the practicing historian. This does not imply that all efforts in these areas are immediately applicable to historical study, for this depends in part upon the purpose as well as the ingenuity of the historian. In this regard, one might examine in a brief way a possible value for the theories of C. Hempel and W. Dray in the writing of history.

A cardinal tenet of Hempelian or Covering Law theory is that all scientific explanations have a common form and in history, as in the natural sciences, the explanation in terms of "hypothesis of universal form," "universal hypothesis" or "general law" can be considered a

statement of universal conditional form which is capable of either being confirmed or denied by empirical findings.¹⁶

Specifically:

In every case where an event of a specified kind C occurs at a certain place and time, an event of a specified kind E will occur at a place and time which is related in a specified manner to the place and time of the occurrences of the first event.¹⁷

General laws thus connect events in patterns, referred to as explanation and prediction embodying

1. statements of other prior or simultaneous happenings;
2. general laws established by empirical evidence.¹⁸

Group 1 states the determining conditions for the event to be explained, while group 2 contains the general laws on which the explanations are based.

The description of an individual event--such as the San Francisco earthquake in 1906--requires a statement

¹⁶C. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History," Theories of History (ed.) P. Gardiner (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959), p. 345; and also see K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies V. II (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 420.

¹⁷Hempel, loc. cit.

¹⁸A. Donagan, "Explanation in History," in Theories, p. 428.

of all the properties exhibited by the spatial region or the individual object involved for the period of time occupied by the event in question. Mandelbaum¹⁹ argues that a complete description of particular complex events and states of affairs must be the bedrock of historical generalizations. Although such a task is admittedly difficult²⁰ requiring vast comparative studies, in principle it is not impossible.²¹

Hempel contends that scientific explanation requires the following three conditions:

1. An empirical test of the sentences which state the determining conditions,
2. An empirical test of the universal hypothesis on which the explanation rests,
3. An investigation of whether the explanation is logically conclusive.²²

¹⁹M. Mandelbaum, "Historical Explanation," History and Theory, I (1961), 241.

²⁰Donagan, op. cit., p. 431.

²¹Mandelbaum, op. cit., p. 242. The assumption here is that a complete description of an historical event is possible. This necessitates possession of all the facts.

²²Hempel, op. cit., p. 347.

Entering the scene at this juncture is the question of verifiability of historical documents as well as the incidents which they portray. W. Gallie in "Explanations in History and the Genetic Sciences" states three primary conditions:

1. The historian has to satisfy himself that what he has before him is a meaningful document. This involves not only that the shapes he is presented with are formed and ordered in accordance with the conventions of some known language, and not only that the words and sentences he reads have sense in that language, but also--and this is what distinguishes the historian's from the linguist's interpretation--that this sense could not have belonged to the words unless they have been inscribed by someone who intended them to convey a recognizable meaning.
2. . . . on either internal or external evidence, that this meaningful document is in part at least veridical in intention, i.e. that it could not have been produced except by someone wishing to record some actual . . . happenings.
3. He must satisfy himself, usually on a combination of internal and external evidence, that his document is also in some degree trustworthy²³

The crux of historical verifiability is presented in Scheffler's maxims which state

1. that indirect verification is possible of a consequence prior to the historian, and
2. that such consequences, acknowledged in

²³W. Gallie, "Explanations in History and the Genetic Sciences," Theories of History, (ed.) P. Gardiner (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959), p. 400.

scientific practice, should be included in the meaning of a historical statement by verifiability theory.²⁴

He illustrates the following case:

Consider the past event C; with its series of consequences M. Let M¹ be that part of the series no longer open to direct confirmation by the historian H. It may be important for H to recognize the peculiar nature of M¹, but he must not let that recognition obstruct the indirect confirmation of M¹:

Scheffler continues:

Suppose M¹ to have its own series of consequences N, some of which are directly verifiable by N, called N¹. Then, by verifying N¹, he partially confirms M¹, thus adding to the confirmation of E¹, though indirectly. The limited significance of reference to the historian should not be allowed, then, to reduce the scope of meaning of historical sentences, properly defined by the range of all consequences future to the state of affairs asserted no matter what the relative time-position of the historian.²⁵

Having verified the statement, the philosopher aims at showing that the event in question was not a matter of chance, but was to be expected in view of antecedent or simultaneous conditions, not prophecy but rational scientific anticipation resting on the assumption of general laws.

²⁴I. Scheffler, "Verifiability in History: A Reply to Miss Masi," The Journal of Philosophy, XLVII (Jan.-Dec., 1950), 165.

²⁵Ibid.

A procedure anticipated by Hempel is the possibility of construing explanations on probability hypotheses rather than on general "deterministic" laws.²⁶ This also necessitates the explanation sketch, consisting of a more or less vague indication of the laws and conditions considered as relevant and in need of the "filling out" or "genetic type" historical explanation. Examining this question in the light of Hempelian principles, R. Brandt,²⁷ in a somewhat different example pertaining to the psychological implications of historical biography, realizes the possibility of theoretical constructs which receive "partial interpretation" through the laws and correspondence rules which connect them with other theoretical constructs and observables.

The filling-out process required by an explanation sketch will . . . assume the form of a gradually increasing precision of the formulations involved; but at any stage of this process those formulations will

²⁶Hempel, op. cit., p. 350. ". . . under conditions of a more or less complex kind F, an event or "result" of kind G will occur with statistical probability-- . . ." He continues: ". . . in symbolic notation: $Ps(G, F) = Q$. If probability Q is close to 1, a law of this type may be invoked to explain the occurrence of G in a given particular case in which conditions F are realized." C. Hempel, "Reasons and Covering Laws in Historical Explanation," p. 144.

²⁷R. Brandt, "Personality Traits as Causal Explanations in Biography," Philosophy and History, (ed.) S. Hook. (New York: New York University Pless, 1963), p. 201.

have some empirical import; it will be possible to indicate, at least roughly, what kind of evidence would be relevant in testing them, and what findings would tend to confirm them.²⁸

The covering law theorists, however, admit the need for full investigation of historical data to avoid misconstruing or assuming full causal connections where none exist.

Another dictum of Hempelian Theory is concerned with the charge that a historian may tend to identify himself with the historical hero and hence destroy the empirical nature of investigation. To this query Hempel notes that "what counts is the soundness of the general hypothesis involved,"²⁹ regardless of the procedure of attaining that hypothesis.³⁰

A last problem is that of determining the relevance of an event to the development of a historical explanation. This involves the causal analysis of the event which consists of establishing an explanation for it, and thus requires reference to general hypotheses.

²⁸ Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History," p. 351.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 353.

³⁰ This would presumably allow the use of empathy and Verstehen as heuristic but not explanatory devices.

Similarly, assumptions about relevance,³¹ and the adequate analysis of the historical development of let us say an institution require reference to general hypotheses. Thus economic conditions, for example, as determinant of all aspects of society, are valuable only to the extent they can be substantiated by explicit laws stating "just what kind of change in human culture will regularly follow upon specific changes in the economic conditions."³²

The preceding sketch, though brief, provides the essentials for an evaluation of Hempelian theory in the light of historiography. A number of factors are noted.

1. Hempel's deductive explanation would shed little additional light upon explaining "why" a certain event happened once the law used to explain those types of events had been formed. It would appear that a main value lies in the process actually employed in the gathering of evidence to develop the general law applicable to explaining the event or events in question. In general deductive explanation, the

³¹Hempel, op. cit., p. 354.

³²Ibid., p. 355.

conclusion is contained within the premises, and the historian might gain valuable insights by attempting to classify the evidence and formulate the law. However, the historian must be aware of the different ways in which idealist and positivists explicate the term "event." In a piece of history which is written from a non-positivist point of view, an event appears to be a particular occurrence and not necessarily part of a "causal" chain. However, those advocating the Hempelian approach often look upon an event as "any change or persistence of state or position," and it is "connected with some preceding event that unless the latter had occurred the former would not have occurred."³³ In the positivist framework causality is a must.³⁴ The conclusion

³³B. Blanshard, "The Case for Determinism," Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science (ed.) S. Hook (New York: Collier Books, 1961), p. 19.

³⁴C. Hempel and P. Oppenheim, "The Logic of Explanation," Readings in the Philosophy of Science (eds.) H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), pp. 321-323.

is a logical necessity if worked from the particular premises and the covering law.

2. Hempel's "explanation sketch," based on probability, is dissimilar to the preceding case only insofar as logical probability rather than necessity is involved, which thus argues that a historical event may or may not occur. If the event does occur, the historian remarks that it was probable, and if the event does not occur, he also maintains the argument. The historian is not wrong in either instance.
3. Regardless of the point of view from which an explanation is made, whether it be Hempelian or idealist, the historian is aware of the fact that an event has or has not occurred. Different kinds of explanations are available for the historian's use. The Hempelian explanation is scientific and meets the particular needs of science. It may or may not meet the needs of the historian, and this depends largely on the kind of explanation one wants to give and the purpose the historian has in mind.

4. If the explanation is reasonable, and "explains" the available evidence by confirming the fact that the event did happen, then the explanation is valuable. In this connection, it would seem that much of the value of attempting to frame general laws lies in the analysis, description and categorization of historical evidence insofar as it is contributory to the historian's possibility of attaining fresh insights into both the particularity as well as generality of those and similar events in question, regardless of whether or not specific laws are the outcome.
5. An investigation of covering law theory requires a brief discussion of the related question of prediction and experimentation. To date, historian qua historian has not been concerned with predicting events. This attitude is related to the distinguishing feature of history, the study of the past. One cannot have a predictive history. To predict that a past event will occur is indeed peculiar. Science, in its rigorous

sense, is rightfully concerned with prediction. Admittedly, historicism, a study partly dependent upon historical learnings, is concerned with prediction in a particular fashion. In this regard, one might observe K. Popper's statement in The Poverty of Historicism, where he notes the following refutation of such prediction:

- a. The growth of human knowledge strongly influences the course of human knowledge.
- b. The growth of our scientific knowledge cannot be predicted by rational or scientific methods.
- c. Therefore, we cannot predict the future course of human history.
- d. Hence, the possibility of a theoretical history must be rejected. There can be no scientific theory of historical development serving as a basis for historical prediction.³⁵

³⁵K. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), pp. vii, viii.

It is statement b that is crucial to the above argument, and it is in full agreement with the underlying assumption made at the beginning of this chapter.

If, however, an attempt at prediction would assist the historian in understanding or organizing past events, or if it would provide a clue to an event or events in the past of which all the data was not available, then the researcher might feel justified in employing speculative or predictive techniques.³⁶ Nevertheless, the historian must be fully cognizant of the fact that, when he is acting as a historian, one who inquires into the past, his concern is not to forecast the future.³⁷

The second issue is that of experiment. The historian must and does conduct experiments if they assist him in shedding light on the past. The Kon Tiki Expedition,³⁸ for example, could have been conducted as an experiment by historians who were attempting to trace the

³⁶Historians use a speculative "technique of sort" called retrodiction. The historian works back from given evidence to "fill in the blanks" in his attempt to gain an understanding of a past event.

³⁷The historian, when acting as an educator or social reformer may indulge in the prediction of the possible course of events. He no longer acts as a historian, however, for he assumes a task that by definition is excluded from history as a study.

³⁸T. Heyerdahl, The Kon Tiki Expedition (ed.) G. Thornley (London: Longmans Green, 1957).

history of the settlement of Polynesia. Similarly, the re-enactment of the battles of Waterloo or Hastings might provide historians with additional insights and thereby attain a better understanding of what had occurred. This approach merely underscores the assumption that no effort must be spared and no insight must remain unexplored in man's quest for an understanding of his past.

Another fundamental approach to historical explanation is that argued by W. Dray.³⁹ Historical explanation for the rationalist approach is presented in the following note by J. Passmore:

What we cannot expect of him [the philosopher of history] is that he should adopt the standards of the physicist or physiologist. For his task has no relation to theirs; he is not attempting to develop a body of theory, but to show us something about the way in which a particular course of events developed.⁴⁰

Essentially, the rationalist approves the use of empathy and other psychological procedures in explaining historical events within an assumed context of impartiality.

If we are acting reasonably we must be impartial--that is, we must grant that if X is a good reason for B to do Y in Z, it is also a good reason for anyone else relevantly like B and similarly situated; we must also act in accordance with the evidence and

³⁹W. Dray, Laws and Explanation in History (London: Oxford University Press, 1964).

⁴⁰J. Passmore, "Explanation in Everyday Life in Science and History," History and Theory, II (1962), 123.

not allow our judgements to be distorted by our fears and aversions, and where such considerations are relevant we must conduct our thinking and acting according to principle.⁴¹

Uniqueness of any state of affairs is thus admitted,⁴² and should historical events suggest causality, this but indicates the operation of "principles" but not laws.

Adopting the view that science has assisted man in releasing his mind from the fetters of superstition and tradition, E. Tapp in "Some Aspects of Causation in History" argues the impossibility of framing historical laws, for

. . . with the greater freedom of will to operate in an ever-widening field of knowledge making contingent events more and more possible, not only does reliable prediction become less and less likely but the task of interpreting the past, and of writing history grows increasingly complex.^{43,44}

Dray's doctrine of rational explanation is in agreement with the following statement:

The historian must penetrate behind appearances, achieve insight into the situation, identify himself sympathetically with the protagonist, project himself

⁴¹K. Nielsen, "Rational Explanations in History," Philosophy and History (ed.) S. Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1963), p. 312.

⁴²Dray, op. cit., p. 44.

⁴³E. Tapp, "Some Aspects of Causation in History," The Journal of Philosophy, XLIX (Jan., 1952), 79.

⁴⁴It appears that the rationalist explanation simultaneously combines both psychological and methodological procedures.

imaginatively into his situation. He must revive, re-enact, re-think, re-experience the hopes, fears, plans, desires, views and intentions . . . of those he seeks to understand.⁴⁵

The philosopher of history must render history intelligible by clarifying the rationale or point of the action from the agent's view,⁴⁶ even if the agent's actions seem unreasonable or abominable, for their actions would make perfectly good sense from their point of view.⁴⁷

Professor Dray's ultimate stand is reflected below:

My chief complaint against acceptance of the covering law doctrine in history is not the difficulty of operating it, in either fully deductive or mutilated form. It is rather that it sets up a kind of conceptual barrier to a humanistically oriented historiography.⁴⁸

⁴⁵Dray, op. cit., p. 119. Italics in original.

⁴⁶Nielsen, op. cit., p. 298.

⁴⁷B. Mazlish raises two points:

1. Dray suggests that history is made of rational and reasonable actions rather than passions-- a quite antihumanistic stand for someone supporting such a position.
2. Unintended consequences are not fully considered and are split into two levels of interpretation; straight narrative and analytic method.

Mazlish notes their contradictory nature by their dealing with social entities in place of individuals. These points are elaborated in B. Mazlish, "On Rational Explanation in History," Philosophy and History (ed.) S. Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1963), particularly pp. 278-285.

⁴⁸W. Dray, "The Historical Explanation of Actions Reconsidered," Philosophy and History (ed.) S. Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1963), p. 133. Italics in original.

It is evident that Hempel and Dray are on opposite "sides of the fence" regarding the value of Verstehen as an interpretive device in the social sciences and history. Further elaboration of the problem is needed.

Verstehen, interpretive understanding, involves participation

. . . along with others, in social process, and in doing this we are able to grasp the situation not only from our own point of view, but from theirs. By identifying ourselves with them, we come to feel what they feel, or at any rate to think their thoughts. And this applies not only for present social situations in which we are actually participating, but also for the past which we can, as historians, relive or re-enact for ourselves, thereby achieving a vicarious participation.⁴⁹

Although no place exists for Verstehen in theory formulation in the natural sciences, its application to the study of man has been open to debate. A. Schutz, in presenting the "phenomenological" position, maintains that Verstehen has nothing to do with introspection, for it is not "a private affair of the observer which cannot be controlled by the experiences of other observers."⁵⁰ He writes:

⁴⁹

Gibson, op. cit., p. 50.

⁵⁰

A. Schutz, "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences," Philosophy of the Social Sciences (ed.) M. Natanson (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 239.

It is controllable at least to the same extent to which the private sensory perceptions of an individual are controllable by any other individual under certain conditions.⁵¹

Nagel's reply questions the adequacy of Verstehen as a "fruitful heuristic technique," but does not exclude in its entirety the value of Verstehen as "a way of generating suggestive hypotheses for explaining social action."⁵²

What precisely is the role of Verstehen? Here again, the question of the conceptual model one wishes to employ and the significance of that model come into play. If one accepts the premise that men, having a "human nature," roughly possess similar psychological or mental

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²E. Nagel, "On the Method of Verstehen as the Sole Method of Philosophy," M. Natanson (ed.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A Reader (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 264. B. Mazlish, (ed.), Psychoanalysis and History (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963), p. 3, argues that historians have employed overtly or covertly Verstehen as a method of understanding. He advances two basic criticisms of such explanation:

"(1) . . . we may consider as natural or understandable only that which is so to our particular time and culture.
(2) . . . the acceptance of 'surface' psychology in history perpetuates the very same deception we practice on ourselves in everyday life. Never go beneath appearances, we settle for the unexamined cliches about human nature and behaviour, and turn our backs on the insights and theories of a deeper and more refined psychology."

For Mazlish's alternatives, see section dealing with psychology and history.

characteristics, and that these men seek to attain some understanding of an historical event--even if there appears to be no empirical means of ascertaining that understanding--does not Verstehen become valuable insofar as it provides a certain type of explanation, tentative though it may be and subject to a higher degree of explanatory power upon receiving additional evidence? It would seem that the historian, admitting his human frailties and often having no possibility of gaining empirically testable facts, must resort to Verstehen, if for no other reason than to advance potentially explanatory hypotheses.

The neo-idealist or rationalist approach has been criticized on both philosophical and methodological grounds.⁵³ Nevertheless, the criticism and dialogue among various opposing camps is vital and necessary to the advance of man's knowledge. It assists the historian in evaluating the worth of both perspectives.

Where Dray refers to principles of history, Hempel insists upon laws, where Hempel expresses reservations on empathy, Dray encourages its use. The historian, if he desires "to get on with the job," must evaluate

⁵³ P. Nowell-Smith, "Review," Philosophy, XXXIV (1959), 170-172; P. Strawson, "Review," Mind, LXVII (1957), 265-268; L. Cohen, "Review," Philosophical Quarterly, 10 (April, 1960), 190-191.

philosophies, but he must be willing to adapt any techniques to the writing of history if they fulfill the expectations of good history. Assume, for example, that a neo-idealist and a Hempelian employ the same facts in the interpretation of an event. Also assume that the assumptions on which their interpretations are based are acceptable. It would seem reasonable, depending upon the historian's purpose, to accept either one or the other or both of the interpretations if they assist in the description, explanation and understanding of the past. If their interpretations do not violate the canons of sound historiography, then the historian must take their theories into account. This view supports the assumption that the explosion of knowledge, based on different techniques, requires that the historian avail himself of these techniques if they are of value in pushing forward the frontiers of history.

In a similar fashion, the sociological and behavioural sciences are valuable to the historian for interpreting the past.

As suggested above, both the sociological and behavioural sciences are relevant to the historian. Although these studies have the same genetic approach as history, they concentrate upon the analysis and interpretation of man's present condition. This, however, in relation to history is a matter of degree, for the

sociologist and psychologist must start with events that have already occurred. Their objectives of prediction and control are in part based upon their previous investigations. Recall F. C. Northrop's stages of scientific development,⁵⁴ and it is observed that the stage of description is preliminary to the stage of prediction. It is the descriptive and explanatory levels, however, that are of direct concern to the historian. Although sociology and psychology are interrelated, the writer first turns to a separate investigation of sociology's value for history. It is undoubtedly a truism to suggest that social organizations have been a trademark of collective human effort throughout history. Commenting on the importance of organizations to man, A. Etzioni remarks that

. . . organizations are not a modern invention. The Pharaohs used organizations to build the pyramids. The emperors of China used organizations a thousand years ago to construct great irrigation systems. And the first Popes created a universal church to serve a world religion.⁵⁵

Not unlike researchers in other fields, social scientists have used various models of society and man to describe and interpret social organization. However, the problem of personal identification with models is a source

⁵⁴Northrop, op. cit., p. 134.

⁵⁵A. Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964), p. 1.

of constant friction in the light of the fact that procedures of evaluating model criteria are still open to debate. As a result, many different perspectives of sociology's relevance for history can be adopted. It is the writer's intention, however, to select for investigation the currently discussed structural-functionalist⁵⁶ approach to sociology, advocated in various forms by such men as T. Parsons,⁵⁷ G. Homans,⁵⁸ and R. Merton.⁵⁹ Reference to other sociologists, however, will also be made.

⁵⁶The term "function" as used here in a sociological context is a technical word indicating the operation or function of the various interacting parts of a social system. By analogy one might observe that a biological organism as an entire system has functioning parts that are interrelated and hence contribute to the existence and operation of that system. In educational discourse, however, the term is differently used and implies ideas of value and purpose. See CHAPTER III for educational implications.

⁵⁷T. Parsons, The Social System (Illinois: The Free Press, 1949).

⁵⁸G. Homans, Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1961), and The Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1950).

⁵⁹R. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1949).

Structural-functionalism's⁶⁰ significance for the historian will be presented first, by considering its nature through an investigation of such issues as "model," "social organization" and their associated terms of "theory" and "system;" and second, by examining its possible value in assisting the historian to organize and interpret his evidence.

Functionalism, in this context, tends to view society as an integration of parts into wholes, the interdependence of the different elements found in society,

⁶⁰B. Malinowski, op. cit., pp. 40-44, argues that institutions are the building blocks of culture which are related to needs. He delineates the ensuing foundation for functional theory:

"1. It has to be accepted as an axiom that human beings have to be nourished; that they have to reproduce; that they must be provided with shelter, personal comforts, the elements of cleanliness, and a suitable range of temperature. 2. For although human beings are animals, they are animals who live not by physiological drives alone but by physiological drives molded and modified by conditions of culture. 3. Again, man never deals with his difficulties alone. He organizes into families; he lives in a community with a tribal constitution, where principles of authority, of leadership, of hierarchy are defined by a cultural charter. 4. Language and abstract thought are the vehicles of knowledge, of belief, of legal systems and tribal constitutions. 5. Our argument . . . leads to the conclusion that the cultural satisfaction of primary biological needs imposes upon man secondary or derived imperatives. 6. The functional approach to the comparative study of cultures thus postulates that the study of systems of production, distribution and consumption must be carried out, even in the most primitive societies."

and the idea of society as manifesting an equilibrium.⁶¹ Contemporary thought has emphasized the idea of an "organic system" operating within society without advance commitment to the acceptance of only one type of "system"; hence all analyses of structure and process radiate from the idea of "system," which is given theoretical status.⁶²

The elaboration of functional sociology involves what R. Merton considers to be latent and manifest functions, the latter, according to D. Martindale, being somewhat analagous to the conscious "manifest content" of Freudian dream analysis, while the former representing

⁶¹ N. Timasheff, Sociological Theory: Its Nature and Growth (rev. ed., New York: Random House, 1957), p. 222.

⁶² C. Barnard, "Organizations as Systems of Cooperation," Complex Organizations (ed.) A. Etzioni (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1964), p. 14.

"A cooperative system is a complex of physical, biological, personal, and social components which are in a specific systematic relationship by reason of the cooperation of two or more persons for at least one definite end. Such a system is evidently a subordinate unit of larger systems from one point of view; and itself embraces subsidiary systems--physical, biological, etc.--from another point of view. One of the systems comprised within a cooperative system, the one which is implicit in the phrase 'cooperation of two or more persons', is called an 'organization'."

the hidden or secret conscious.⁶³ The official structure of society, however, may not always operate within a particular set of functions; thus structures of an unofficial nature would be generated to fulfill the needs.⁶⁴

In providing a basis for the idea of conflict and reinforcement between differing aspects of a given system, Merton supplements the "latent-manifest" distinction with concepts of dysfunction and nonfunction. Specifically, dysfunctions are those observed consequences which lessen the adaptation or adjustment of the system. "There is also the empirical possibility of nonfunctional consequences, which are simply irrelevant to the system under consideration."⁶⁵ However, the issues raised by dysfunction seem inevitably tied to solution only on normative grounds.

Although it appears impractical if not

⁶³D. Martindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p. 445.

⁶⁴See K. Davis, "The Myth of Functional Analysis as a Special Method in Sociology and Anthropology," American Sociological Review, 24 (Dec., 1959), p. 765, who sides with Merton in arguing that "the functionalist movement, as I see it, represents an effort to explain social organization and behaviour from a disinterested observer's point of view. This is why the manifest-latent distinction is important."

⁶⁵Merton, op. cit., p. 51. Italics in original.

impossible to succinctly summarize the meaning of function, Gouldner suggests that "functionalism is nothing if it is not the analysis of social patterns as parts of larger systems of behaviour and belief."⁶⁶ Therefore an understanding of functionalism in sociology necessitates an understanding of the resources of the idea of "system."

In his presidential presentation in the American Sociological Review, Homans maintains the following chief interests and assumptions of functionalism.

1. Functionalism bases its work upon the study of norms, the statements the members of a group make about how they ought to behave. "It was especially interested in the cluster of norms called a role and in the cluster of roles called an institution."
2. The interrelations of roles and of institutions is representative of the "structural side" of functionalism.
3. The school was interested in the consequences

⁶⁶A. Gouldner, "Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory," Symposium on Sociological Theory, edited by H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), p. 241.

of an institution, particularly in the consequences for a social system considered as a whole, these consequences being the "function" of the institution.⁶⁷

An elaboration of the theory associated with the preceding discussion brings the writer to an examination of "functional prerequisites" and the question of "functional postulates."

The question of functional postulates is examined by Merton in his Social Theory and Social Structure.⁶⁸

Substantially, these postulates hold first, that standardized social activities or cultural items are functional for the entire social or cultural system; second, that all such social and cultural items fulfill sociological functions; and third, that these items are consequently indispensable.⁶⁹

Merton's argument relies heavily on the statements of

⁶⁷G. Homans, "Bringing Men Back In," American Sociological Review, 29 (Dec., 1964), 809-810.

⁶⁸Merton, op. cit., pp. 25-37.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 25. Italics in original.

Malinowski,⁷⁰ Kluckholm⁷¹ and Parsons,⁷² and implies the value of considering the inevitability of substituting his own dysfunctional and nonfunctional categorization for the "teleological" implications of the three basic axioms.

The first two postulates, Merton suggests, are dependent upon empirical investigation, whereas the third postulate of indispensability entails two distinct propositions:

. . . the one alleging the indispensability of certain functions, and this gives rise to the concept of functional necessity or functional prerequisites; the other alleging the indispensability of existing social institutions, . . . and this gives rise to the concept of functional alternatives, equivalents or substitutes.⁷³

The former point is of utmost interest in light of "The Functional Prerequisites of a Society"⁷⁴ where the authors, in defining the nature of a society, indicate nine prerequisites and four conditions as fundamental to the

⁷⁰B. Malinowski, "Anthropology," Encyclopedia Britannica, OMNIBUS First Supplementary Volume, (London and New York, 1942), pp. 122-123.

⁷¹C. Kluckholm, Navaho Witchcraft, Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University (Cambridge: Peabody Museum, 1944).

⁷²T. Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory, Pure and Applied (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1949).

⁷³Merton, op. cit., p. 36. Italics in original.

⁷⁴Aberle et al., "The Functional Prerequisites of a Society," Ethics, LX (1949-50), 100-111.

existence of any society. Much support for "imperatives" is found in Malinowski's The Dynamics of Cultural Change where the author discusses the basis of functionalist theory.⁷⁵ Such a series of postulates seem primarily useful in directing attention to a set of "needs" which are sufficiently concrete to characterize the system at hand.

Selznick, commenting upon functional prerequisites, maintains that societal or organizational survival is intimately connected with the struggle for relative prestige, both for the organization and for elements and individuals within it.⁷⁶

This view, however, is attacked by Homans who maintains that no prerequisites for the survival of a society exist except that the society provide sufficient reward for its individual members "to keep them contributing activities to its maintenance, and that it reward them not just as members of that society but as men."⁷⁷ It would seem that Homans, too, accepts a type of functional

⁷⁵See footnote 60.

⁷⁶P. Selznick, "Foundations of the Theory of Organization," in Complex Organizations, p. 27.

⁷⁷G. Homans, Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1961), p. 384.

prerequisite which, upon closer comparison with Selznick, emphasizes the role of "man," as opposed to "men." In addition, Homans appears to be defining the question from the viewpoint of explanatory theory as opposed to the postulated imperatives, Malinowski fashion.

These seemingly divergent views indicate a fundamental difference in examining the problem of social organization. Homans, a "rebel" with considerable stature in the field of sociology, poses the question of theory as necessary to any science, and insists that the traditional structural-functionalist approach has failed to adequately develop explanatory theory.

The Human Group⁷⁸ and "Bringing Men Back In"⁷⁹ have served as milestones in the development of "sociological functionalism." Homans' thesis centers on the position that the study of social organization requires the development of an adequate body of knowledge plus an explanatory framework.⁸⁰ His criticism is directed to the

⁷⁸G. Homans, The Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950).

⁷⁹Homans, "Bringing Men Back In."

⁸⁰Unless specific quotations are made, the material in reference to Homans will not be footnoted. The Human Group, Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms, and "Bringing Men Back In" are the basis of discussion.

problem of functionalism, insofar as it has served primarily as a descriptive and not as an explanatory procedure. Description for Homans appears to be "analysis;"⁸¹ whereas explanation appears to be a "synthesis," a synthesis of a particular type which he refers to as theory.

Homans, who appears to be a kind of micro-functionalism, erects his theory on the axioms of psychology and economics. His application of Skinnerian operant conditioning and elementary economics results in what he considers to be a sociological theory.

Although Homans has tended to depart from the mainstream of sociology, he has opened the study of social organization to a widened horizon that bears the promise of major theoretical gains, somewhat different in nature than those possible in the writings of Merton and Parsons.

Merton, however, bases his functional approach on a descriptive protocol that guides the direction of analysis, and must include, as far as possible:

1. the location of participants in the pattern within the social structure;
2. the consideration of alternative modes of

⁸¹Homans, "Bringing Men Back In," p. 812.

behavior excluded by emphasis on the observed pattern;

3. the cognitive and emotive meanings attached by participants to the pattern;
4. a distinction between the motivations for participating in the pattern and the objective behavior involved in the pattern;
5. the regularities of behavior not recognized by participants, but which are nevertheless associated with the central pattern of behavior.⁸²

The above statements of the observer's protocol "provide a tentative step in the direction of specifying points of observation which facilitate subsequent functional analysis," and are more specific than general statements which advise the observer "to be sensitive to the 'context of the situation'."⁸³

Whereas Merton focuses attention on "theories of the middle range" which are "intermediate to the minor

⁸²Merton, op. cit., p. 60.

⁸³Ibid. Italics in original.

working hypotheses evolved . . . during the day-by-day routines of research, and the all-inclusive speculations comprising a master conceptual scheme,"⁸⁴ Parsons is concerned with those theories of a macroscopic nature. In The Social System⁸⁵ the optimization of gratification, mediated through a system of culturally shared and structured symbols, is encompassed through social action in personality, social and cultural systems.

The aspects of gratification and orientation form the basis of the individual's action system, and the ordered selection among the alternatives is represented by evaluation. The evaluation, or "value/norm process," is fundamental to all three basic systems.⁸⁶

The interaction and relations between the actors of the system represent its structure. The actors having relatively defined status-roles operate within institutions which function as role integrators of strategic structural significance in the social system.⁸⁷

Parson's system attempts to link structural

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Parsons, The Social System, pp. 5-8.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 19.

⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 36-45.

categories to the dynamically variable elements of the system, the dynamic aspect represented by function.

Functional significance in this context is inherently teleological. A process or set of conditions either "contributes" to the maintenance . . . of the system or it is dysfunctional in that it detracts from the integration . . . of the system. It is thus the functional reference of all particular conditions and processes to the state of the total system as a going concern which provides the logical equivalent of simultaneous equations in a fully developed system of analytical theory.⁸⁸

As suggested, Parsons' scheme appears to be an action frame of reference built on a structural-functional base. The "system" itself tends to maintain a state of internal unity or harmony. It represents a net balance of a collection of consequences frequently called "equilibrium."⁸⁹

Apart from a number of problems of functionalism, as considered by Homans and raised in the work of Parsons, Merton lists some of the basic queries that must be answered in facing the problem of empirical validation of theory in the investigation of social organization. Some of these queries are:

1. What is involved in the problem of evolving canons for assessing the net balance of the

⁸⁸Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory, Pure and Applied, p. 22. *Italics in original.*

⁸⁹Parsons, The Social System, pp. 491-492.

aggregate of functional and dysfunctional consequences in a system?

2. What is required to establish the validity of such an intervening variable as "functional requirement" where rigorous experimentation is impracticable?
3. What is the presently available inventory of social mechanisms through which social functions are fulfilled?
4. What available procedures will permit the sociologist most adequately to gauge the accumulation of stresses and strains in a given social system?⁹⁰

The preceding questions are part of the problem of definition. A lack of agreement by functionalists on common terminology and the logical consequences of their application has tended to result in a wide range of interpretation. Nevertheless, the writer believes that the historian can and does, either knowingly or unknowingly, often adapt various aspects of functionalism to his

⁹⁰Merton, op. cit., pp. 50-54.

researches. Specifically:

1. A first step in the historian's task is to collect the evidence and attain a comprehensive description of the subject under research. This does not mean that the historian must begin his study by a detailed description of what he is undertaking. However, such a description could provide a basis from which explanation and understanding might follow. The educational historian, in particular, whether or not he operates within a framework of social or cultural history, can fruitfully analyze social patterns "as parts of larger systems of behaviour and belief." Granted that such an analysis would be founded largely upon ascertaining the "need" relationships within a society, and although in many instances the analysis would be based on an arbitrary classification, such a technique would enable the historian to structure his study in light of the objectives and available data.
2. Homans' attempt to relate functionalism to psychology and explanatory theory in the

tradition of Hempel and Northrop once again illustrates the interdisciplinary nature of man's efforts to interpret his knowledge. The historian, who is aware of a variety of methods of applying explanation, has at his disposal the technique of attempting to locate within a behaviouristic or Freudian context, for example, such an explanation. It may shed light on the development of historical events.

3. A primary concern of the functionalist approach as developed by Parsons, Merton and Homans indicates the need for description as the basis. Explanation is the outgrowth. Whereas Homans tends to focus on small group study, Merton on those studies of the middle-range, and Parsons on wide-scale studies, each envisions an explanatory system that can account for the data. If the historian is willing, for example, to adopt Merton's descriptive protocol as a basis for classifying historical data, then he might be able to proceed along various lines or levels of explanation. This never guarantees,

however, that his explanation is full, complete or otherwise perfect. It merely provides a viewpoint that might be of assistance in gaining that desired understanding of the historical situation.

4. The structural-functional concept bridges the individual with society within an interdependent framework. The role of the individual in society can thus be viewed by the historian in his attempt to provide adequate historical explanations.
5. Various aspects of society interact with one another. This interaction of parts frequently follows definite patterns and its understanding is fundamental to any systematic study of change. To analyze, for example, the effect of the family on education in historical context, the historian must be aware of the internal structure and interrelated roles of the family, the effect of the culture and society, and the processes whereby the family is acted upon by itself, as well as upon the society.

6. Finally, the functional approach tends to view individual events within a wider context and development that may provide for the conception of a broader continuity. The historian thus has the possibility of explaining happenings on a higher level, and might account for trends and movements, as in the case of intellectual history, that are not readily apparent in small scale explanations.

The preceding suggestions indicate that the historian must invariably be aware of a multiplicity of techniques, not the least of which are those that are derived from psychology, the companion of sociology.

N. Fehl, in History and Society maintains that

. . . one of the oldest and most interesting children of history, is psychology, which hovers on the borderline between the natural and social sciences, running to the former in some endeavors (as when biological machinery of behaviour is the object of study) and to the latter in others, (as in the work of the social psychologist).⁹¹

The discipline of psychology is often associated with the behavioural sciences, a field which is described by B. Berelson in the following terms:

⁹¹N. Fehl (ed.), History and Society (Hong Kong: Ching Chi College, 1964), p. 301.

To be considered a part of the behavioural sciences, a field must satisfy two basic criteria. First, it must deal with human behaviour. However, some parts of psychology and biology that study animal behaviour are included on the ground that they are getting at human behaviour indirectly or basically. Second, it must study its subject matter in a "scientific" manner. I use the term in quotation marks because there is still so much argument over what the scientific method is as applied to human behaviour, or indeed whether it can be applied at all.⁹²

In allocating these studies to history, W. Langer's Presidential Address in the American Historical Review recognizes that the historian's responsibility of "enriching [his] understanding of the past" is made on the assumption that "modern psychology is bound to play an ever greater role in historical interpretation."⁹³

The above references indicate that "psychology" has a place in history. A number of suggestions as to how this might be accomplished will be explored.⁹⁴

The value of any model applied from psychology to the area of history must be considered for its effectiveness in assisting the understanding and explanation of

⁹²B. Berelson (ed.), The Behavioural Sciences Today (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1963), pp. 1-2.

⁹³W. Langer, "The Next Assignment," American Historical Review, LXIII (Jan., 1958), 303.

⁹⁴A thorough understanding of the relative worth of differing psychological theories requires a study of the theory from the viewpoint of metatheory.

individual historical acts, and/or its effectiveness in assisting the understanding and explanation of a particular historical milieu. In advancing these goals, the historian could operate on the assumption, or possibly "fact," that the sharpest lines of cleavage in contemporary psychology divide areas of specialization and application, "rather than schools of thought that played so prominent a role in the earlier history of the discipline."⁹⁵

Langer's optimism, however, has been tempered by a caution that demands from the historian "a degree of humility," and a disposition that "does not come armed with systems, and arrogant in his modern knowledge, to divest the past of its mysteries."⁹⁶

Much of the work of historical interpretation has been in conjunction with psychoanalysis.⁹⁷ Of various techniques, the frequently discredited Freudian and Neo-Freudian systems have been widely attempted. It is to this aspect of psychology that the writer addresses himself.

⁹⁵Bulletin 64, op. cit., p. 59.

⁹⁶P. Smith, The Historian and History (New York: A. Knopf, 1964), pp. 132-133.

⁹⁷A. Strachey, The Unconscious Motives of War (New York: International Universities Press Inc., 1957).
H. Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press of Glencoe, 1950).
M. Farber, "Psychoanalytic Hypotheses in the Study of War," Journal of Social Issues, XI (1955), 29-35.

Mazlish favours Freudian procedures for two reasons.

1. Freud has elaborated a fundamental historical explanation, that of the origin of human society.
2. Freud has developed psychoanalytic approaches which can assist in the interpretation as to the causes of specific events.⁹⁸

As a tool of historical explanation, however, psychoanalysis presents considerable problems for historians, unless their views or those of Freud are modified. This is underscored by P. Smith who argues that Freud's "essentially biological model of history as a cyclical process not unlike that of the Greeks"⁹⁹ has caused history to become nothing other than a re-enactment of the past, offering no possibility of any genuinely new happening. However, the question that must be answered is whether or not, in particular cases, psychoanalysis offers some reasonable explanation of the past, regardless of whether or not the general trend of the explanation is cyclical, linear or circular.

⁹⁸ Mazlish, op. cit., p. 3.

⁹⁹ Smith, op. cit., pp. 129-130.

Although Freudianism as a model explains too much, contra Popper's criteria of refutability as opposed to confirmability,¹⁰⁰ and though its radical subjectivity in the investigation of human understanding is not unlike that of Verstehen or empathy, the development of less dogmatic and possibly more sophisticated psychoanalytic procedures could prove of immeasurable value to the historian.

Some evidence of this approach has been demonstrated in conjunction with the study of leadership. "Psychologists formerly sought to find in leaders a specific set of qualities, perhaps distinguishable as a personality type."¹⁰¹ Today leadership is effected within a social role, defined by the behaviour expected of an individual by the members of his group, this role being interdependent with reciprocal roles of other group members.¹⁰²

The historian applying such methods could formulate hypotheses on the basis of the investigation of the

¹⁰⁰ K. Popper argues that the only sufficient criterion for meaningfulness of scientific propositions is falsification, since scientific propositions have the form of universals and a universal can be falsified by a single opposing instance while no number of supporting instances correspondingly establishes it. See S. Barker, Induction and Hypothesis (New York: Cornell University Press, 1957), pp. 156-160.

¹⁰¹ Bulletin 64, op. cit., p. 64.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 66.

subject's early life, projecting the man into different types of situations, thereby testing the hypotheses.

The possibility of misusing psychoanalytic techniques is realized, but such procedures, as in the instance of Verstehen, can create at least a limited awareness of psychological forces in the understanding of history, possibly generating a series of hypotheses which, upon discovery of additional evidence, might be confirmed, refuted or subjected to the more rigorous model of the "behaviouristic school."

III. HISTORICAL COMPLEXITY

As indicated above, the complexity of history requires that a variety of approaches be employed to interpret the past. The question of explanation, which is dependent upon interpretation, has served as the focal point for much of the discussion. W. Gallie has attempted to accommodate a variety of explanations in an historical understanding that differs from understanding in the other disciplines, on the assumption that the former would involve the narrative form. History, he claims, is a story which is founded on evidence.¹⁰³ His emphasis on

¹⁰³ W. Gallie, Philosophy and the Historical Understanding (London: Chatto and Windus, 1964), p. 107.

the narrative converges upon what appears to be a pragmatic use of explanation. Gallie writes:

If the narrative has . . . been made consistent, plausible, and in accordance with all the evidence, if it is the best narrative that we can get, then the explanation that helped us to get it is the best explanation as yet available.¹⁰⁴

This statement appears to be in the same general tenor as the following stand expressed by the Social Science Research Council:

As long as history consists of a series of . . . unique acts, thought to symbolize or cause change in society, a narrative account . . . has a certain logic. But once the historian penetrates to the level of the social conditioning factors that produce persons capable of such acts and tries to find the probability of the occurrence of any type of event, the acts themselves become as surface manifestations of more fundamental forces.¹⁰⁵

Recognition of individual events in historical understanding is also given here, but the possibility of applying explanations that penetrate to the level of laws, probabilistic or other, is employed as an interpretive device assisting, as in Gallie's procedure, the story development.

Gallie conceptualizes a special role for explanations. He distinguishes between explanations in the natural and social sciences, and in history on the ensuing

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 123.

¹⁰⁵Bulletin 54, op. cit., p. 163.

basis:

Explanations in the sciences . . . play a supreme creative role: they mark the vital growing points as well as the points of positive achievement. It is they that express the kinds of increase of knowledge that we look for from the sciences, and they do this because they are in essence answers to problems which challenge scientific men to expand and refine and unify the existing corpus of their laws and theories. But, by contrast, no one expects an historian to be an originator or unifier of the laws and theories which are exemplified in his work. What we expect from him is the ability to use other men's laws and theories, as and when they are relevant for his own purpose: which is to help us to see which is the most likely of a number of conceivable or followable developments in the difficult because imperfectly evidenced narrative that he is trying to present.¹⁰⁶

Gallie has conceded that different types of explanation are necessary in the writing of history. This view recognizes explanation as a proprium of the basic activity of following an historical narrative, "but a proprium to who relative importance or complexity . . . within any given narrative no a priori limits can be set."¹⁰⁷

For Gallie, history is a story, and a story is best expressed in the narrative form. Such a conception of the historian's task is indeed simple, but its very simplicity might eventually serve to restrain rather than advance the cause of historical research. It should be

¹⁰⁶Gallie, op. cit., pp. 112-113.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 107. Italics in original.

recognized that the logic of the narrative form is possibly only one of a variety of adaptable logics available to the historian. The narrative form is one kind of metaphor or perspective. Why must the historian be restricted to the narrative? One might note the following ideas of H. White who believes that the historian should be allowed greater freedom in presenting his material:

Such a conception of historical inquiry and representation would open up the possibility of using contemporary scientific and artistic insights in history without leading to radical relativism and the assimilation of history to propaganda, or to that fatal monism which has always heretofore resulted from attempts to wed history and science.

He continues:

. . . it would permit historians to conceive of the possibility of using impressionistic, expressionistic, surrealist . . . modes of representation for dramatizing the significance of data which they have uncovered but which, all too frequently, they are prohibited from seriously contemplating as evidence.

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If historians were to seize the opportunities thus offered, they might in time convince their colleagues in other fields of intellectual and expressive endeavor of the falsity of Nietzsche's claim that history is "a costly and superfluous luxury of the understanding."¹⁰⁸

The historian is faced with a difficult task.

He is asked to present in understandable form a complex of

¹⁰⁸ H. V. White, "The Burden of History," History and Theory, V (1966), 131. Italics in original.

events based upon a host of variables. He must explain and interpret events on the available evidence and must not violate the fundamental canons of good historiography. Rather than emphasize the differences, for example, among the approaches of the physicist, artist, and historian in their attempts to depict a situation, the writer observes some fundamental distinctions and views their similarities.

1. Man's interpretation of his world, past and present (recall that even the present is in some ways already the past), is in most instances based on verifiable facts. These facts, even though empirically ascertained, are in the last analysis only as sound as the principles which guide their discovery. It is evident that the researcher, in all fields, is continuously improving his means of gathering and objectifying his evidence. His techniques are not absolutely perfect nor are they ever likely to become so.

2. The facts that man has at his disposal can be interpreted from different perspectives. One might consider the ensuing argument:

Sometimes it seems as if there are almost as many theories of social change as there are sociologists writing about it. Some

of these writers, wedded to a particular theory, are quite dogmatic. The monolithic cause of change through the ages is found convincingly to reside in ideology, or in geography, or in psychology, or in technology, or in some other single "ography" or "ology."

To take one of these positions and argue it with force is rather satisfying and can win applause for subtle and profound thinking. To take an eclectic position is to invite doubts and confusion, and whatever clarity is achieved is likely to be equated with superficiality.

Since I intend to be eclectic, it may help if I begin with a parable. Let us call it the parable of the dead duck. The story is simple. A duck was shot dead by a hunter at daybreak in a Michigan marsh. Now the problem. What was the cause of the duck's demise?

Well, there is a physiological explanation. The duck died because of a hemorrhage, which left the heart no blood to pump. And there is a psychological explanation. The duck died because the hunter was the kind of person he was--if he had had different frustrations in his youth, he might not have become a bird-killer. We might take quite a psychoanalytic dive on this one, but let's skip it. And there is an ideological explanation. If the culture of Michigan were like that of some parts of India, the killing of a duck--or of any other animal, for that matter--would be reprehensible. And there is a geographical explanation. Note that our duck died in a marsh. No hunter probably would have been waiting for him on top of a hill. Finally, consider a technological explanation, the gun that killed him, a product of centuries of technical progress in the manufacture of lethal hardware.

Now the point of this parable is, first, that every one of these explanations of the cause of the duck's death is correct. And, of course, many additional explanations could be dreamed up. Second, the explanations are at different levels. The next time you witness a big argument in a bull session, just notice whether or not the argument is kept going by mixing up levels. Jones insists Smith's explanation is wrong, but Smith may be talking along a track at one level, while Jones wants to restrict the discussion to his own level, which he claims is the only one.¹⁰⁹

Similarly, the historian may provide a series of explanations of an event, none of which must necessarily be the explanation. The type of explanation he provides depends upon the perspective or metaphor he wishes to employ.

3. The historian in relating the various fields of study in his researches allows for the possibility of gaining fresh insights, explanations and understandings into the historical data.
4. No one perspective is inherent in the data under analysis. Therefore, if the evidence

¹⁰⁹S. Stoufer, Social Research to Test Ideas (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 238-239.

cannot be accommodated to a particular theory, the historian must be prepared to either modify, supplement or if necessary abandon that theory. His task will be facilitated if he is aware of his own perspective and conscious of its limitations in the light of the expectations of sound historical method.

The historian is thus in the fortunate position of being able to employ the researches of other studies in his analysis and synthesis of the past. He must be aware of the possible weaknesses of his study, for his interpretations are not fully open to experiment and test. His task, however, is lightened by the meaning of history which restricts his investigation to the past,¹¹⁰ and leaves prediction to those fields directly concerned with tomorrow's society.

¹¹⁰ Note, however, in the preceding section dealing with scientific explanation that experiments of a kind appear to be possible.

CHAPTER VI

INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AND HISTORY OF EDUCATION

History is the discipline that brings together many of the results of the investigations that the other disciplines conduct, and shapes them into a comprehensive account related to the course of historic events. Man seeks to increase his insight and perfect his knowledge of the world. This is accomplished by describing and interpreting the world from various perspectives. These perspectives, depending on their goals or ends, become the disciplines of the natural, social and behavioural sciences, and the humanities, thereby assisting man in his task. The historian, in investigating the actuality of the past, has at his disposal all of man's efforts.

Inherent in this process of interpretation is that of description and explanation. Although one might vouch for the possibility of purely descriptive histories apart from any interpretive techniques, their existence seems doubtful, for even descriptive histories require the selection and ordering of facts within a particular framework. Further, the interpretation of these facts, founded on a perspective arbitrarily chosen by the historian, tends to increase bias and value judgements.

History thus becomes the inquiry into the past of man in reference to actual events. These events are presented in the datum available to the historian through primary and secondary source materials. It might be argued that since history involves the past of mankind, and insofar as the whole of culture and environment are encompassed in man's past, historical writing is not complete until it provides for a universal history.¹ This impossible task is delimited by:

1. the availability of data,
2. the selection of data,
3. the description and explanation of the event or events.

The historian thus employs a perspective or point of view to assist him in obtaining the best explanation,² and hence understanding, of an event. History, in this respect,

¹L. von Ranke, "Preface: Histories of the Latin and Germanic Nations from 1494-1515," The Varieties of History, Fritz Stern (ed.) (Cleveland: Meridean Books, The World Publishing Company, 1956), pp. 54-62.

²W. Gallie, Philosophy and the Historical Understanding (London: Chatto and Windus, 1964), p. 123.

becomes an interpretation, directed by the data and perspective selected and studied in accordance with specific interests. This requires the study of a particular aspect of man's past, but realizes the possibility of as many histories as there are dimensions to man's existence. This results in history of economics, political affairs, education, social customs and many other histories that reflect man's involvement with the world.

I. THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION

B. Bailyn, Harvard historian, has suggested a revised approach to the study of the history of education. Bailyn's understanding is that the history of education is the history of "the entire process by which a culture transmits itself across the generations."³ This might lead one to conclude that history and history of education are synonymous, insofar as both areas involve the study of man's past in the context of a particular culture. In attempting to avoid an institutional history of education, Bailyn has moved to the opposite end of a continuum by considering the process of the growth of culture as the

³B. Bailyn, Education in the Forming of American Society (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1960), p. 14. Italics not in original.

development of educational history, as a result leaving many historians wondering as to exactly what he means by the history of education. Indeed, history involves the whole of culture, but the history of education, as the history of anything requires specialization and delimitation. Bailyn has made many educators and historians aware of the weaknesses of what in the past has been considered to be the history of education by indicating its shortcomings and suggesting needed revisions. The historian of education is now faced with clarifying and redefining his task in the light of these criticisms.

It should be noted, however, that not all historians agree with Bailyn's proposed scheme, as suggested in the previous section. As Tolles has argued, the traditional interpretation of educational history, though narrow in its meaning, at least provides a definitive area for research.⁴ The goal was attainable. He further suggests that previous studies in the history of education employed methods that were fundamentally unhistorical, and this was the area in which improvement, if any, was needed. In regard to Tolles' first remark, it would seem that his understanding of education is

⁴F. Tolles, "Book Reviews," The Historian, XXIII (May, 1961), 365.

synonymous with that of schooling. The field of education in this sense becomes precise by its delimitation to an institutional study of the school, while it largely ignores the non-school educative agencies. However, one is prompted to ask which historian should assume the responsibility for the oft neglected non-school agencies of education.

The economic historian, for example, not only deals with the narrow study of finance but is also concerned with the various influences—political, social, religious—that in any way affect the economic situation. Similarly, the historian of education should see education as more than schooling, by investigating the cultural background and the non-institutional educational forces. The historian should attempt to go beyond the formal to the informal forces that often are the major educational influences.

It is realized that such an approach complicates the task of research and tends to remove the definitiveness from the field of study. Two issues bearing upon this problem must be clarified. First, history is seldom precise in its area of study, for any historical situation hinges upon numerous surrounding events. The exact lines of demarcation between various branches of history are not clear, for history is often misrepresented by insistence upon highly rigorous and artificial separations that may

lead to inadequate descriptions and faulty explanations. Similarly, educational developments within society are equally and often necessarily imprecise; for the influences of family, press and church, to mention only a few, are the other agencies, in addition to schools, that affect the cultural and educational context of any society. The informal influences are often the most crucial, for they tend to determine the attitudes taken towards formal schooling. Hence, allowance should be made for these factors.

Second, the writer believes that there is a need for specific delimited studies of formal educational institutions and personalities within the history of education. Such studies, often in monograph form, provide needed background and depth which can be related to other studies, thereby providing basic raw materials for better explanations and generalizations. These researches, however, do not constitute the whole but merely a segment of the history of education, a segment which is often best understood by viewing it in the perspective of related influences.

Tolles' second suggestion that historians of education have failed to use correct historical method in their researches has considerable merit, for as indicated in a previous section, Bailyn has pointed out many of the

shortcomings. However, a word of explanation is needed. First, Tolles does not elaborate on what he means by an acceptable historical method, nor does he specify where historians of education have fallen short in this regard. Second, many traditional educational historians, including Cubberley⁵ and Dexter,⁶ have employed original source materials in their writing, although their frames of reference might have been narrowly conceived. Third, many general historians have relied upon professionally biased and methodologically dubious works of the traditional educational historian, while others have totally ignored the history of education,⁷ thereby making themselves party to incomplete and inadequate histories.⁸ The above factors merely indicate that the question of a history of education

⁵E. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947).

⁶E. Dexter, A History of Education in the United States (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914).

⁷J. Higham (ed.), The Reconstruction of American History (New York: Harper and Bros., 1962), Higham, in reviewing the course of American historiography, indicates that general historians are not overly concerned with educational history. In this sense, by default, they have left the writing of the history of education to educators.

⁸R. Nye, The Cultural Life of the New Nation (New York: Harper and Bros., 1960), pp. 150-170. If viewed in the wider context of social intellectual history, Nye would not be "guilty" to the same extent as if he were merely presenting a "general history." Nevertheless, he relies heavily upon the "traditional educational historian."

is indeed complicated and should be re-examined in order to correct its shortcomings.

Prior to specifying a concept of history of education, the writer turns to the idea of intellectual history and its relevance to the historian who is attempting to reinterpret his task in the light of the preceding discussion.

II. INTELLECTUAL HISTORY

The examination of the history of education from the viewpoint of intellectual history provides the possibility of attaining a comprehensive understanding of past educational events. However, the approach to intellectual history is in need of clarification. This is evident from the studies of Lovejoy,⁹ Brinton,¹⁰ Curti,¹¹ and others. In The Great Chain of Being, A. O. Lovejoy relates the history of ideas to the history of philosophy. He recognizes the dependence of the history of ideas on other fields of historical thought but suggests that its

⁹A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936).

¹⁰C. Brinton, The Shaping of Modern Thought (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963).

¹¹M. Curti, The Growth of American Thought (second edition; New York: Harper and Bros., 1951).

uniqueness remains in the fact that "it divides . . . material in a special way, brings the parts into new groupings and relations, views it from the standpoint of a distinctive purpose."¹² Lovejoy maintains that the historian is concerned with "unit-ideas" derived from implicit or explicit assumptions, specific presuppositions or principles and sacred words or phrases which are evident within the thoughts that have affected a particular historical milieu.¹³ The stress is largely upon the analysis of unit-ideas held by various thinkers. The danger of such an approach, apart from its emphasis upon the intellectual elite, is its possibility of fragmenting an overall view of a philosophic movement.

Coupled with this problem is that of tracing back unit-ideas to their origin, while disregarding new idea developments sometimes referred to as "recurrent ideas."¹⁴

As a contrast to Lovejoy's position in this matter, one might cite C. Brinton's statement concerning

¹²Lovejoy, op. cit., p. 3.

¹³Ibid., pp. 7-15.

¹⁴M. Mandelbaum, "The History of Ideas, Intellectual History, and the History of Philosophy," The Historiography of the Philosophy of History, edited by J. Passmore (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1965), p. 40.

his own methodological convictions.

The intellectual historian is interested in ideas wherever he finds them, in wild ideas as well as in sensible ideas, in refined speculation and in common prejudices; but he is interested in these products of men's mental activity as they influence, and are influenced by, men's whole existence.¹⁵

Two factors are worthy of note. First, Brinton introduces the term "intellectual history" as a part of the history of ideas and second, he attempts to relate these ideas to the actual life of the people.

Lovejoy, on the other hand, tends to emphasize the history of philosophy as the history of ideas, while placing less emphasis on the interaction of ideas with the social condition.

This distinction might be elaborated by referring to Curti who argues that the "status of knowledge, the tissue of thought, the cluster of values are all at any particular time affected by the physical environment and economy, polity and social arrangements"¹⁶ within the process of change. Here, the stress is upon the relationships between developing ideas and bodies of knowledge on the one hand, and other phases of life on the other.

¹⁵Brinton, op. cit., p. 4.

¹⁶Curti, op. cit., p. vi.

Another aspect of the history of ideas is raised by J. C. Greene, who in his "Objectives and Methods in Intellectual History" maintains that the primary function of the intellectual historian

. . . is to delineate the presuppositions of thought in given historical epochs and to explain the changes which those presuppositions undergo from epoch to epoch . . . it is the province of the intellectual historian to search for and describe those most general ideas, or patterns of ideas which inform the thought of an age.¹⁷

This requires a "wide coverage of material and a capacity to penetrate to implied major premises."¹⁸ These statements indicate a desire to seek a unifying strand of thought or an idea based on the assumption that various strands of intellectual history are always connected internally.

An alternative to such an approach is that of viewing historical occurrences as containing many strands, each of which may interact or cross with another. Mandelbaum states this view:

. . . what pluralism rejects is the methodological position which holds that at least a partial monism must be true. In other words, pluralism denies the assumption that there always are internal connections between the various strands of intellectual and

¹⁷J. C. Greene, "Objectives and Methods in Intellectual History," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIV (June, 1957), p. 59.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 60.

cultural history, such that even in those cases in which no direct influences can be established, the changes in one of these strands cannot be understood independently of changes which also occurred within the other.¹⁹

This methodological position recognizes a complexity in historical events, and opens the way to a less restrictive outlook than that implied by a monistic approach. The importance and need for interdisciplinary studies in history is evident as the techniques and knowledge of these studies assist the intellectual historian in his task. The pluralist's position realizes the possibility of monistic strands of development, but it does not attempt to force all ideas into a Procrustean Bed of Monism.

The foregoing draws attention to a basic difficulty in history as the history of ideas. On the one hand, the history of ideas has been concerned with internal analysis or the examination of ideas as ideas, and on the other hand, the history of ideas has been concerned with external analysis or the relation of ideas to events. It is the writer's contention that there is a need for and a possibility of reconciling and interrelating these two approaches in an intellectual history of the history of education.

¹⁹Mandelbaum, op. cit., p. 51.

The history of education is considered to be the history of the process of the formal and informal communication of ideas across the generations. Through a consideration of the informal as well as the formal aspects of education, all phases of a culture that are communicated by any means become vital to the understanding of history. Newspapers, magazines, associations, libraries, the family, and other non-institutional agencies, as well as the formal institutions such as schools and universities, are viewed as part of the history of education. How does the historian know when he has adequately explored the varieties of educational experience? This question is answerable by the historian in the light of the available data and the objective of his study. These factors are clarified when the historian has given careful consideration to his evidence as he himself interacts with it in providing an adequate description and explanation of the historic event.²⁰ This interaction with data involves the selection of facts bearing upon the communication of ideas. This often includes discovering hitherto unknown facts, and in this sense writing and re-writing the course of history as the evidence demands. Thus, limits as to what educational

²⁰E. Carr, What is History? (Victoria, Australia: Penguin Books, 1961), p. 123.

agencies are worthy of study are made by the historian in the process of describing, clarifying and explaining or interpreting all the available data in view of his purpose. Only when the period has been thoroughly explored can the historian successfully delimit his study.

The criteria for an intellectual history of education might be based on the following principles:

1. An intellectual history of education is dependent upon an understanding of the culture by the historian. A grasp of the political, economic, religious and other forces active in the society of the time is necessary in order to place educational developments within their context. A comprehension of these forces will assist the historian in viewing the effect of the inter-relationship of education to society. Frequently, the historian is able to discern various principles that have molded and in turn have themselves been modified by the material culture and actions of men.
2. The origin and growth of educational ideas are the product of man's efforts, whether man acts as an individual or as a member of a

group having similar interests or shared attitudes. However, in order to comprehend the significance of any idea, it is necessary to understand its meaning or intellectual content. To assist the historian in this task, an idea, in a broad sense, might be conceived as "almost any coherent example of the workings of the human mind expressed in words."²¹ These ideas would be prevalent in the fields of knowledge, fact, belief or value.

3. Ideas of education can be traced within the period under investigation and their consequences observed within the society. In this way, there is an interaction between educational and cultural ideas, and the actual business of life. Depending on the period under investigation, one or many ideas may be prevalent in the society at one time. Ideas are subject to change because of the influence of other ideas or the material culture. These influences may come from

²¹Brinton, op. cit., p. 8.

either the inside or the outside of the culture. For example, the ideals of the French Revolution had an effect upon American society and education, and in turn were accepted or modified by other ideas or the particular cultural conditions of American life.

4. Ideas will not necessarily culminate in practice. Their importance may lie in their value as influences upon other ideas, movements or trends. Thus it may be necessary to study the ideas for their own sake, rather than to assume that they will invariably affect the business of living.²²
5. The intellectual historian of education should be aware of both "continuing ideas" and "recurrent ideas." Certain trends in education will be diffused into the culture, whereas other trends will be recurrent and unique to the particular conditions of the time. However, it is "sometimes not readily discernible from examining isolated instances

²² R. Welter, "The History of Ideas in America: An Essay in Redefinition," Journal of American History, 51 (1964-65), 599-614.

of similar ideas whether diffusion or independent invention is to be regarded as the more plausible hypothesis."²³

6. In view of the cultural dimension of his task, the historian of education will find all manner of literature of value including formal treatises by scholars, educators, autobiographies, biographies, travel accounts, newspapers, periodicals, folk literature, the formal records of educational institutions and other sources that would shed light on the cultural and educational nature of society.

With these principles in mind, the writer attempts to write an intellectual history of education in the North Eastern United States from 1820 to 1850.

²³Mandelbaum, op. cit., p. 38.

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PART THREE

A History and an Analysis

CHAPTER VII

AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN THE NORTH EASTERN UNITED STATES FROM 1820 to 1850

I. CULTURAL OVERVIEW

The history of education in the North Eastern United States from 1820 to 1850 occurs during a period which in part is frequently called the Age of the Common Man.¹ With the ascendancy of A. Jackson to the presidency in 1829, the aspirations and ideals of a youthful society, which were in formation as early as 1815, gained full sweep. This period of development continued in its characteristic growth to approximately 1850 when America encountered new and changing forces.²

The expansion and pacification of an unknown frontier, the growth and expansion of the city, and a recognition of the optimism, patriotism and enterprise of

¹J. Ward, "The Age of the Common Man," The Reconstruction of American History, J. Higham (ed.) (New York: Harper and Bros., 1962), pp. 82-97.

²C. Fish, The Rise of the Common Man (Vol. VI of A History of American Life, eds. A. Schlesinger and D. Fox; New York: Macmillan Co., 1929), pp. 1-12, passim.

the American people provide a framework for a discussion of events from 1820 to 1850. American society, moulded in part on the aspirations of the early colonists, reflected in theory and often in practice Jeffersonian Theory on the equality of man and the dignity of the individual.³

Jefferson's ideals, though democratic, did reflect a belief in an educated elite that would rule the nation. Nevertheless, the emphasis upon individual dignity and the freedom of the person were principles that greatly affected the outlook and actions of the young democratic society.

According to the Abstract of the Returns of the Fifth Census of 1832, the population of the United States and its territories totalled 12,858,670, including 2,009,050 slaves.⁴ The states of New York and Pennsylvania had the heaviest concentration of people,⁵ and the largest population in a particular area. America at the beginning of the nineteenth century was primarily rural,⁶ and

³R. Honeywell, The Educational Work of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Russell and Russell Inc., 1964), p. 199.

⁴United States Bureau of the Census, Abstract of the Return of the Fifth Census, (Washington: Printed by Duff Green, 1832), p. 46.

⁵Ibid., p. 46.

⁶J. Krout and D. Fox, The Completion of Independence (Vol. V of A History of American Life, eds. A. Schlesinger and D. Fox; New York: Macmillan, 1929), p. 92.

according to H. Faulkner's study of population statistics, revealed three outstanding characteristics: (1) a rapid increase in population, (2) a westward migration, and (3) a concentration in cities.⁷ From 1820 to 1850, "The region west of the Appalachians more than doubled by five millions,"⁸ while the population of the seaboard states doubled by two millions.

A basic component of the population, whether urban or rural, was the family. Although the father was the social and legal head of the unit,

. . . his sons might easily have an economic domain larger than his, and his daughters might just as easily leave his home to set up households of their own. Family wealth, social caste, and parental influence counted much less in a society as open and as fluid as that of the United States.⁹

The social continuity of the family was not necessarily a trademark in a rapidly evolving culture.

The expansion of industry assisted in changing the function of family members in comparison to their European counterpart. A. Calhoun, for example, suggests

⁷H. Faulkner, American Economic History (eighth edition; New York: Harper and Bros., 1960), p. 286.

⁸Ibid., p. 287.

⁹R. Nye, The Cultural Life of the New Nation (New York: Harper and Bros., 1960), p. 14.

that

. . . women formed, roughly speaking, two-thirds to three-fourths, and in some places as much as nine-tenths, of the total number of factory operatives in the first half of the century. Many of the early mill-workers were country girls who simply came in for a time in order to earn a little money, often for their wedding outfits.¹⁰

The economic productivity of women, and subsequently their increased responsibility and social position ran counter to their supposed "inferiority which for the sake of order, the all-wide Author of Nature manifestly intended for them."¹¹

The children also reflected attitudes contrary to that expected of their European cousins. For example, in her America As I Found It, L. Duncan provides the following description:

The first impression produced by their manner is that they are brave, bright, pleasant little 'impudent things'. But this, like many first impressions, turns out to be erroneous. The 'impudent thing' is gradually dropt, and instead of the bad word, you adopt 'intelligent' or 'independent'.¹²

The apparent expression of independence and equality by

¹⁰A. Calhoun, A Social History of the American Family (Vol. II; New York: Barnes and Noble, 1945), p. 175.

¹¹A. Schlesinger, Learning How to Behave (New York: Macmillan Co., 1947), p. 10. *Italics in original.*

¹²L. Duncan, America As I Found It (London: James Nisbet and Co., 1852), p. 17.

the general population possibly recognized the need by the community for a mature population to manage and organize new frontiers in a youthful nation.

The relationship of social mobility, marriage, and economics to the spirit of independence was indeed unique.

Independence signified no fundamental revolution in the currents of social life, and colonial tradition passed on unbroken into folkways of the republic; for until the Civil War the population was distinctly rural, and urban sophistication had acquired no dominant influence over the thoughts, standards, and habits of the major part of the inhabitants of the United States.¹³

Marriage, in the light of the developing economy and general ideal of independence, was frequently made without regard to economic concern.¹⁴ Further, R. Nye remarks that a "national shortage of women" gave them "much more independence than they possessed in Europe and consequently greater freedom."¹⁵

Although social class distinctions existed in early nineteenth America,¹⁶ they also were less pronounced than those of Europe. This stress upon equality

¹³Calhoun, op. cit., p. 11.

¹⁴Nye, op. cit., p. 139.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 137.

¹⁶D. Wecter, The Saga of American Society (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), p. 359.

was voiced by Andrew Jackson in his message to Congress in 1829 when he remarked that "the duties of all public offices are, or at least admit of being made so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance."¹⁷

To summarize then, men in America, . . . all ranked according to certain categories by the give and take of social life; common habits, education and especially wealth establish these classifications; but these rules are neither absolute, nor inflexible, nor permanent. They establish passing distinctions and by no means form classes properly so called; they give no superiority, even in thought, to one man over another. So that although two men may never see each other in the same drawing-rooms, if they meet outside, they meet without pride on one side or envy on the other. At bottom, they feel themselves to be, and they are, equal.¹⁸

Tocqueville's description establishes a tone that permeated into many phases of daily activity, including those of economics and politics.

Agriculture dominated the American economy at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The inventive genius of England and America, coupled with the expansion of trade and the growth of manufactures, however, assisted

¹⁷ J. D. Richardson (ed.), A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1908 (Washington: 1908, II), p. 449.

¹⁸ A. de Tocqueville, Journey to America, J. Mayer (ed.), translator G. Lawrence (London: Faber and Faber, 1959), p. 260.

in changing the economic outlook of the United States by pointing it to the road of industrialization. D. Webster, nationalism's outspoken celebrant, argued that invention and industrialization "bears subsistence and human comfort" in addition to its wide reaching effects upon commerce, agriculture, and the customs of the people.¹⁹ Tocqueville supports Webster's statement and marvels at the economic expansion of a nation of which "no people in the world have made such rapid progress in trade and manufactures."²⁰

By the middle of the century, the restless pursuit of wealth resulted in wide-spread speculation and investment which often endangered the economy.

Everything has become an object of speculation

.

The principal objects of speculation are those subjects which chiefly occupy the calculating minds of the Americans, that is to say cotton, land, city and town lots, banks, railroads.²¹

¹⁹D. Webster, The Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster (Vol. XII; national edition; Boston: 1903), pp. 666-677, cited in E. Rozwenc (ed.), Ideology and Power in the Age of Jackson (New York: New York University Press, 1964), p. 38.

²⁰A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Francis Bowen (ed.), (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1863), II, 187-192, unabridged, cited in Rozwenc, op. cit., p. 20, hereafter cited as Ideology and Power.

²¹M. Chevalier, Society, Manners and Politics in the United States: Being a Series of Letters on North America (Boston: Weeks, Jordon and Company, 1839), p. 305.

The conservative The American Review of January 1845, though an exponent of capital, enterprise and industry, regretted the effect of America's economic growth upon the "humanness" of the population.

Our virtues are the virtues of merchants, and not of men. We run all to honesty, and mercantile honesty. We do not cultivate the grain of humanity. We have more conscience than heart, and more propriety than either.

.

Our goodness is formal, deliberate, premeditated. The upright man is not benevolent, and the just man is not generous. The good man is not cheerful. The religious man is not agreeable.²²

In the wake of economic expansion, labor movements of socio-economic protest and reform made their appearance.²³ Their cause was the social betterment of mankind through education. The Mechanic's Free Press of 1829, a voice of the working man, charged for example, that when

. . . mechanics are really convinced that knowledge is power, and that the educated part of society give laws to the rest, they will wake up from their stupor and bestir themselves to get this power into their hands.²⁴

²²"Influence of the Trading Spirit Upon the Social and Moral Life of America," The American Review: A Whig Journal of Politics, Literature, Art and Science, I (Jan., 1845), 95.

²³F. Flugel and H. Faulkner, Readings in the Economic and Social History of the United States (New York: Harper and Bros., 1929), pp. 253-254.

²⁴Editorial in The Mechanics Free Press, July 8, 1829.

Behind this movement of democracy was a system of politics grounded in the Constitution and influenced in part by such ideals as liberty, equality and fraternity. In the East in 1828, conservative business interests, supported by an ardent nationalism, were opposed by agricultural concerns and upholders of states rights. With the revision of voting rights allowing for modified property qualifications, however, the "common man" was permitted to a far greater extent than before to shape the destiny of America.²⁵

Jackson, the "common man's" choice of 1828, represented a party of several intellectual traditions.

Basically, it was a revival of Jeffersonianism, but the Jeffersonian inheritance was strengthened by the infusion of fresh influences; notably the anti-monopolistic tradition, formulated primarily by Adam Smith and expounded in America by Gouge, Leggett, Sedgwick, Cambreleng; and the pro-labor tradition, formulated . . . by William Cobbett and expounded by G. H. Evans, Ely Moore, John Ferral.²⁶

Jackson's administration, because of its many factions, was not peaceful. Conflicting desires operated within the party. The Maysville Road Veto, for example, reflected some opposition to federal aid for internal

²⁵C. Wiltse, The New Nation 1800-1845 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1961), 104-105.

²⁶A. Schlesinger, The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1950), pp. 307-308.

improvements, and had the effect of removing federal participation from transportation projects in certain instances.²⁷ The growth of transportation rested in the hands of private enterprise. Another issue was that of the Indian Question. Under Jackson's Administration, numerous treaties were negotiated with the Indians to allow for white settlement and provision of more lands, often with the assistance of federal troops.²⁸

The difficulties faced by Jackson threatened the very core of the federal union. The case resulting from the tariff dispute and economic expansion of the West was such an issue. It involved problems of land speculation and depopulation of the eastern states. The question was eventually associated with the state versus Federal rights as expressed in the Webster-Hayne debates. Congress eventually sided with the Jacksonian faction and the central administration gained in power.²⁹

Another problem of the administration was that of the second bank of the United States. According to B. Hammond, the "Jacksonian revolution" placed in power a

²⁷Fish, op. cit., pp. 73-74.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 298-301.

²⁹Wiltse, op. cit., pp. 110-123.

group of incipient entrepreneurs who employed agrarian ideology to accomplish nonagrarian objectives.³⁰ The bank was therefore destroyed, because its power to regulate credit posed a threat to the Jacksonians in reaching their goals. Schlesinger, however, suggests that Jackson's suspicion and distrust was related to the fact that to Jackson it seemed a money monopoly directed by wealthy Eastern capitalists who profited by the actions of the government.³¹ Coupled to this was Jackson's preference for coin and "hard money" over the power of the banks to issue paper notes. Mistrust on Jackson's part was compounded by his feeling that the bank interests had opposed his election of 1828.

Jackson succeeded in abolishing the Bank, and a period of affluence followed after its restraining influences were lifted in 1833.³² The economic "boom," however, was followed by a depression from 1827 to 1843 when overexpansion and overspeculation, assisted by the release of large sums of money, contributed to economic

³⁰B. Hammond, "The Jacksonians," Jacksonian Democracy: Myth or Reality? J. Bugg (ed.) (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1962), pp. 92-106.

³¹Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 74 ff.

³²Fish, op. cit., pp. 52-54.

collapse. Matters were complicated by nation-wide crop failures.³³

Following the close of Jackson's second administration in 1837, Van Buren, his favored successor, assumed the presidency. His attempts to stem the financial difficulties of the United States through an independent treasury, however, were not fully successful.³⁴ Van Buren's campaign of 1840, and his subsequent defeat at the polls by the Whig Candidate W. Harrison, signalled the end of the simple democracy of the Jacksonian era.³⁵

To successfully account for Jackson's popularity and success with the people is not an easy task. However, W. Holland, in The Life and Political Opinions of Martin Van Buren, has this to say:

The president has had the sagacity to observe the sentiments of the great body of the people and the integrity and firmness to carry them into effect. He has collected and embodied the wishes of the people; . . . and if he is endued with a penetration which has enabled him to see its current, . . . Guided by the fundamental principle, that the will

³³ S. Rezneck, "The Social History of an American Depression 1837-1843," American Historical Review, XL (July, 1935), 662-687.

³⁴ Fish, op. cit., p. 165.

³⁵ Wiltse, op. cit., p. 174.

of the majority should, in all cases, control, he has never attempted to defeat that will.³⁶

Holland argues that there was an intuitive bond between the President and the common man--that the ideals of the plain farmer or the mechanic were in harmony with those of Jackson's.

The first half of the nineteenth century was thus affected by a number of factors. First, Tocqueville and others indicate that there was an attitude of independence and a desire to break away from the past. The Revolution against the British in the eighteenth century reflected this independence of thought, and provided a distinctive American reference point, which in itself was a marker of a new tradition.³⁷ However, the European ideals, particularly those of France, were often adapted to the distinctive American culture. Second, the social mobility, equality, and optimism of American society, in conjunction with an expanding economy, provided the base for a strong pluralistic, democratic tradition.

³⁶Ideology and Power, p. 254, citing W. Holland, The Life and Political Opinions of Martin Van Buren (Harford, Connecticut: 1835), pp. 357-360, abridged.

³⁷Nye, op. cit., p. 146.

II. TRENDS IN THE INTELLECTUAL OUTLOOK

Jacksonian democracy was associated with both liberal and conservative interpretations of man in his universe. The liberal conception of man is frequently related to both the enlightenment's appeal to reason³⁸ and romanticism's appeal to imagination.³⁹ Joining the ideals of these movements were those of religion, which in numerous instances, were in opposition to their basic objectives.

The development of Deism, Unitarianism and Transcendentalism might be considered as liberal movements, insofar as they supported a nonsectarian viewpoint and opposed the formality of Calvinistic and Catholic interpretations.⁴⁰ They tended to place man in the role of humanitarian and social reformer. The popularity and force of these movements in advocating a non-institutional approach to religion is recorded by The Mechanic's Free Press in 1828, when, in the first of a series of articles entitled "Practical Religion," the author argues a case on the basis of Owen's humanitarianism for the value of

³⁸ Ibid., p. 8.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ A. Tyler, Freedom's Ferment (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1944), p. 27.

noninstitutionalized Christianity.⁴¹

However, Transcendentalism and Deism exhibited fundamental differences in emphasis. Whereas Deism advocated belief in an impersonal God knowable through reason and the orderliness of nature, Transcendentalism viewed man in a personal communion with God via a transcendence of the material and temporal.

On the other hand, the Unitarians retained many of the traditional ideals of orthodox religion, such as a personal Saviour, but rejected belief in the Trinity.⁴²

The movement's main concern centered on social improvement and reform in labor, formal education, and morality.⁴³

Conservative outlooks towards man were typified by the sectarian orientation of both Evangelical Protestantism and Roman Catholicism.⁴⁴ Though these movements were in opposition to each other on dogma and formal organization, they were united in attacking naturalism and materialism.⁴⁵ Faculty psychology, with its introspection,

⁴¹ Editorial in The Mechanics Free Press, May 17, 1828.

⁴² R. Riegel, Young America 1830-1840 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1949), 254 ff.

⁴³ Fish, op. cit., pp. 182-183.

⁴⁴ One might include Quakers and Shakers as Protestant Evangelical groups.

⁴⁵ Nye, op. cit., pp. 218-226.

mental discipline and spiritual nature of mind,⁴⁶ favored the sectarian groups, thereby reinforcing their existence.

It is suggested that the men of the Revolution were the children of the Enlightenment and in this sense were optimistic and confident.⁴⁷ The ideals of freedom and equality emphasized the Enlightenment beliefs of natural right and natural law.⁴⁸ America, however, faced problems not encountered in Europe, and though the basic tenets of the Enlightenment found their way into American thought, they were adapted to new conditions.

Supplementing Enlightenment ideals was the dynamic and holistic thought of Romanticism.⁴⁹ The American not only lived in a Newtonian universe, his existence was expressed through creativity and imagination. He was, in other words, an individual existing within the matrix of a dynamic and changing society.

Assisting the formation of American life was the Benthamite idea of utilitarianism,⁵⁰ a well-spring of

⁴⁶ By 1850, there is evidence that faculty psychology was under attack in educated circles. See note 117.

⁴⁷ Nye, op. cit., p. 4.

⁴⁸ M. Curti, The Growth of American Thought (second edition; New York: Harper and Bros., 1951), p. 370.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 121.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 176.

reform in politics, labor, and education.

Throughout the period of 1820 to 1850, the ideals of American life were interrelated with society's social and economic forces. The depression of 1837-1843, for example, shocked a complacent America and revived strong interests in labor and reform.⁵¹ The rights of the common man were reasserted and the crusade for female equality was begun. Fouier's economic and social creed grasped the imagination of America, and was supported by such "radicals" as the publisher H. Greeley. With the return of better economic conditions, however, the movement lost much of its force and surrendered to an expanding and thriving economy.⁵²

Religious movements also affected the ideals of the young nation. Christian ideals of morality, love and the brotherhood of mankind found their way into social reform. Community responsibility for sin was indicated through such diverse groups as Quakers, Mormons and Shakers.

R. Gabriel has argued that the resulting democratic faith which had emerged by the mid-century included both naturalistic and supernaturalistic characteristics.

⁵¹Rezneck, op. cit., passim.

⁵²Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 367.

The basis of this thought Gabriel traces to the eighteenth century ideal of an orderly, law-governed Newtonian universe, in which both man and his institutions attained perfection through harmony with each other. To this, it merged a religiously fervent, transcendental faith in the dignity and power of the individual "common man." The individual was conceived as both ends and means; the end was conceived as the complete growth and power of the individual. The means by which this was to be achieved was individual effort, in concert with others to break down the barriers of tradition, law or interest that stood in the way of elevating all people in the most depressed ranks to full power and glory.⁵³

The merging of the rational doctrine of the perfectability of man and progress with a religious devotion to individualism came to be identified with America both as a symbol and as an actuality.⁵⁴ This complex of democracy and Americanism implied an inexorable faith in the belief of the superiority of America's republican and democratic institutions as the only way to meet the needs of all people.

Developments in the arts, sciences and humanities

⁵³Gabriel, op. cit., pp. 19-22.

⁵⁴Curti, op cit., p. 383.

were influenced by several factors. One factor was that of the classical European heritage which considered the possession of knowledge to be a trademark of the intellectual elite of society. The other was that of the practical value of knowledge as a means to advancement in a youthful expanding democracy. Both of these influences were significant for the social and natural sciences, the humanities and the fine arts.

The philosophical basis of the natural sciences, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, reflected the Enlightenment shift of emphasis from theology to science.⁵⁵ Although little in the way of progress was made in the formulation of universal laws, descriptive studies and new data were added.⁵⁶ Advances were also made, for example, in geology, medicine and botany.

The social sciences, including psychology, however, aroused the interests of the new found nation, and related these interests to mental and moral philosophy. Mental philosophy, the ally of faculty psychology, assisted man in interpreting his epistemology and his spiritual nature. The study of history served patriotic functions by its concentration upon early American colonial

⁵⁵Nye, op. cit., p. 3 ff.

⁵⁶Fish, op. cit., p. 238.

independence.⁵⁷

Promoting the diffusion of knowledge were numerous professional organizations including the American Academy of Arts and Sciences founded in 1780, the American Philosophical Society, the Lyceum movement and the founding of various libraries.⁵⁸

Whereas the arts were affected by the classical European tradition, the humanities reflected the concern of such men as Emerson,⁵⁹ Longfellow,⁶⁰ and Holmes.⁶¹ R. Reigel, in Young America 1830-1840, notes the relevance of newspapers, periodicals, and other journals that inundated the reading public.⁶²

The fine arts including painting, sculpture, music, drama and specialty arts mirrored the pace of nineteenth century life. As in other fields of endeavour,

⁵⁷Curti, op. cit., pp. 410-412.

⁵⁸Mechanics Free Press, Sept. 13, 1828.

⁵⁹R. W. Emerson, The Early Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson (eds.) S. Whicker et al. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 1964).

⁶⁰H. Longfellow, Complete Works (Revised ed.; Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1866).

⁶¹M. Lerner (ed.), The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1943).

⁶²Riegel, op. cit., pp. 385-415.

patriotism and nationalism played significant roles in determining not only the content but the form of expression.

The preeminent function of art, held the common definition, was to exert an elevating and humanizing influence--to touch the finer sensibilities and bring the mind into sympathy with the good and the pure.⁶³

Whether the stage was either the concert or family platform, nationalism and religion played decisive roles in the expression of man's ideals. E. Branch, for example, notes of a camp-meeting echo which ran,

The fatherhood of God, and the brotherhood of man,
The cause of true religion is spreading through the land.
Oh, the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man,
We'll talk and sing while on the wing, and ring it
through the land.⁶⁴

The preceding ideas were the major forces that molded the attitude of the young nation. Whether their source was European or American, or a combination of both, their effect upon the daily lives of the people was most pronounced. Frequently the ideals were expressed by men who failed to fully consider them in practice, as for example in the case of Jefferson. Frequently the ideals were intermingled, and some were even abortive. Neverthe-

⁶³E. Branch, The Sentimental Years, 1836-1860 (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1934), p. 174.
University Microfilms Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1964.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 180.

less, they interacted with the life of society, and through their interrelationship within the totality of the culture, assisted in the growth and development of the nation's education.

III. IDEAS AND EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

Both formal and informal educational developments during the second quarter of the nineteenth century were rooted in the aspirations of a democratic culture. T. Jefferson, H. Mann, H. Barnard and others provided the foundation that eventually affected the practice of all educational forms within the matrix of Jacksonian society.

Jefferson in 1820 and 1822, for example, while emphasizing the value of education, remarked that

. . . the greatest good [for the people] requires that while they are instructed in general, competently to the common business of life, others should employ their genius with necessary information to the useful arts, to invention for saving labor and increasing our comforts to nourishing our health, to civil government, military science⁶⁵

This task was to be accomplished by educating all levels of society.

The object is to bring into action that mass of talents which lies buried in poverty in every country, for want of the means of development, and thus give activity to a mass of mind, which, in proportion to

⁶⁵Honeywell, op. cit., p. 148.

our population shall be the double or treble of what it is in most countries.⁶⁶

The ideals of Jefferson's system were grounded in principles of morality, patriotism and democracy⁶⁷ that affected all educational agencies. C. Brooks, for example, discusses the educational force of the family in the following manner:

In the family everything and everybody teaches. There are infinitely complex and indescribable feelings, which there give the greatest force to ideas and an unconscious influence to conduct. These manifest themselves in the glance of a mother's eye, the tones of a father's voice, and the manners of a faithful friend. It is this mysterious something, which is all around us like an atmosphere, that truly and permanently shapes youthful character. The children think the family thoughts, catch the family manners, and follow the family aims; thus carrying the family morals into the schoolhouse, as the grinder of aromatic seeds carries with him wherever he goes, the fragrance of his workshop.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ The standard fare of education in early nineteenth century America included books known as "Readers." These were graded collections of stories, essays, poetry and orations which were designed to provide materials for the improvement of reading and spelling. The selections were also chosen to encourage desirable traits of character and to discourage the formation of bad habits. Among the more popular Readers, in Jackson's time were the McGuffey Readers. See Ideology and Power, pages 136-140 for selected examples.

⁶⁸ C. Brooks, "Education for Moral Improvement," reprinted from American Journal of Education, I (Mar., 1856), pp. 336-344, cited in C. Gross and C. Chandler, The History of American Education Through Readings (Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 1964), p. 105.

Brooks notes the bond between formal and informal education within the society and illustrates their interdependence with the value system.

W. Emerson, the transcendentalist who attacked the crass commercialism of the nation, defended democratic ideals when he noted that "freedom, has its root in the sacred truth that every man hath in him the divine Reason" which is "the equality and the only equality of all men."⁶⁹

In 1837, R. Cobden in his journey through the United States maintained that

. . . every man of whatever shade of politics will avow that his hopes of the permanency of sound democratic self-government, free from anarchy on the one hand and tyranny on the other, are based entirely upon the great and increasing knowledge of the masses: --education--education--education is the motto of every enlightened democrat in America.⁷⁰

Harper's New Monthly Magazine of 1850, commenting upon American society, records that the "enterprise and general prosperity of the Americans to be attributed to . . . their general enlightenment."⁷¹

Supporting this trend in thought was M. Chevalier

⁶⁹V. L. Parrington, The Romantic Revolution in America, 1800-1860 (Vol. II of Main Currents of American Thought. 3 vols.; New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1927-30), p. 392.

⁷⁰E. Cawley (ed.), The American Diaries of Richard Cobden (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 26. *Italics in original.*

⁷¹"Education in America," Harper's New Monthly Magazine, I (June-November, 1850), 209.

who indicated a "common man" outlook in America of 1834.

American society taking for its point of departure, labour, based upon a condition of general ease on one side, and a system of common elementary education on the other, and moving forward with the religious principle for its lodestar, seems destined to reach . . . prosperity, power and happiness.⁷²

The above statements indicate a few of the values and ideals of education, formal and informal, and stress the influence of religion and equality, which in many ways were both assisted and hindered by a secular enlightened spirit prevalent in the national habits and customs of the culture.

The family was a major cultural force. The intimacy of family life is depicted in the following description:

The evening is spent in the intimacy of his family circle in front of the blazing fire. His wife will sit with the youngest child on her lap; the other children surround us on the soft carpet before the fireplace; the steaming tea pot is on the table; and time flies during enlightening conversation concerning mathematics, American and European matters of state and politics, trade, the tariff, the tendencies of the times, the fine arts, literature, religion, philosophy⁷³

Klinkowstrom's description, which might be atypical of the general population, is countered by Calhoun's study

⁷²Chevalier, op. cit., pp. 174-175.

⁷³F. Scott (ed.), Baron Klinkowstrom's America 1818-1820 (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1952), p. 127.

that maintains that during the first half of the nineteenth century, "the development of the public school and the spread of the Sunday school" tended to minimize the educative influence of the family.⁷⁴ Calhoun appears to be suggesting that the formal and nonformal agencies were in competition with each other. However, Duncan, who was fully aware of the various educative forces, suggests a family solidarity⁷⁵ that might lead one to conclude that formal and informal education were complimentary to one another. Additional evidence for the latter position is that of G. S. Boutwell who notes that he "learned to read by standing in front of my mother as she read the Bible."⁷⁶

An educator of the period made the following observation:

The tone of conversation at the table and the fire-side is of greater importance than many imagine: so are the books and newspapers read and thrown before the young. The father, at his work-bench or behind his counter, while hoeing his corn or pursuing any other of our social forms of useful labor, may be communicating to his sons and other companions, lessons on an endless variety of useful topics; while the mother may ordinarily find still more frequent

⁷⁴ Calhoun, op. cit., p. 137.

⁷⁵ Duncan, op. cit., p. 30.

⁷⁶ G. S. Boutwell, Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs (Vol. I; New York: McClure, Phillips, and Co., 1902), p. 7.

and opportune occasions to pursue a similar course with her daughters.⁷⁷

It might be an oversimplification to attribute an inordinate amount of influence to the family as an educative force in view of the economic independence and social mobility of the younger generation. Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that the family's role in education, particularly in rural areas, was paramount until the middle 1820's.

Religious and philosophical influences assisted the family in its educational task. This is borne out by Chevalier, who records in his Society, Manners and Politics in the United States that

Religious and philosophical societies, instituted under various names, take upon themselves the task of enforcing the decrees of public opinion; like vigilant sentinels, they compel a rigid observance of the austerities⁷⁸

However, it is difficult to assess the impact of these forces on the daily life of the people as the societal trend towards secularization in a beginning industrial economy tended to minimize the importance of traditional religious thought. Some clarification of this problem

⁷⁷H. Barnard, "The Family," Connecticut Common School Journal, I (Oct., 1838), 18-19, cited in J. Brubacher (ed.), Henry Barnard on Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. Inc., 1931), p. 61.

⁷⁸Chevalier, op. cit., p. 207.

might be effected by noting the remarks of Duncan:

The faithful and consistent pastor becomes the man of his circle. His influence is felt in his city and in his state. His presence renders a public meeting more respectable than that of ten men of mere wealth.

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If a clergyman speaks at a public meeting, he is sure of attentive listening. His Thanksgiving Sermon gives the tone to the people for the year. His inaugural address, or popular lecture, is expected before it is delivered and discussed after.⁷⁹

Evidence to the contrary, however, is supplied by H. Martineau who suggests that clergymen were weak and "comparatively uninfluential" figures, their strength increasing with their separation from doctrinal, stereotyped religious expectations. She states:

My final impression is, that religion is best administered in America by the personal character of the most virtuous members of society, out of the theological profession: and next, by the acts and preachings of the members of that profession who are the most secular in their habits of mind and life.⁸⁰

The tension between secularizing and non-secularizing forces was reflected in the development of formal institutions of learning. The early colonists, it might be argued, were a highly sectarian group, and their educational programs satisfied their religious aims. With

⁷⁹Duncan, op. cit., p. 110. Italics in original.

⁸⁰H. Martineau, Society in America (Vol. II; New York: Saunders and Ottey, 1837), p. 364.

the gradual development of the democratic ideal and its application to most phases of daily living, the cry was heard for formal systems of education that would be congenial to democracy, and the entire spectrum of religious and secular thought. Formal education, it was felt, would assist the continuation of democratic principles and values to generations as yet unborn. T. Jefferson in a letter to P. Carr presented this point of view:

It is highly interesting to our country, and it is the duty of its functionaries, to provide that every citizen in it should receive an education proportioned to the condition and pursuits of his life. The mass of our citizens may be divided into two classes--the labouring and the learned. The labouring will need the first grade of education to qualify them for their pursuits and duties; the learned will need it as a foundation for further requirements.⁸¹

Jefferson's ideals, though still within an aristocratic framework, supported elementary public education. Not until 1850, however, did certain segments of America develop a compulsory, public supported, universal, non-sectarian system of formal elementary education. Its growth was not unchallenged, particularly by sectarian religious and tax opposed groups operating within the society.

In his Lectures and Annual Reports on Education, H. Mann argued for a republican system of education that

⁸¹Honeywell, op. cit., p. 223.

would release and mold the "energies in the whole mass of people"⁸² under a centralized administrative body. His efforts were directed towards a publicly supported and controlled non-sectarian educational system.⁸³

Mann's efforts were assisted by the work of Barnard, who devoted considerable time and effort to advance the cause of common schools and education in general.

Numerous workingmen's associations also assisted the cause of public education. Education for these groups served political purposes of alerting the working segment to the ambitions of aristocracy, thereby bringing about social reforms, and upholding the democratic ideal of social equality. The workingmen of New York City in 1830, for example, in their political platform announced the relevance of public education on the grounds that unless this safeguard of liberty is secured, and by the enlightening of the mass, "the axe of knowledge is laid at the root of aristocracy, there is effected, as it were nothing. The best labours are lost and the success of the present

⁸²H. Mann, "Letters and Annual Reports on Education," (Cambridge: 1867), pp. 77-86, 144-146, 150-151, cited in Gross and Chandler, op. cit., p. 101.

⁸³Boutwell, op. cit., p. 256.

is ever hazarded in the future."⁸⁴ The Philadelphia Times campaigned for compulsory school education, and if the parents should fail to send their children to school, they "should be coerced by law, as much as those who refuse to provide their children with food."⁸⁵

Many forces, however, operated in opposition to these developments. In 1830, the National Gazette of Philadelphia ridiculed the idea of public schools as an impractical dream and class legislation, and suggested that "a scheme of universal equal education . . . would not be used with any degree of equality of profit unless the dispositions and circumstances of parents and children were nearly the same."⁸⁶

Increasing the difficulty of implementing the elementary school system were those who opposed a uniform structure of public tax support. The pros and cons of such support were debated in the journals and newspapers of the times. J. G. Carter made the following statement in the North American Review of 1824:

⁸⁴ R. Welter, Popular Education and Democratic Thought in America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 46.

⁸⁵ Editorial in The Philadelphia Times, Mechanics Free Press and Reform Advocate, December 7, 1833.

⁸⁶ Calhoun, op. cit., p. 61.

For the purpose of public instruction, we hold every man subject to taxation, in proportion to his property, and we look not to the question, whether he himself has, or has not children to be benefitted by the education for which he pays. We regard it as a wise and liberal system of police, by which property, and life, and the peace of society are preserved.⁸⁷

By 1845, with the assistance of H. Mann, C. Lyell is able to remark that the "taxes self-imposed by the people for educational purposes are still annually on the increase, and the beneficial effects, of the system are very perceptible."⁸⁸

One might question Lyell's optimism, however, for in the Harper's New Monthly Magazine the following note is made:

The Legislature of 1848 passed a law making education in the common schools of the state absolutely free to all children who might choose to attend, making the law dependent for its validity on its adoption to the people.

The article goes on to say:

The opponents of the law resisted the principle that property should be taxed for purposes of education, inasmuch as men of property would thus be compelled to pay for educating children not their own. Others

⁸⁷ "Letters to the Hon. W. Prescott, LL.D. in the Free Schools of New England with Remarks upon the Principles of Instruction by J. G. Carter," North American Review, XIX (Oct., 1824), 451.

⁸⁸ C. Lyell, A Second Visit to the United States (Vol. I; London: John Murray, 1849), p. 196.

objected . . . to details of the law, and to the injurious effect of the established mode of collecting the rate bills.⁸⁹

The law was eventually adopted but not without opposition.

Religious issues were also associated with the question of common public schools. In his notebook of 1831, Tocqueville observed that the clergy were advocates of an education that "will be moral and religious."⁹⁰

The Reverend G. Lewis, on his visit to the United States, supported this view and attacked the secular nature of New York schools.

To complete the Christian character of the common schools of New York, it is only needful to add, that there is no prayer in them, no psalms nor hymn, no devotional exercise of any kind, or recognition of the authority of God and his Word, save in the reading of a few verses every morning at the opening of school, of which no explanations are permitted. I do not wonder at the Roman Catholic Bishop being desirous of overthrowing such a blank and godless system of national instruction . . . and substituting one in which the young shall be religiously taught and trained.⁹¹

The struggle for religious education in the schools frequently brought the "old line" religions to cooperate in

⁸⁹"Monthly Record of Current Events," Harper's New Monthly Magazine, I (June-November, 1850), 418.

⁹⁰de Tocqueville, op. cit., p. 47.

⁹¹G. Lewis, Impressions of America and the American Churches: From the Journal of the Rev. G. Lewis (Edinburgh: W. P. Kennedy, 1845), Library of Congress Photoduplication Service, p. 374.

spite of differences in dogma.⁹²

The relation of religion and politics to education is described by Lyell in the following excerpt:

The Roman Catholic bishops and priests command a vast number of votes at the election in New York, yet they failed, in 1842, to get into their exclusive control that part of the public school money which might fairly be considered as applicable to the teaching of children of their own denomination. Their efforts, however, though fortunately defeated, were attended by some beneficial results. It is obviously the duty of every government which establishes a national system of secular education, to see that no books are used in the schools, containing sectarian views, or in which the peculiar opinions of any sect are treated with marked contempt.⁹³

The whole of American society did not oppose religion but many opposed sectarian religion in the schools. A number of factors mitigated against orthodox religious attitudes. First, those in favor of non-religious instruction appeared to be in a minority, but an extremely vocal minority. Second, the common school ideal of education available to all, regardless of creed, in conjunction with the opposition among various Christian groups to each other, weakened the case for incorporating sectarian religion in a national publically supported educational system.

The religious influence nevertheless remained

⁹²Lyell, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 247.

⁹³Ibid., pp. 246-247.

strong and was reflected in the thinking of such leading educational reformers as H. Barnard. He argued that "Sunday schools, city missions, and evening classes" show most conclusively that "they will mitigate the ills and evils of the present, and land us in a purer and better generation."⁹⁴

Various types of Sunday or Sabbath Schools accommodated sectarian interests and attempted to compensate for "the lack of religious instruction in Common Schools."⁹⁵ Assisting this program were what Duncan calls "Sabbath ragged-schools," that hopefully planned economic and moral reform of society's outcasts.⁹⁶

The ideal to establish secondary and higher centers of learning, for example, academies, colleges and universities, was expressed by Jefferson in his national education plan.

At the discharge of the pupils from the elementary schools, . . . those destined for labor will engage in the business of agriculture, or enter into apprenticeships to such handicraft art as may be

⁹⁴H. Barnard, "Regularity of School Attendance," Report on . . . Schools of Rhode Island, (1845), pp. 35-50, cited in Brubacher, op. cit., p. 275.

⁹⁵Duncan, op. cit., p. 49.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 58.

their choice; their companions, destined to the pursuits of science, will proceed to the college, which will consist of 1st, of General Schools; and 2nd, of Professional Schools.⁹⁷

Jefferson's aristocratic bias is apparent in the above quotation but he examines, and later elaborates his proposals for secondary education.

Jacksonian America had a variety of secondary and higher institutions of learning. In her analysis of collegiate institutions, Duncan speaks of Princeton, Yale and Jefferson's University of Virginia. By 1835, she reports the existence of ninety-six colleges in the United States with a student population of 9,032.⁹⁸ Sectarian⁹⁹ and state operated colleges are evident by this time, although both institutions employ secular studies.

Teacher training was another area of higher education in early America. Barnard, a spokesman for "better education," advocated normal schools, in-service training and teacher institutes in order to improve teaching standards. His proposals were outlined in his Fifth

⁹⁷Honeywell, op. cit., p. 223.

⁹⁸Duncan, op. cit., p. 87.

⁹⁹Lewis, op. cit., p. 248.

Annual Report,¹⁰⁰ Seventh Annual Report¹⁰¹ and the Report on the Condition and Improvement of the Public Schools in Rhode Island.¹⁰²

Boutwell, as secretary of the board of education, also attempted to upgrade teaching standards. Boutwell each year provided for

. . . twelve teachers' institutes and each institute continued five days in session. A portion of each day was given to criticisms, during which time the teachers of the institute and the lecturers were freely criticised by cards sent to the chair without the names of critics.¹⁰³

Formal education was also conducted through the academies for "those whose prospects, ability, and leisure may induce them to desire to go further." The Free Academy was supported by "a self-imposed tax" and provided advanced classical, mathematical and scientific studies."¹⁰⁴

Its growth met the objections of H. Greeley who, according to Duncan, argued that it could not "be provided for and freely proffered to all."¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁰H. Barnard, "Normal Schools," Fifth Annual Report, (1850), 15-24, cited in Brubacher, op. cit., p. 174.

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 192.

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 188.

¹⁰³Boutwell, op. cit., p. 258.

¹⁰⁴Duncan, op. cit., p. 31.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 33.

H. Barnard, in his Second Annual Report stated that academies, whether incorporated or not, or devoted to male or female education, could provide "special instruction of the higher occupations of the useful arts, at the same time that they might help to educate teachers for the common schools, and prepare students thoroughly for college."¹⁰⁶ He reports that New York in 1840 had 117 academies financially assisted indirectly by state funds and supervised by state officials.

Education for patriotism was formally conducted in military academies. An example of such an academy was West Point whose growth was hindered to some extent by "the democrats" who suggested it savours "too much of monarchy."¹⁰⁷ The academy's function is discussed by Wright.

These youths, natives of different states gathered from the north, south, east, and west of this vast confederacy, and here trained together for the defense of the great whole under the fostering and liberal care of the government of that whole, necessarily forget all those paltry jealousies and selfish interests which once went nigh to split these republics and to break down the last and

¹⁰⁶H. Barnard, Second Annual Report, (1840), 45-50, cited in Brubacher, op. cit., p. 111.

¹⁰⁷F. Marryat, Diary in America, (ed.) J. Ranger (London: Nicholas Vane, 1960), p. 70. Italics in original.

noblest bullwork of freedom erected on this earth.¹⁰⁸
 This devotion to ideals of liberty and country were implemented through military and liberal arts and science studies.¹⁰⁹

Programs of study and their method of implementation in the classroom situation indicated two specific influences. The first was that of the Enlightenment and the ideals of Pestalozzi and Rousseau who affected not only the teacher's view of the child, but the techniques of teaching and the subject-matter of curriculum. In the Miscellaneous Journal of 1819, the respect for European learning is reflected in the following observation:

I have no hesitation in saying, that the people of America must do as other nations have done, . . . when they hold out inducements to able professors from their more learned neighbours to come and reside among them.¹¹⁰

Pestalozzian innovations¹¹¹ in arithmetic instituted by W. Colburn, for example, and combined with French innovations

¹⁰⁸F. Wright, Views of Society and Manners in America, (ed.) P. Baker (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, 1963), p. 80. Italics in original.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., p. 80.

¹¹⁰"School Education," North American Review and Miscellaneous Journal, IX (June, 1919), 189.

¹¹¹"An Arithmetic on the Plan of Pestalozzi by W. Colburn," North American Review, XIV (January, 1822), 381, 383.

in algebra,¹¹² greatly altered school programs. Many educators, including H. Mann, travelled to Europe in hopes of providing American education with valuable insights from Europe in the areas of school management and reading instruction. Reforms, however, were often slow in coming as they had to overcome the traditional ideals of education.¹¹³

A second influence upon curriculum was that demand for a utilitarian education, probably reflecting the Benthamite position. The faculty at Amherst College in 1829 made the following report:

If he is to engage in mechanical employments, let him be thoroughly taught the principles of his art, that he may become an intelligent workman, well versed in the laws of nature, If he is to be an agriculturist, let him . . . by a skillful application of the principles of science to triumph over the obstacles of nature . . . and . . . subdue the earth. If he is to be a merchant, let him become acquainted with the language of foreign nations,¹¹⁴

In 1826, a demand for practical popular education was

¹¹²"Course of Mathematics by A. Lacroix and S. Legendre," North American Review, XIII (Oct., 1821), 365.

¹¹³"Mr. Mann and the Teachers of the Boston Schools," North American Review, LX (Jan., 1845), 234.

¹¹⁴"The Substance of Two Reports of the Faculty of Amherst College to the Board of Trustees with the Doings of the Board Thereon," North American Review, XXVIII (April, 1829), 301-302.

heard, for "if education is more intelligible, and more interesting, one may presume it will be more practical, . . . it will be directed to purposes of more obvious and real utility."¹¹⁵ This emphasis on the practical mirrored the growth of the American economy which was expanding by the 1830's.

However, by 1849 certain quarters were advocating a return to a liberal education, as it is necessary "to send forth scholars, in the technical sense of the word,-- not mere practical chemists, or tolerable engineers, or scientific mechanics."¹¹⁶

Interestingly, the emphasis upon a utilitarian education coincided in part with the time when faculty psychology was in vogue, although by 1851, Harper's Magazine levels criticism at its principles.¹¹⁷

Lyceums and popular lectures accompanied the development of public schools. Martineau¹¹⁸ notes that

¹¹⁵H. Brougham, "Practical Observations upon the Education of the People," North American Review, XXIII (July, 1826), 61.

¹¹⁶S. Eliot, "A Sketch of the History of Harvard College, and of Its Present State," North American Review, LXVIII (Jan., 1849), 116. Italics in original.

¹¹⁷"Editor's Table," Harper's New Monthly Magazine, III (June-November, 1851), 703-704.

¹¹⁸Martineau, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 344.

the popularity of the lectures stimulated study in many areas of literature and science. Lecture series were adopted to most levels and interests in society including that of the labouring classes, thereby providing "descriptions of nature . . . travels and . . . poetry, as well as graver works."¹¹⁹

Lyceums were represented at civic, municipal, state and national levels. At various times, for example, Dexter indicates that the national lyceum:

1. Formed a museum of natural history supported by local contributions;
2. Encouraged a system of exchanges among local museums, particularly in the area of natural history;
3. Promoted cooperation between schools and encouraged the adoption of the social sciences to the curriculum;
4. Advocated the study of American history and constitutional law;
5. Introduced new lecture techniques;

¹¹⁹ Lyell, op. cit., Vol.I, p. 196.

6. Suggested a uniform procedure for keeping meteorological data;
7. Encouraged beautification of village scenery;
8. Introduced travelling libraries and the use of text-books in schools.¹²⁰

It appears that the range of interests expressed by the lyceums reflected most phases of American life, and through their democratization of knowledge, lessened the gap between the average people and the classes whose means and position provided quicker access to the use of such knowledge.

Fundamental to much of the education of Jacksonian America was the apprenticeship system with its related associations and learned societies. The apparent emphasis upon individual initiative and the value of practical studies assisted the development of the system. Until the 1850's, higher education was the exception rather than the rule with elementary schooling often being the limit of formal training. Chevalier remarked that when an American wishes to learn a trade,

¹²⁰ G. Dexter, A History of Education in the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1941), p. 570.

. . . he goes into the workshop, the counting-house, the manufactory, as an apprentice. By seeing others act, he learns how to act himself; he becomes an artisan, a manufacturer, a merchant; all the facilities of his firm and watchful mind, all the energies of his ambitious spirit are centered in his worksop or warehouse.¹²¹

Although the common school ideal gained much support from 1830 to 1850, the evidence suggests that the education for a livelihood was a form of apprenticeship education in which the learning of specific skills was supplemented by instruction in temperance, virtue and a "sense of moral and social obligation."¹²² Apprenticeship was often an informal learning situation sealed by a formal agreement or contract between a master craftsman and an apprentice. The system, popular in the less wealthy classes, provided a means for the children to learn a trade, thereby maintaining a steady flow of skilled workers into an expanding commercial and urban society.

Female factory education¹²³ was not uncommon, for as Calhoun indicates, "before 1837, women were employed in over a hundred different industrial occupations," although

¹²¹Chevalier, op. cit., p. 347.

¹²²Ibid., pp. 140-141.

¹²³Although women of the household were subordinated to the men in America, their elementary education was equal if often not superior to that of the male. Lyell, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 190.

"prior to 1850 there was no field for educated women; and there were practically no opportunities for training."¹²⁴

Numerous learned societies and associations, which could be traced to the ideals of B. Franklin, catered to the interests of various groups. Prior to the close of the eighteenth century many groups were concerned with either "general scientific problems, or . . . historical discussions."¹²⁵ These efforts were in many ways parallel to those noted by R. Welter who suggests that "the early 'unions' strove to establish mechanics' institutes and reading rooms and libraries where aspiring young men might both broaden their intellectual horizons and improve their command of the crafts."¹²⁶ By 1849, E. Knight counted the formation of at least fifty-eight societies and associations.

Other informal educational agencies were libraries, newspapers and periodicals. Numerous groups concerned with the diffusion and promotion of knowledge frequently assisted in the formation of libraries. Public libraries, in the sense of a collection of books purchased and maintained by public taxation for the free use of the

¹²⁴Calhoun, op. cit., p. 182.

¹²⁵Dexter, op. cit., p. 551.

¹²⁶Welter, op. cit., p. 49.

people, were a development of the last half of the nineteenth century.¹²⁷ As far back as 1779, however, Jefferson, in his plan to improve the educational standards of the nation, proposed a bill to establish public libraries. Apart from libraries associated with various institutes and academies, little evidence as to the development of these centers has been found. In his trip of 1827-1828 to the United States, Hall indicates his awareness of only a few libraries.¹²⁸

H. Barnard, reviewing the course of popular education, maintained that libraries "aim to supply the defects of early elementary education, and to carry forward that education far beyond the point where the common school of necessity leaves it."¹²⁹ He elaborates on their importance for creating a more intelligent public opinion. By 1850, there is a renewed demand for a national library "to which we can direct such of our own scholars as are desirous of availing themselves of the highest and

¹²⁷Dexter, op. cit., p. 481.

¹²⁸Honeywell, op. cit., p. 210; and B. Hall, Travels in North America (Vol. II; Graz, Austria: Akademisch Druck, 1964-65, reprint of 1829 Edinburge, ed.), p. 357.

¹²⁹H. Barnard, Fourth Annual Report, (1842), 31-39, cited in Brubacher, op. cit., p. 36.

fullest authorities in their investigation and studies."¹³⁰

Of much greater consequence upon the educational scene were the influences of newspapers and periodicals. However, it is difficult to determine their precise effect. Nevertheless, they reflected and affected the public opinion of the time. In his Democracy and America Tocqueville observes the following:

. . . I should attribute the increasing influence of the daily press to causes more general than those by which it is commonly explained. A newspaper can only subsist on the condition of publishing sentiments or principles common to a large number of men. A newspaper, . . . always represents an association which is composed of its habitual readers.¹³¹

The newspaper not only served partisan interests but acted as a safety valve in maintaining the democratic ideal, "for they no more regard all the noise and sputter that it occasions than the roaring of the vapour on board their steamboats."¹³²

The popularization of knowledge was also encouraged by the periodical press. In 1815, for example, there is the birth of the North American Review, which was

¹³⁰"Public Libraries," North American Review, LXXI (July, 1850), 220.

¹³¹Ideology and Power, p. 284, citing Tocqueville, Democracy in America, II, 129-39, unabridged.

¹³²Wright, op. cit., p. 209.

originally published in Boston as a quarterly, but later published from New York as a monthly. It ranked first among American periodicals as a magazine reflecting most phases of American culture.¹³³ A second periodical, Harper's Magazine, was established at the close of the Jacksonian Era and served its purpose as an educational force. Its editors outlined the following objectives:

It was projected and commenced in the belief, that it might be made the means of bringing within the reach of the great mass of the American people, an immense amount of useful and entertaining reading matter, to which, on account of the great number and expense of the books and periodicals in which it originally appears, they have hitherto had no access.

.

They will seek, in every article to combine entertainment with instruction, and to enforce . . . the best and most important lessons of morality and practical life.¹³⁴

In considering the intellectual educational history of the Jacksonian Period, a number of factors have come to light. The young nation was shaped in part by the ideals of both the European and American traditions. In The Course of American Democratic Thought, Gabriel

¹³³F. Mott, American Journalism (New York: Macmillan, 1962), p. 207.

¹³⁴"Advertisement," Harper's New Monthly Magazine, I (June-November, 1850).

presents three fundamental principles that directed the course of young America: the dignity of the human personality, the belief in the principle of universal validity underlying the common life of men in society, and the nation's devotion to the cause of freedom and humane living.¹³⁵ Although one may adopt these tenets as guidelines to the exploration of an intellectual history of the period, attention must be reserved for the forces, often equally as powerful, that worked to their opposition in practice. The road to equality was not smooth, and possibly it is the historian's "enclosed view" that tends to make its development appear inevitable. The religious question in the schools, for example, was eventually settled in favour of the "secularists," but in view of the events and ideas of the period the tide might have turned in the other direction. If the historian dares to generalize the tendency of the times as being one of equality, he must also give careful consideration to the meaning of the word as it was evident in life; for the total culture, ideas and practices interacted in the historical process that molded the development of the Age of the Common Man.

¹³⁵R. Gabriel, The Course of American Democratic Thought (second edition; New York: Ronald Press, 1956), pp. vi, vii.

CHAPTER VIII

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ILLUSTRATIVE HISTORY

The preceding study has raised a number of questions concerning the application of philosophical and methodological perspectives. It appears that these issues can best be clarified by an analysis that considers the nature of history and the problem of historical interpretation within the framework of the intellectual educational history of the young American Republic.

A fundamental assumption employed in the study was that the historian must constantly strive to improve, by any means available, his understanding of the past. This was in keeping with the belief that

. . . there is not a single sentence among what we today should look upon as adequate transmitters of our most important, surest and most indisputably significant assertions, which may not at another stage of our insight become an object for ridicule and painful shame.¹

Throughout the study, history was assumed to be the inquiry into the past as it was concerned with human events. This conception, of course, included a discussion of the political, economic, geographic, social, and

¹H. Tennessen, "The Serio-Comic Encounter of Clinical Psychology and Existential Philosophy," (abbreviated version of a paper read before the International Psychology Congress at Banff, April, 1965), pp. 40-41.

religious factors that affected the pattern of development during the period from 1820 to 1850. In adopting this particular view towards the past, the writer realized that he was exercising a value judgement as to what history should be by excluding, for example, the idea of a history of natural phenomena as integral to the study.

In the process of delimiting the province of history, it was found desirable to view the historiography of the American period in the light of a three-fold classification:²

1. Historiography in the first sense included the description and interpretation of the educational history. This accounted for the recognition that the period from 1820 to 1850 was a period with many problems inviting investigation, but which in this study were related to issues of education. The material was carefully selected to present as unbiased a viewpoint as was possible, keeping in mind, however, that certain value judgements were probably inevitable.

²Social Science Research Council, Theory and Practice in Historical Study: A Report of the Committee on Historiography, Bulletin 54 (New York: 1946), 133.

2. Historiography in the second sense included the results of the description and interpretation of that period, and in this manner was the completed study itself. The investigation which was in part based on primary sources has now become secondary historical literature.

3. Historiography in the third sense was a critique of the written history. This was accomplished in the thesis both directly and indirectly. Directly, it was conducted by examining and comparing, for example, A. Calhoun's A Social History of the American Family³ with F. Scott's edition of Baron Klinkowstrom's America, 1818-1820⁴ in the description of family life and its educative influence, and A. de Tocqueville's⁵ and

³A. Calhoun, A Social History of the American Family (Vol. II; New York: Barnes and Noble, 1945).

⁴F. Scott, (ed.), Baron Klinkowstrom's America 1818-1820 (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1952).

⁵A. de Tocqueville, Journey to America, (ed.) J. Mayer, trans. G. Lawrence (London: Faber and Faber, 1959).

D. Webster's⁶ viewpoints on American economic industrial expansion. Indirectly, it was accomplished by considering the relevance of secondary source materials as they compared with primary sources and other secondary sources. For example, C. Fish's Rise of the Common Man⁷ was viewed in the light of what was stated in F. Flugel's and H. Faulkner's Readings in the Economic and Social History of the United States⁸ and the Editorial in The Mechanics' Free Press of July 8, 1829.⁹

Historical method was thus inherent in historiography. It was a sound historical method that provided the basis for accurate, credible historical writing. The essentials of the historical method included:

⁶D. Webster, The Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster, Vol. XII, (national edition; Boston: 1903), pp. 666-667, cited in E. Rozwenc (ed.), Ideology and Power in the Age of Jackson (New York: New York University Press, 1904).

⁷C. Fish, The Rise of the Common Man (Vol. VI of A History of American Life. eds. A. Schlesinger and D. Fox; New York: Macmillan Co., 1929).

⁸F. Flugel and H. Faulkner, Readings in the Economic and Social History of the United States (New York: Harper and Bros., 1929).

⁹Editorial in The Mechanics' Free Press, July 8, 1829.

1. A gathering of the relevant evidence and the exclusion of unauthenticated materials.¹⁰
2. The organization of the evidence into a meaningful study.¹¹

The writer in presenting a cultural-intellectual approach to the past provided materials that reflected a cross-section of American life. Included were the following types of primary and secondary sources:

1. Primary sources:

- i) diaries - G. S. Boutwell, Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs, (Vol. I; New York: McClure, Phillips and Co., 1902), E. Cawley (ed.), The American Diaries of Richard Cobden (Princeton: University Press, 1952), and B. Hall, Travels in North America (3 vols.; Graz, Austria: Akademisch Druck, 1964-65, reprint of 1829 Edinburgh ed.).
- ii) literary works - H. Longfellow, Complete

¹⁰L. Gottschalk, Understanding History (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1950), p. 28.

¹¹J. Barzun and H. Graff, The Modern Researcher (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1957), p. 134.

Works (revised ed.; Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1866); R. W. Emerson, The Early Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson (eds.) S. Whicher et al., (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1964); and D. Webster, The Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster, Vol. XII (national ed.; Boston: 1903), pp. 666-667, cited from E. Rozwenc, Ideology and Power (New York: New York University Press, 1964).

- iii) newspapers - The Philadelphia Times, The Mechanics' Free Press.
- iv) periodicals - North American Review, Harper's New Monthly Magazine, and The American Review.
- v) books and travel accounts - H. Martineau, Society in America (Vol. II; New York: Saunders and Ottey, 1837); G. Lewis, Impressions of America and the American Churches: From the Journal of the Rev. G. Lewis (Edinburgh: W. P. Kennedy, 1845, Library of Congress Photoduplication Service).
- vi) official documents - United States Bureau of the Census, Abstract of the Return of

the Fifth Census (Washington: Duff Green, 1832).

2. Secondary sources:

R. Nye, The Cultural Life of the New Nation (New York: Harper and Bros., 1960); J. Higham (ed.), The Reconstruction of American History (New York: Harper and Bros., 1962); and A. Schlesinger, The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1950).

The preceding sources and others were employed in the expectation of striking a balanced picture of life and education in America of 1820 to 1850. Newspapers and periodicals, especially the North American Review, were valuable in indicating the many attitudes adopted by various segments within the society. Sources were used questioningly with an awareness of their authenticity and general representativeness of opinion. Such judgements were exercised in the light of the authenticity of the internal and external evidence of the sources and in view of what historians such as A. Schlesinger,¹² M. Curti¹³ and

¹²A. Schlesinger, The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1950).

¹³M. Curti, The Growth of American Thought (second edition; New York: Macmillan, 1945).

R. Welter¹⁴ considered to be acceptable source materials.

Underlying the above issues was a philosophy of history in the tradition of critical philosophy. Specifically there was no concern with a speculative philosophy that would imply that the course of educational events during the early years of the American Republic followed a set, determinate or inevitable pattern. No "hidden hands" were considered to be operative in the period under study. The writer concentrated upon an analysis of various views concerning the cultural growth of the time and devoted a considerable amount of the discussion to criticism and evaluation. Neither Hempelian nor idealistic frames of reference were exclusively employed in the presentation of data. All perspectives were considered valuable if they assisted in the understanding of what had occurred. In the tradition of H. E. Barnes,

The historian of the new type does not try to substitute any magic basis of unity, organization or exclusion for the older political fetish, but confines his efforts to constructing as intelligible and complete a picture of the entire past as his sources of information will allow and to emphasizing the dominant features of every epoch.¹⁵

¹⁴R. Welter, Popular Education and Democratic Thought in America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962).

¹⁵H. E. Barnes, The New History and the Social Studies (New York: The Century Co., 1925), p. 17.

The development of the historical perspective did not emphasize the autonomy or uniqueness of history. History was assumed to be a discipline insofar that it involved "a branch of knowledge involving research."¹⁶ The knowledge with which it was concerned was that period of educational development in the United States of 1820 to 1850. This knowledge was not independent of the influence of other techniques. For example, the sociological structural-functional technique was in part used to organize and determine the various educative structures such as family, church and press.

Similarly, although the thirty years under investigation occurred but once, and although the happenings of church-family-state forces acting within that period never could recur again in that exact manner, the very attempt to classify data and formulate concepts such as "government" indicated the generality as well as particularity of the events.

Although the intellectual perspective tended to remove history from the "blood and thunder" of the particular event of thought and action to a more abstract level of comprehension, the writer attempted to account for the

¹⁶ Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (Toronto: Thomas Allen Ltd., 1961), p. 236.

thought as well as the action side of events, for example, in citing W. Holland's appraisal of Jackson's personal effect upon the political opinion of the working class American.¹⁷

In addition, such statements were made with an understanding that history included the analysis of value judgements made by the individuals and groups of the period under study, as well as by the historian who was evaluating that period. In the first instance, the ideal of equality as being a worthy goal for American society was expressed by both working groups¹⁸ and the European traveller.¹⁹ This ideal thus affected much of the course of a democratic, compulsory formal education system and thereby reinforced certain values of the time.²⁰ In the second instance, the writer was aware of his own value orientation which leaned in favor of public compulsory formal education and

¹⁷ Rozwenc, op. cit., p. 254, citing W. Holland, The Life and Political Opinions of Martin Van Buren (Hartford, Connecticut: 1835), pp. 357-360, abridged.

¹⁸ Welter, op. cit., p. 46.

¹⁹ M. Chevalier, Society, Manners and Politics in the United States: Being a Series of Letters on North America (Boston: Weeks, Jordan and Co., 1839), pp. 174-175.

²⁰ Q. Gibson, The Logic of Social Enquiry (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960), p. 64.

also such informal agencies as libraries and newspapers as being vital to the educational process. The explicit expression of the writer's preferences were omitted from the study. However, the writer, being aware of his preferences took into account those forces that opposed as well as assisted the development of public compulsory education.²¹

The above arguments underline the fact that the writer was selective, and that this selection among other factors revealed his own interests.²² The writer's interest in educational history of the United States during the colorful Jacksonian Period provided one reason for exploring an intellectual educational history. The history was also affected by its delimitation in time span that was both manageable and convenient, in view of the abundance of primary source material. The thirty year period served this purpose. It was found that there was reliable primary source material that would adequately sustain an in-depth investigation, and secondly, that this material would be most meaningful if applied to the Jacksonian Era,

²¹E. Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), pp. 486-488.

²²A. O. Lovejoy, "Present Standpoints and Past History," The Philosophy of History in Our Time, (ed.) H. Meyerhoff (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1959), pp. 174-175.

an era that was in many ways a complete unit in itself.

In concentrating upon the education of the Jacksonian Period, the writer has selected a particular set of happenings from the context of an ideal universal history. The selection of a segment of the past necessitated the selection of facts, and the danger of selection was that it could overemphasize factors that at the actual time were relatively unimportant. The writer, however, attempted to overcome this by adopting recognized historical investigative techniques in his study. The effect of misrepresenting the period by extracting it from context has been minimized, it is hoped, by having discussed early American colonial and late eighteenth century European influences. Emphasis was placed on the period from 1820 to 1845, employing developments immediately preceding and following those dates as points of introduction and conclusion.

Interpretation of the facts was carried out within the framework of intellectual history, using, where possible, the techniques and knowledge derived from related fields of interests such as sociology.²³ This in turn

²³H. Faulkner, American Economic History (eighth edition; New York: Harper and Bros., 1960), p. 286; and Flugel and Faulkner, op. cit., pp. 253-254.

assisted the uncovering of problems unique to the period under study but not necessarily relevant to the present. Specifically, the immediate importance of Romanticism and the Enlightenment to the formation of ideals during Jackson's presidency, the influence of European educational ideals upon the formal curriculum, and the aspiration of working men's associations to improve the formal and informal educational influences are exemplary.

In the study it was assumed that the historian, as far as is possible, should be aware of the potential value of other disciplines in organizing and clarifying various aspects of his research. This does not imply that he must employ all related fields of interest in presenting his history. It only suggests that he employ, directly and/or indirectly, where feasible, the insights of those fields if they are suitable to his purpose.

Questions of theory, description and explanation were vital to the investigation. The approach of intellectual history, because of its tendency to abstraction and its suggestion of higher levels of interpretation, is in some ways removed from concrete individual descriptive events. Nevertheless, description played a vital role.²⁴

²⁴Nagel, op. cit., p. 26.

Throughout the study, and particularly in the cultural overview, the presentation of the political, economic and social forces placed a groundwork for the explanation of the intellectual forces acting within the context of formal and informal education. For example, the description of the social functions of the male and female indicated the role, and hence the importance of the family as a part of the social system.²⁵ It was through this technique that the writer proceeded to develop an intellectual history.

One might apply the viewpoint suggested in Bulletin 64, The Social Sciences in Historical Study,²⁶ in viewing the theory development of the educational history of 1820-1850. First, there was a body of empirical material. This included the periodicals, newspapers and diaries that served as the raw material to which the writer applied a framework.²⁷ The informal and formal educational forces were then selected, in part, on the basis of the effect these agencies had upon the overall societal system. The perspective of intellectual history,

²⁵R. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1949), p. 60.

²⁶A Report of the Committee on Historiography, The Social Sciences in Historical Study (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1954), Bulletin 64, p. 30.

²⁷Barzun, loc. cit.

the relationship of ideas to events and vice-versa, was then adapted in the light of the educational factors operative within the culture. The fundamental description, which enabled the writer to organize the main types of formal and informal education, assisted in framing the hypotheses that in turn guided the development of the study.

The question raised is whether or not explanations of the Hempelian or idealist type were employed. The writer did not intentionally set out to provide one or the other specific kind of explanation. Nevertheless, certain explanations can be seen to follow one or the other pattern. The material relating to the impact of the depression of 1837 to 1843, for example, could be viewed in the light of a Hempelian explanation sketch.²⁸

Similarly, Holland's The Life and Political Opinions of Martin Van Buren,²⁹ in which Van Buren evaluates "why" Jackson was popular with the masses, is adaptable to an

²⁸S. Rezneck, "The Social History of an American Depression, 1837-1843," American Historical Review, XL (July, 1935), passim 662-687; and C. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History," Theories of History (ed.) P. Gardiner (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959), p. 351.

²⁹Rozwenc, op. cit., p. 254, citing W. Holland, The Life and Political Opinions of Martin Van Buren (Hartford, Connecticut: 1835), pp. 357-360, abridged.

idealist explanation.³⁰ The writer was not directly concerned with presenting either a purely positivistic or idealistic explanation of educational events. If the explanation was found useful in gaining some understanding of the facts, then the explanation was considered to have served its purpose.

In regard to Van Buren's written assessment of President Jackson, it is evident that Van Buren was placing himself in the "shoes" of Jackson in order to explain to his reader reasons for Jackson's popularity with the "common man."³¹ In a sense, Van Buren was employing a Verstehen³² technique in attributing "sagacity" to the President's qualities. Indeed, it may be argued that the operation of Verstehen in this instance provided but a starting point from which to frame hypotheses of human behaviour that would account for Jackson's popularity. This may well be so, but again the Hempelian must provide, at least, "universal hypotheses" that could fit an

³⁰Ibid.; and W. Dray, Laws and Explanation in History (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 119.

³¹Rozwenc, op. cit., p. 254.

³²E. Nagel, "On the Method of Verstehen as the Sole Method of Philosophy," Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A Reader, M. Natanson (ed.) (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 264.

"explanation sketch," which in turn would require filling out. This is possible, and Van Buren's Verstehen technique might well be within the context of such laws. In this case, the application of Verstehen might function as a generator of an explicit or implicit hypothesis which might be tested in the light of the evidence by the historian who is concerned with providing a rigorous positivistic explanation. As indicated, however, the writer considers it significant to be aware of the benefits and potentialities of both positivistic and idealistic procedures if they assist in explaining and understanding Jackson's behaviour.

Basic to the explanation of events are those problems of selecting, describing and categorizing developments into manageable proportions, the ground work of which would provide a referent point for the introduction of an intellectual perspective upon the formal and informal educational activities. In the study, this was in part accomplished with the assistance of structural-functionalism.³³

Educational history, from the cultural intellectual viewpoint, tended to deal with long-range changes at

³³T. Parsons, The Social System (Illinois: The Free Press, 1949).

a higher level of abstraction than either political or economic history. Within this context, the writer generally adapted an overall view of the tendencies and potentials of the culture, and the degree to which the potentials were in part realized. For example, the forces of Romanticism and the Enlightenment had major effects upon the culture of young America, and these in turn, joined to a pragmatic, utilitarian way of life resulted in an emphasis upon a practical education.³⁴ Similarly, the egalitarian ideal, in part encouraged by the beliefs of Revolutionary France, lent impetus to the forces acting on behalf of compulsory, free, and equal educational opportunity. The need for more generalized concepts, and their accompanying weakness, was more necessary in this study than in studies concentrating exclusively upon concrete events.³⁵ This does not imply that the facts were less concrete than, for example, in political history, but that they were selected with a different purpose in

³⁴R. Nye, The Cultural Life of the New Nation (New York: Harper and Bros., 1960), p. 4; and M. Curti, The Growth of American Thought (second edition; New York: Harper and Bros., 1951), pp. 121, 176.

³⁵Merton, op. cit., passim; and G. Homans, "Bringing Men Back In," American Sociological Review, 29 (Dec., 1964), 809-810. Employing Merton's "protocol," the writer has attempted to supplement the description with an explanation as suggested by Homans.

view.

The analysis of the cultural forces was indeed complex, for man is often unaware of the effect of these forces upon his tradition. For this reason, it was useful to obtain the descriptions and viewpoints of Tocqueville,³⁶ Duncan,³⁷ Lyell³⁸ and others who were visitors to the United States and not imbued to the same extent as the native Americans with American beliefs and ideals.

Through analysis, the writer was able to separate, for example, various facets of the culture and thereby gain a better understanding of the family, school, church, apprenticeship and press as they interacted with each other in shaping the educational pattern.³⁹ These parts were viewed as interconnected structures with a recognizable effect upon the cultural development of the period.

The carriers of the culture are men, groups and individuals. The writer, for example, not only recognized

³⁶Tocqueville, op. cit.

³⁷L. Duncan, America As I Found It (London's James Nisbet and Co., 1852).

³⁸C. Lyell, A Second Visit to the United States (Vol. I; London: John Murray, 1849).

³⁹Merton, op. cit., p. 60. The "protocol" was valuable in assisting the categorization of the social system.

the effect of either H. Mann⁴⁰ or the local minister upon the educational scene,⁴¹ but also pointed to the relevance of mechanic's institutes and political organizations.⁴²

Not to be excluded were the effect of British and American invention upon the industrial society, and subsequently their effect upon a change in cultural ideals.⁴³ The economic expansion not only accelerated the pace at which ideas became effective within the system, but also reinforced, for example, trends towards utility in formal education, thus minimizing the relevance of the traditional classical education upon the society. The introduction of new viewpoints such as those of popular workingmen's associations in turn affected the development of educational agencies.

Research into the intellectual history of the period thus indicated cultural change, which embodied

⁴⁰G. S. Boutwell, Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs (Vol. I; New York: McClure, Phillips, and Co., 1902), p. 256.

⁴¹Lyell, op. cit., pp. 246-247.

⁴²R. Honeywell, The Educational Work of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Russell and Russell Inc., 1964), p. 223.

⁴³"Influence of the Trading Spirit Upon the Social and Moral Life of America," The American Review: A Whig Journal of Politics, Literature, Art and Science, I (Jan., 1845), p. 95.

dysfunctional as well as functional forces.⁴⁴ New educational patterns emerged, and often as in the case of Jackson's ascendancy, the intellectual traditions operative in the social system assisted this change. Jacksonian Democracy ushered in the era of the "common man," and the traditional ideals of the early colonial society gave way in part to the ideals of equality and utility. The problems of the society interacting with the intellectual movements hastened a loss of equilibrium and new developments.⁴⁵

The method of explanation used in the intellectual approach to educational history is vital to the understanding of what has occurred.

The problem is essentially that of deciding on what level of abstraction one wishes to provide an explanation. The historian's primary data consists of testimony about particular events and particular facts, and he is traditionally interested in the concrete and the individual. Certain types of questions cannot be answered on this level. How far we choose to go in abstracting from these particular phenomena and in developing generalized concepts and hypotheses depends entirely on the nature of the problems we set ourselves. At one extreme the historian may work on the highly abstract level of general cultural change; on the other, on the level of the particular and unique. The more general the problem, the more abstract, in most cases, must be his concepts and hypotheses.⁴⁶

⁴⁴Merton, op. cit., p. 51.

⁴⁵Parsons, op. cit., pp. 491-492.

⁴⁶Bulletin 64; op. cit., p. 101.

In the study, however, the writer attempted to illustrate how explanations which were given at a lower level of analysis were interrelated with those at a higher level.⁴⁷ In employing this approach, a number of factors have been considered.

First, the intellectual history of American education from 1820 to 1850 was interpreted within the cultural framework. The writer prefaced the educational developments with an overview of the political, economic, religious, and social conditions that prevailed during the Jacksonian Period. In presenting the overview, the writer provided a picture of the general course of events and observed the emergence of various attitudes and ideals that were operative at the time.

Second, educational ideas are the product of man's efforts. The ideals of such popular educators as H. Barnard and Pestalozzi affected America beliefs and values. The significance of religious groups and their values were also considered, often in relation to the

⁴⁷"School Education," North American Review and Miscellaneous Journal, IX (June, 1919), 189; and "Course of Mathematics by A. Lacroix and S. Legendre," North American Review, XIII (Oct., 1821), 365. These sources indicate within the context of the study the relationship of explanations on the levels of the specific and the general.

opposition forces which, though a minority, were extremely vocal.

Third, the ideas of education were traced within the period under study and their consequences observed within society. The demand for equal elementary educational opportunity was affected by the general desire for equality in the social system expressed by many Americans. As indicated above, ideas often clashed and thus modified cultural and educational changes. The effect of these changes upon formal classroom curriculum and informal periodical press reading matter, for example, were noted. It might also be observed that the economic expansion affected the structure and the relationships within the family. The ideal of utility and personal success was reflected in daily informal family situations which were of an educative function.

Fourth, all ideals did not necessarily culminate in practice, as for instance, the attempt to extend equal educational opportunity beyond the elementary level. This attempt, nevertheless, was studied, and its value in affecting elementary schooling was noted. In some quarters, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the ideal of practical, utilitarian education was coming under scrutiny and discussion, although there appeared to be no immediate effect upon educational practice.

Fifth, continuing as well as recurrent ideas were found in the education of the period. Whereas equality was an ideal that tended to continue throughout the period, the ideal of a classical education constantly recurred in contradistinction to the practical education.

Thus, the writer attempted to relate the process of the formal and informal communication of ideas across the generations within the context of culture, employing an intellectual history point of view. In essence, many viewpoints were effected, and selection was required in all phases of the historical study. The assumption that man's researches must continuously allow for inquiry, analysis, synthesis and evaluation was fundamental. The writer presented a perspective, a perspective which was but one among many.

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